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G(lreth Matthew~Jeaches
philosophy at the _ University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.

T. HINKil~G

IN·
STORlES-.
By G~reth. Matth~ws·: · ·

Ozma of Oz,

L. Frank Baum

verybody knows that soiTle children's stories are
adventure stories: .but not everybody realizes that
sometimes the adventure is intellectual. A story of
intellectual adventure is a thought experiment (Gedank·
enexperlment), or perhaps a series of thought experi·
ments, .that explores problematic ideas, such as the no·
tions of life, nature, consciousness, mooda.nd tempera·
ment.
Frank Baum's Ozma of Oz (mercifully still in print!) is a
splendid tale of intellectual adventure. Here are some of
_.
.· .
its thought experiments. .
First, there is ·the idea qfatree thatb~e1rslunch box~s
and napkins as "fruit~" (p. 27) Each of·these boxes con~
tai_ns a ham sandwich, apiece of sponge cake, a pickle, a
slice of new cheese and an apple; and each box is marked
with the word 'lunch' on its side. ·Could a lunch box really
be a product ofnature? If not, why not'? Could a mark that
appeared . naturally on .a :.fruit and that.was isomorphic
with the English word 'lunch' mean lunch? If so, under
what conditions?
Second, there is the idea of a peculiar race of beings
called "wheelers'' (p. 32ff) that resemble human beings,
but have wheels at the ends oftheir four limbs and move
· ·b · 11·
.·.h· · · ·. . ·h· I .· Th · h. _:. · l · . f .
.· : · .··
about yro . mg on t ose w ee.s. e. w ·. ee_ is, .o . cour~e,
one of the simplest of human mventaons; but 1t 1s an m·
vention - it does not copy nature. Could a wheel be a
product of nature? Or is .a wheel necessarily (in·some ap·
propriate sense of 'necessarily') an artif~ct? . .
·. . .
Third, . there is the ~~~a ·()fa mechanical .man .(call~d
"Tiktok'') who i$ said to think, to speak~ to act and to dO
"everything but live." (p~ 43) Tiktok's instructions say

E

w)1ere to ins~rt.thekey towif1g ~phis 'think.;:::•\\fhere to in· .
sert it to windup his 'talk' a.nd"where to i.nser.tit to wind
up his action.Might a mechani<::al (or an eledronic!) man ·.
be capable of thought? Might one be capable of real
speech? At one point Tiktok admits thathe is only a
rmichine th(l~< 'pln·not feets9r~row or joy, D? ·m~Mer what• .
?ap;.pens. 0 (p.p!)Coulda. ~~.iJ1g . incapabi~ . 9f;.~m.otion be.'
nevertheless'¢apable of tho9ght?
.·.. .
.
Fourth, there is·the idea of a princess wit~ thirty alter;. ·
native heads - each, in its own peculiar way;·a model of .
be~uty. (p. 79ff}Each mornip~this prince~. ~,instead of
stl~cting a dW~~Jo wearfor~,~~t. day, selec~~\~.'· ~~.ad. With·>
ea<f:h head~ a#,th~ princess·· ~~~_ms to know~:<~hete goesa ·
characteristicrnood and ternperament. Coulcfone choo~e
one's mood orteinperamentfor the day? Whatis the con·
nection between, for example, having red hair;~ Clnd having
ci fiery disposition? Is it natural? <;:onvention~I? Or what?
_.·. .-.The thougljt·;·experirnents··.iri Ozma of -Q*:-'.a re philos• >i
ophically ·rich; so is some .oftfae reasoning<fiere, for ex- ·
ample, is an intriguing argument from continuity:
"Once," saidDorothy, "I knew a man made out of tin,
who was a woodman named Nick Chopper. f3:ut he Y/BS
alive as Vie ~re. 'cause he !(BS ~orn a reaLITl'-9:·~f'ld QOt
his tin bp~y.:fi little at a tl.IJl~ . ~ first a leg ·:~0..~ :' ~'1f3n · a
finger and then an ear _. fqr ~~e reason 1hatti.~ ;hactso
many accidents with his axe; ·and cut himself up in a
very careless manner." (p. 42) . ·
· .· · •

One could ·ba.s e a whole philosophy cours,~.<on Ozma of,
()i. .One can·: al§O read .it simply for fun .: o:::·i,,?lµdi11g, pf·:.

cdurse,
·.

philo~opl)ical

Chicago,

fun. ·.··< ,_
. . ·.· _ ._· _·. ..

R~m~ _ ,\\cNalJ)':'-

· ,:;-:: '-·::·--.· ·
'
Qar~tt),;~·s:M,atth¢w~ -~

J_
.9()7.•_
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In March, 1976, the "Philosophy for Children" program was undertaken as an experiment with 127 students of the fifth, sixth and
seventh grades of the Madre del Salvador school located in Santa
Ana, El Salvador. The program was coordinated by Anna Marie Hart·
man. a Maryknoll Sister working in that part of Santa Ana. But
before the children were exposed to any philosophy, the Salvadorean
teachers went through a two-week teacher training workshop. Ken·
neth Aman, a professor of philosophy at Montclair State College in
New Jersey, assisted in this workshop. The following descriptions of
the teacher-training workshop and the actual classroom experience
have been independently written by Dr. Aman and Sister Anna Marie.

Philosophy for Children in a
Spanish-Speaking Context
By Kenneth Aman
aking a program which had been worked out entirely
in a North American setting had numerous pitfalls,
some obvious, some not so obvious. Even the translators
of Harry had to be especially careful. The material they
were working with had two difficulties: it was philosophical
and it was intended for children. Inevitably, mistakes were
made in dealing with each of these subtleties. The danger
which loomed largest, though, was that of cultural imperialism, of attempting to bring yet another benefit from
North America.

T

Educational Setting
El Salvador's system is fairly typical of Latin America. Its
core consists of three cycles in the primary school, each
having three grades.
After primary school in Santa Ana, one may go on to the
Institute and receive his or her bachillerato. One can
begin teaching primary school with only the bachlllerato;
needless to say, many of the teachers are very young.

In the classroom, emphasis is on memorization. Frequently, students have no books at all. The teacher reads
or writes; the students memorize or repeat correct
Fortunately, most of the actual teaching of children was answers. Students are seated in rows of chairs which
t_o be done by Salvadoreans. And the teacher-training was won't move. They are often packed into small rooms, up
carried on only in Spanish, handled fluently by Anna to sixty-five at a time.
Maria. My role was the relatively simple one of organizing
The School Madre del Salvador was an ideal place to try
in some detail (first by myself, then with her) the specific
philosophy for children.
lessons and activities for each session.
The director and all the classroom teachers are now
We soon learned to structure the teacher training sessions
Salvadoreans. Teachers get about 220 colones a month
as much as possible like actual classroom situations. There
(about $88) from the government. The students come
was nothing wrong about talking about the program, but
the teachers themselves truly came to life when we began from the area around Madre, a barrio on the east side of
to do philosophy. So we developed a sequence something Santa Ana. Most of the people there are working c\ass,
like-this: exercises or activities, individual reading of Harry, not the poorest in Santa Ana, but not far from the
key ideas (claves), philosophical explanations and back- poorest, either. The school has fine morale, partly as a
ground. Teachers were exposed to philosophy qua philos- result of its asking, even demanding, participation on the
ophy when they had already twice encountered it in intro- part of parents. There is now a considerable waiting list of
ductory exercises (game-like or involving fantasy) and the children, whose parents can clearly see the advantages of
Madre over the average public school.
reading of particular stories.
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Meeting with the teachers in January was much like getting
together in the United States just before Labor Day. The
school year breaks in late October, and commences again
around February 1. (The reason: the need for children to
contribute to the crucial coffee harvest.) Yet, even the
teachers who were not themselves to teach philosophy to
the children, voluntarily attended all the training sessions.

Teachers' Responses
I have already mentioned that our first session was a des·
cription of philosophy for children. We began by pointing
out that philosophy is customarily associated with adults.
But this is because it is regarded as a system of abstractions, or is linked with great historical figures known to
write in a difficult if not impenetrable style. Philosophy
need not be experienced in this manner. At its heart is the
asking of "why" questions. Children are notorious for asking just this kind of question. They are also inclined to
take great pleasure in the manipulation of concepts and
logical forms when this manipulation is seen as play.

Salvadorean children and a few parents entering classrooms.

Attentive listening gave way to animation when we began
to explore the games and exercises designed for the children. In the first class this amounted to playing with sentences, to determine whether they were in fact reversible.
(For example: "All monkeys are animals" does not allow
us to say, "All animals are monkeys"). In a discussion on
the distinction between discovery and invention, they were
quick to note the difference between discovery of a place
or thing, and the discovery of an idea. Here perhaps their
awareness that this was a workship in philosophy came into
play; they were prepared for some critical thinking.
In our second session we combined the technique of brainstorming with the topic of superstition. Here was a theme
to which Salvadoreans. could relate with great enthusiasm. They were vague about cracks in the sidewalks (which
are relatively rare), but they could point to superstitions in
almost everything else (including placing a broomstick
behind the door to get rid of unwelcome guests). Yet as
teachers, they were of two minds about the superstitions
of students. They wished to be tolerant, but they also wanted to be scientific. A process in which students freely exhibited their superstitions and which allowed these even to
be accepted as a possible value, produced a vague uneasiness in temperaments disposed to fight any evasion of
objective reason.

Sister Anna presents philosophy to some of the Salvadorean
teachers In the teacher training program.

We attempted to translate some "voting" techniques of
Harry to activities familiar to the Salvadoreans: carrying
water, washing clothes, picking coffee, setting off firecrackers, simply walking (by far the commonest mode of
travel for the average Salvadorean). Besides giving the
opportunity for some vehement expressions of opinion,
this process also clearly established that Salvadoreans
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This Is one of thelllatifox-carts to be found In-this portion
of El Salvador.
·~ween

thinking :and understandirw. .·The teachers easily
accepted the -text's position ·that thinking was· for understanding. But _what is the
nature
.
. _ of understanding?
.
. The
teachers wanted to identify understan~mg with the
comprehens_
i_o_."
__ on. _to science. So they
. .
· - ·-.
-. o.f. cause.s. co. mm
w1~hed t? sa¥ that we comprender (~omprehend) only
·. J,tjJ~i.¥~1)1-t;le<ir toth~m~ . Jh~Y ~e~~f) ~~t~¢~~~g the.·•e>Cer~i~~~ _Jh1~g~; w1.thR~~~o~s, ~·~ . are ~bl~ t?ach1~ve .only t~e other
·::-•·m:
- <:. -:,a<
-.,.:mecuamca
,._.·.-..- .. .-. ·L.:-'····. : ~ · ·1· :manner-;-exac
". ·.·---;· .'·.-..-.>.·- ·..·.-..··.- ..... ···t·1.,:·yw
.. ·.n'· a".·.t·. :-w~
-...·.·.·-·-. .·.·a.·r-._
e-. :·'try
' ·1·n··.g"
. ·•.. ·.·.entender
<.acquamtancew
>:
. ·to·_. ··.8···v··.0··· 1· d-_ ~ . --type
.. · .·. .o.f.un.de_
·. ·.. · r.--st.
· a·. ·.ndang
·-._..:. ....
· ~ · . - .· .: ._- _._ · .··.
·. - ._ 1_t. h). But
: · _.-/ .,.~::·-,: : · .;< < : : _: ·. · -":: >-~ .. ·. · · ~ - · i ':.- < : ·· . · ·.. ·· - . _ ·. - can we not say that artists and authors perh(lps come
-- Or\:the other ~a~d~ _ th~1rrefle~t1ons on~ thou~hts an~ the closer to comprehension of humari nature than we? A
prqce~s o~ thmkmg ~ere at ~1mes ~rovocat1ve, at tames knotty question for the Salvado~eans, one which pro- amusmg, and al~ays mt~restmg. Asked to complete such voked a lengthy discussion -of current Latin American
.. se~t~nces as ''Mr ~h~u!Jllts sometimes:~eern to me like ../', authors. .
rep'r eserited somef~'ihg quitepleasa~t'f6rsoine~ .
·.--:. . ·- : · · · · ...-- · :
· . t · . · oth
·.· 1'ke
.··-..N
-- o::-t_:-...·-_every
exerc1se--wen
· sm 0 . ··1y..- . _·L
_ t. he.1· r E·n g.·1·ash
. .. ~
speaking counterparts, the teachers had difficulties
- .·. d-_ar
.·. - d'1zmg
·
. -t.ences
-.· .·. . .b egmnmg
· . · -.w1
- .-...·-.t·h "onl y. " .w._.
h-.a.-..t_-·
s·.t·..an
sen
loglclans wante,fto-. dcrwith these s~pt~nces was not in·

.tf1e::· s~Jvacle>re~11~ .:. r.~~~~g~ed 'Yitq : c:~r~.: ar1~ ·. irnagin~t.i_o~. < ... . • ..

9f':t?e

·: . ·. -:. . . > .·

.

.· ·.

.-:·:w~;~)~~rson:a .Hti~s.
te~.chers . w~~~\l'~vealed in .s?me~ ··Having instructo.rs .present . ~ho would · nof be teaching
. wb~t ·unexpected ways:. O?e. teacher· who had appeared- formal courses in philosophy proved to have unexpected
·_tough _and perhap$ a bat rigid offer~d that her ~houghts _advantages. They sometimes became the most excited by
wer:· hke carefully-cut crysta.I: precious, ?ut brt~tl~ _~nd the philosophical materials; as a result, they vowed to
eas~ly shattered. Another, quiet to the pomt of t1m1d1ty, .introduce some of these ideas into other courses, such as
sµgg~ste,d ·tha_t her·· thollgh.t s s~eme~like . sorbetes .~•. :· a . science. As for -Ana andthe other two teachers, they have
·: l.~5~1:, ~xp~e:~~i??f~~".i. ~~ : ~~~.~m c~?.~~\ ;:.:• _.· ·:._· · .·•.·· .·. ·'.:· ·. .· ...•. : -<. . . in:weekl>'.t1'le~tirig~5~mt~nu~dto.- work out their strat.egy·_
· ll'l. ourfast.sessiO(l~ · ~h~ ' atmospher~ ·to·~. k. on a thoughtful; for filosof1a~. Andth1s philosopher returned to the Umted
listening air whkh appears all too _frequently in phil- States, excited by new inner-cultural possibilities for his
osophical discussi9ns>The topic was·the relationship be- chosen field of study.

··.···: .. ··'.·
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By Sister Anna Maria Hartman

A~~hno~~~a~~~~ t~:!·~~··~f;~;:~~~~:~y i~:e~~:!~ ~~::~:.
ment, i.e., there were.>no strict control groups, no .prearranged •set period of time, no mutually agreed upon
standards of evaluation, - nevertheless, the testing of
some of the children prior to the course and again at its
culmination, allows some conclusions to be drawn.
This present evaluation is made from the results of the tests
as well as from personal observations made while working
with the students and with the Salvadorean teacher who
collaborated in the experiment.
I. The EducationatSituation Under Which the Program
was Administered.

Observations regarding the educational ·set-up where the
Program was tried will be of help to understanding the
effectiveness of thecciUrse, or the lack thereof.
Although labeled as ."parochial", the primary-junior-high
school in which the experiment was made, is in reality
more a public institutionthan a private one. The teachers
are appointed and paid by the government, and the curriculum and schedules are dictated by the Ministry of Education. Extra-curriculum subjects or activities must be fitted
into free periods or given in out-of-school hours. This
situation greatly curtailed the time allowed for teaching
the Program, especially after the school day was changed
in August to a single-session schedule, 7:30 to 11 :45 a.m .•
during .which the offizictl subjects were to be taught. ~U
other classes, such as<English, religious education, handcrafts and, of course, the Philosophy for Children Program, had to be given in non-official time. Some of the
children didn't return fOrthe "extras" in the afternoon hours.

Sister Anna poses outside .the Madre del Salvador School.

II. The Collaboration of School Personnel

Having obtained the permission of the principal to carry
out the experiment with the Philosophy for Children Program in the school, a preliminary workshop for · the
teachers was held under the direction of Dr. Kenneth Aman
of the Philosophy Department of Montclair State College.
The interest and enthusiastic response from the group was
most encouraging, a(l~ alLexpressed the great valuet~~Y
felt theProgram coulcl>offer to the children's all-around
' ·· ·
growth.
Originally, the course '\\'as to be given to the fifth, ~rld
sixth grades with the respective teachers (women) teaching
it, and myself working with ·them .and supervising the
. classes. The seventh •grc:ide was added ·to the experimental
group when the principal, eager to try her hand at the Program, offered to teach those students. The sudden appointment, however, of the fifth grade teacher to another school
threw the proverbial monkey-wrench into the works. The
shifts in personnel and the changes in schedules brought
the well-laid plans to naught. The sixth grade teacher con7
tinued to give the co1J~setoher own class, and I tookgn .
.both the fifth and the sev~J'lth grades. In a sense, this nec~s~
sary arrangement \V~~ld •. ~e an . obstacle to any· T~~l
evaluation since patt"t,9fthe experimentwas to hav~\.~he
Program handled by ni;l~J()nal teacherstmder supervision.

-.-

Four children eager to strike.up a cor1vel'saif~n on a street In
Santo Ana. (Median ageln .E_I Sillvad~r: l-4)~ .·
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An additional disadvantage insofar as personnel was concerned, was the limited time I could devote to the Program.
As I was already carrying a full-time work schedule in the
parish, the Philosophy for Children course, delightful and
beneficial as I found it, had to be· fitted into marginal time.

Reading skills were also greater as results demonstrated
by non-standardized comprehension-vocabulary tests.
Imaginative-creative skills similarly showed improvement,
as well as did situational judgment, but it would be difficult
to calculate the percentage of improvement.

A complete list of the tests administered is found at the
end
of this evaluation.
The first six chapters of Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery
had been translated by faculty members and students of VI. Personal Impressions.
the Language Department of Montclair State College. The enthusiasm, interest and real joy of the students,
These were mimeographed here and each student received especially of the fifth and sixth graders, during the classes,
a copy, chapter by chapter as they were studied. A rough were a constant stimulus and challenge to both myself and
translation of part of the teacher's manual was left with me. the Salvadorean teacher collaborating in the Program. The
by Dr. Aman, and we used it for several months until it children looked forward to the class and would often sug·
had to be returned to the Institute as it was the only copy gest that additional time be found for more discussions.
of the translation. From then on, we worked with the
original English manual, I myself doing the necessary The youngsters were quick to spot unfamiliar vocabulary
and situational differences in the text. What was not comtranslation for the Salvadorean teacher.
mon to their cultural and social environment, (for examIV. The Time Element Involved.
ple, the racial discrimination question in Chap~er Three),
From March to August, one 45-minute period a week was afforded them the opportunity-to study modes of bedevoted to the Philosophy for Children Program in each of havior, cultural habits and language differences, that
the three grades involved. The change of the school hor- they had not been aware of up to that time.
rarium left sixth and seventh grades with an average of Soon after beginning the course, analogous classroom
40 minutes a week, but fifth grade had two 30-minute situations were compared to those in the text. Judgments
periods a week from August to October.
were questioned and discussed. Group and personal values,
Ill. Materials Used.

V. Conclusions:

such as self-discipline and responsibility, began to be more
Personally, I am inclined to judge the effectiveness of the operative in both school and home circumstances. An
Program more by the classroom experiences than by almost tangible sense of curiosity developed, and the
comparing the results of the tests given before and after students• questions became more penetrating and creative.
the course to a number of the students, and this for several A listening attitude grew in the classroom as the pupils
reasons. First of all, few, if any, of these youngsters had learned to appreciate and evaluate the opinions of their
ever had the experience of taking standardized general classmates. The sheer joy that effused from them when
ability tests, reading tests, etc., and that very possibly they discovered they had arrived at a correct conclusion
affected the results of testing. Also, the standardized tests on their own before it was exposed in the text, was
available to us are American-formulat~d tests translated recompense enough for any amount of time and effort put
into Spanish by a private university in Guatemala. In many into the preparation of the classes on our part. The whole
instances, the concepts and/or vocabulary are not common course was a fun time, just as much for us who taught as
to this area and the students either guessed or left the for the students.
items blank. Another negative factor regarding the testing
was the absence of a professional psychologist to administer and interpret the tests. I had to rely on my own limited
personal experience and the instructions given on the
test manual.
In spite of these drawbacks, however, I am presenting the
conclusions made from the comparison of the scores obtained before and after the Program. Even with the limitations cited, the following indicates an effectiveness
beyond my expectations.
11

In the Pinter Non-Verbal General Ability Test, Intermediate
Form K,"there was an average increase in the l.Q. rating
of fourteen points (the improvement range was from one
to twenty-seven points), which, if I'm not too mistaken in
my calculations, is an increase of approximately two and
a half years in mental ability. The average improvement
in the ..Otis Self-Applied Verbal Test, Intermediate Form A
was one of eight points, which I judge to be about a twoyear increase in mental ability.
11

A Salvadorean mother and her oldest daughter.
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The many possibilities of correlating the Philosophy for
Children Program with other subjects are too numerous
to be discussed in this evaluation. A teacher with even a
moderate degree of creativity could very effectively liven
up units of study in almost any subject, applying the logical
and ethical principles the children discuss in the "Harry
Stottlemeier" class. The reverse is also true. Material investigated in other classes can be used in discussions and
exercises in the Philosophy class. To illustrate: in one of the
first classes, we were discussing the meaning of the word
..discovery" as compared with "invention." I remarked that
we were celebrating the 1OOth anniversary of the telephone
that month. After a few comments of the students on the
topic, I asked them if they considered the telephone as an
invention or as a discovery. Most of them immediately
claimed it was an invention. One boy, however, replied, "I
think it is a product both of discovery and invention.
Alexander Graham Bell or other scientists had to discover
the properties of the matetials he used to invent the
telephone."
Another rewarding experience of the Program was the
evident change of behavior in some of the pupils. Problemstudents seemed to enjoy the challenge of the discussions,
and one could almost see them grow in self-esteem when
they were praised for some insight they proffered. The
very material, ethical and logical, that is the basis of the
exercises, caused obvious change and development in
the groups.
Recommendations.
1. To assure a continuity in the Program, I would suggest
that a presentation and explanation of it be given not only
to the personnel of the school or schools to be involved, but
primarily to the educational authorities of the district or
province, etc. Such a procedure might' forestall the appointment of teachers prepared to give the Program to
schools not included. Hopefully, it would also cause the
course to be given adequate time in the school horarium
as well as periods in the day that would not usually be the
ones cancelled because of teacher's meetings, early dismissals, special programs, etc. It might also pave the way
for arrangements that would regulate the number of pupils
in any one class, or to permit the class to be divided into
smaller groups. Obviously, the effectiveness of the Program
is reduced when the classes have 42 to 45 children, as was
the situation that is evaluated here.
2. Before the initiation of the Program, it would be most
desirable to h~ve all the materials on hand, ready to be
placed in the hands of the teachers and students. It would
not be necessary that there be corrections in either the
teachers' manual or the children's text to fit the local
language and environment, but time should be taken with.
those who are to give the Program to discover the variants
and make the required adjustments before the course begins.
3. If there are going to be serious efforts to promote the
Philosophy for Children Program in Latin America, I would
strongly suggest that it be done in a well-organized manner. The text and the teachers' manual should be a standardized translation, carefully screened to avoid purely

A small girl helps out with the family wash.
Children are an essential part of the labor force In El Salvador.
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Anna and four of the teachers relax after a morning
session on teaching philosophy.

North American situations or concepts. Norms of approach;
time limits for the experiment; available materials for
adequate testing, preferably the same for all Latin America
so that comparisons of the effectiveness of the Program
could be made in the various countries; mutually agreed
standards of evaluation; standardized formats for teachers
workshops, would all seem to be necessary before any
large scale diffusion of the Program is attempted.
4. Linked with 3, would be the recommendation that some
sort of regular communication be established between the
person responsible for teaching the Program in any given
area, especially if it is at the experimental stage, and the
curriculum developers. If the communication is minimal,
or totally absent, it could be interpreted as a lack of interest
or of on-going support for those who might be promoting
the Program at a personal sacrifice of time and/or money,
and thus discourage any further collaboration. Even if the
Program were officially adopted into the curriculum of any
given school system, correspondence would be a stimulus
to exchange ideas, opinions and suggestions, or to relate
some of the more original or creative classroom responses.

criticism and fear on the part of the parents, and would
make it easier for the students to communicate at home.
8. Lastly, I would urge that great care be used in the selection of the people sent to Latin America to promote the
Philosophy for Children Program. They should be
educators of sensitivity, well-versed in the culture to which
they are sent. In this day when nationalism is strong in
Latin America, the "know-it-all" North American is not
welcomed with enthusiasm. The Program must be presented delicately, almost humbly, not with an air of
superiority as though we had all the answers or were the
saviours of the "under-developed" nations. Convinced as I
am of the tremendous educational and moral value of this
Program, I feel it would be rejected if it were presented as
another United States super-product.
Sister Anna Maria Hartman, M.M.
Madre del Salvador Parish
Santa Ana, El Salvador
April 6, 1977

5. :Y-he person designated to coordinate and supervise the
Program should be free enough from other obligations to
be able to devote sufficient time to it. The propagation of
PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN-EVALUATION PROGRAM
the Program depends on its promotion by those who have
Escuela Unlflcada "Santa Ana"
Santa Ana, El Salvador
experienced it and are prepa_red to publicize its benefits.
* Tests "Otis"Autoaplicados, lntermedio: Forma A-Verbal
Time is of great importance for this.
6. It would be a great advantage if the coordinator-supervisor were as well a philosopher, or at least if he or she
had someone steeped in philosophy and knowledgeable
in pedagogy as an adviser.
7. If possible, I would recommend that informative sessions
be held with the parents of the students taking the Program,
especially·at the beginning of the course. In areas where a
general education is not enjoyed by a very high percentage
of the population, there is great fear of any innovation.
Some foreknowledge, slight as it might be, of what the
children are studying would prevent misunderstanding,

* Test "Pintner" de Habilidad General: lmtermedio, Forma KSerie No Verbal
* Test de Lectura ADG - Nivel lntermedio (Reading Test)
Satisfacci6n Pict6rica - Maw and Maw (Picture Satisfaction)
Satisfacci6n de un Cuento - Maw and Maw (Story Satisfaction)
lnventario de la Situaci6n del Alumno (Pupil Situational Inventory)
Test de Casualidad Social (Social Causality Test)
Similitudes y Usos Alternativos (Similarities and Alternate Use Tests)
Disparates (Absurdities)

*these tests are published by El Colegio Americano de Guatemala with the
necessary permissions according to copyright laws.
The rest of the tests were translations I made of the material supplied to me
by Hppe Haas.of Rutgers University.
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Plutarch on Education
Now the free-born child should not be
allowed to go without some knowledge,
both through hearing and observation,
of every branch also of what Is called
general education; yet these he should
learn only incidentally, just to get a taste
of them, as it were (for perfection in
everything is impossible), but
philosophy he should honour above all
else. I can perhaps make my opinion
clear by means of a figure: for example,
it is a fine thing to voyage about and
view many cities, but profitable to dwell
only in the best one. And it was a clever
saying of Bion, the philosopher, that,
just as the suitors, not being able to ap·
proach Penelope, consorted with her
maid-servants, so also do those who are
not able to attain to philosophy wear
themselves to a shadow over the other
kinds of education which have no value.
Wherefore it is necessary to make
philosophy as it were the head and front
of all education.
-Plutarch, The Education of Children

How Important are Categories
for Children?
I should like to see children learning to
receive sharper and more delicate im·
pressions. This they can do by learning
sharper and more precise expressions
for what they receive. We do our
children a cruel disservice by clamoring
at them for "self-expression." We encourage them to draw trees not as they
see them but as they "feel" about them.
God knows, no one wants children to
draw with daguerreotype realism, to
record with mere pointless accuracy. But
why do we badger children into "feeling"
about trees, when trees do not exist?
Trees do not exist: a silver maple exists,
and a quaking aspen exists, and a
cypress exists. One lives many years, I
think, before one has seen enough of the
particular trees that exist to be able to
Platonize and have feelings about ideal
or abstract trees.
Numbers have their most vital attribute in common; none of them exists. But
with things, the fundamental attribute,
existence itself, is only to be found in in·
dividuals, in particular things. Categories are important utensils of the mind,
but they are of the mind only; they summarize life, but they are not the stuff of
life. When we are older, we may feel
deeply about summaries, but when we
are young we should feel deeply about
the moments of living, the moments
themselves.

-Donald Barr, Who Pushed Humpty
Dumpty? Diiemmas In American
Education Today (New York:
Atheneum, 1971) p. 296.

Do Children
Lack Logic or Experience?

Education through Dialogue

[Children] try fiercely to disguise the ignorance of affairs that is the peculiar
physical affliction of all children. Here is
an example from Reik's Sex In Man and
Woman of the little cruelties to which
they are constantly subjected:
I had some fun with a boy four years
old, whom I told that a certain tree in his
parent's garden bore pieces of chewing
gum. I had bought some chewing gum
and hand hung the sticks by strings on
the lower bough of the tree. The boy
climbed up and picked them. He did not
doubt that they grew on the tree, nor did
he consider that they were wrapped in
paper. He willingly accepted my explanation that the sticks of gum, blossoming
at different times, had various flavors. In
the following year when I reminded him
of the chewing-gum tree, he was very
ashamed of his previous credulity and
said, "Don't mention that."
Some children, in an attempt to fight
this constant ridicule of their gullibility
- when they see that their painful ig·
norance is considered "cute" - try to
cash in on it, in much the same way that
women do. Hoping to elicit that hug and
kiss, they purposely take things out of
context, but it seldom works the second
time, perplexing them: What they don't
understand is that the ignorance itself is
considered "funny," not its specific manifestations. For most children don't understand the arbitrary adult order of
things, inadequately explained even
when there Is a sound explanation. But,
in almost every case given the amount of
information the child begins with, his
conclusions are perfectly logical.

If education is dialogical, it is clear that
the role of the teacher is important,
whatever the situation. As s/he dialogues
with the pupils, s/he must draw their attention to points that are unclear or
naive, always looking at them problem·
atically. Why? How? Is it so? What relation is there between the statement you
have just made, and that of your companion? Is there any contradiction between
them? Why? It can be said once more
that such an approach needs time. That
often there is "no time to lose," "there is
a syllabus to be completed." Once again
in the name of time which is not to be
wasted, time is wasted. Young people
are alienated by the kind of copybook
thought that is almost entirely verbally
narrated. Moreover, the content of what
is narrated must be passively received
and then memorized for repetition later.
Dialogue does not depend on the content which is to be seen problematically.
Everything can be presented problem·
atically.
The role of the educator is not to "fill"
the educatee with "knowledge",
technical or otherwise. It is rather to attempt to move towards a new way of
thinking in both educator and educatee,
through the dialogical relationships bet·
ween both. The flow is in both direc·
lions. The best student in physics or
mathematics, at school or university, is
not one who memorizes formulae but
one who Is aware of the reason for them.
For students, the more simply and
docilely they receive the contents with
which their teachers "fill" them in the
name of knowledge, the less they are
· able to think and the more they become
merely repetitive.

-Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic
of Sex (New York: William Morrow and
Co., Inc., 1979), pp. 116-117.

- Paulo Freire, Education for Critical
Consciousness (New York: The
Seabury Press, 1973) pp. 124-125.
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Thinking and Meaning
Knowledge is a necessary ingredient of
the thought process; it does not of itself
generate thinking, however. Thinking is
a distinctive form of behaving and, as
such, it has to be learned. It may be
learned outside the classroom - if it
were not learned in a measure before the
child enters school, no one could be
taught to improve . his thought. The
whole purpose of having a classroom is
to increase the opportunities for young
people to participate in reflective activity. This activity is one in which the person deals with meaning, with ideas.
Thinking is, as Boyd H. Bode put it, "the
finding and testing of meanings." It
never deals with certainty, though it constantly reaches for better understanding.
It is never an adjustment to things as
they are; it is always an adjustment of
things In terms of their promise to bring an Idea to fruition. It involves the
ability to formulate hypotheses (the finding of meanings), which is something
the individual may be said to do naturally, though he may learn through a
directed and widened experience to do
more effectively. It involves, also, a
method of checking out the promise of
hypotheses (the testing of meanings).
This is specifically a matter of learning;
at the natural level the individual does
not rise above the trial and error
methods so clearly observed in animal
experimentation. It is the method by
which the individual learns, carrying him
beyond the merely repetitive acts by
which he may be trained, as animals are.
It is, moreover, the essence of a liberal,
or liberating, education, since, as John
Dewey noted, "to be liberal is all one
with being liberating, with effecting a
release of human powers."

- H. Gordon Hullflsh, "Reflective
Thinking as Educational Method,"
reprinted In Metcalf, Lawrence E.,
DeBoer, John J., and Kaulfers, Walter
V., Secondary Education (Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, 1966), p. 440.
On Writing Good
Writing cannot be taught from a textbook or by lecture. To do it well - to do
it at all - the teacher must confront a
small group of students several times a
week. They cannot indulge in bigthink
because writing demands the actual production of a finite piece of work. In order
to make thi)t work intelligible the
teacher must go over it in painful detail
alone in his study and then again in the
inquisitive presence of each individual
student. At this level writing is neither a
"skill," which is simply mindless jargon,
nor form of self-expression. It is the
procedure whereby form is given to impulse, and by which consciousness becomes thought.

a
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The various policies that curtail
writing do not choose to be aware that it
is the fundamental mode of learning. I
don't mean by this that written examinations alone indicate intelligence, or that
"style" in writing implies some grace of
character. Writing is a series of conceptual decisions. Even within fiction it
must describe, include, select, compare,
define and ascribe, among many other
logical responsibilities. It moves from
evidence, through reasoning, to conclusion. It can do these things in a thousand
different ways, indirect as poetry, heavy
as the law. But it does after all have to
translate feeling and intuition into statement, and that procedure underlies everything in the life of the mind.
There is, of course, a second, and less
methodological reason for writing: One
never knows what he knows until it is
written. This is to say, until the individual engages himself, fights the
most primary of intellectual battles, until he argues with his creativity he cannot
formulate that creativity. Far from "expressing" the self, what writing does is
allow judgment of the self. That is why it
is a critical procedure, and why it is so
htnportant as a form of free play, to say
nothing of imposed educational work.

-Ronald Berman, The New York
T/mes,January 29, 1978, Op Ed, p.4

On Conversation as an Aid to Study
Of all the adjuncts of study, none is so
familiar, so available, and, on the whole,
so helpful, as Conversation. The authors
of Guides to Students, as lsaas Watts,
give elaborate rules for carrying on conversation, a good many of them being
more moral than intellectual; but an art
of conversation would be very difficult to
formulate; it would take quite as long an
essay as I have devoted to study, and
even then would not follow half of the
windings of the subject. The only notice
of it that my plan requires, is such as I
have already bestowed upon Observation: namely, to point out the advantage
of combining a certain amount of
reading with conversation; a thing that
almost everybody does according to
their opportunities. To rehearse what we
have read to some willing and sympathizing listener, is the best way of impressing the memory and of clearing up
difficulties to the understanding. It brings
in the social stimulus, which ranks
so high among human motives. It is a
wholesome change of attitude; relieving
the fatigue of book-study, while adding
to its fruitfulness. Even beginners in
study are mutually helpful, by exchanging the results of their several book acquirements; while it is possible to raise
conversation to the rank of a high art,

both for intellectual improvement and
for mutual delectation. I cannot say that
the ideal is often realized; since two or
more must combine to conversation,
and it is not often that the mutual action
and re-action is perfectly adjusted for the
highest effect.

- Alexander Bain, Practical Essays
(1877).
The Tasks of Infancy
I commence by challenging the adequacy of some principles by which the
subjects for study are often classified in
order. By this I mean that these principles can only be accepted as correct if
they are so explained as to be explained
away. Consider first the criterion of difficulty. It is not true that the easier subjects should precede the harder. On the
contrary, some of the hardest must
come first because nature so dictates,
and because they are essential to life.
The first intellectual task which con·
fronts an infant is the acquirement of
spoken language. What an appalling
task, the correlation of meanings with
sounds! It requires an analysis of ideas
and an analysis of sounds. We all know
that the infant does it, and that the
miracle of his achievement is explicable.
But so are all miracles, and yet to the
wise they remain miracles. All I ask i~
that with this example staring us in the
face we should cease talking nonsense
about postponing the harder subjects.
What is the next subject in the educa·
tion of the infant minds? The acquire·
ment of written language; that is to say,
the correlation of sounds with shapes.
Great heavens! Have our educationists
gone mad? They are setting babbling
mites of six years old to tasks which
might daunt a sage after lifelong toil.
Again, the hardest task in mathematics
is the study of the elements of algebra,
and yet this stage must precede the comparative simplicity of the differential
calculus.
I will not elaborate my point further; I
merely restate it in the form, that the
postponement of difficulty is no safe
clue for the maze of educational practice.
You cannot read Homer before you
can read; but many a child, and in ages
past many a man, has sailed with
Odysseus over the seas of Romance by
the help of the spoken word of a mother,
or of some wandering bard. The uncritical application of the principle of the
necessary antecedence of some subjects
to others has, in the hands of dull people
with a turn for organisation, produced in
education the dryness of the Sahara.

- from Alfred North Whitehead, The
Alms of Education (New York: The
MacmUlan Co., 1959), pp. 25-26.
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The

Ethics
of

Elfland

G.K. Chesterton's essay, "The Ethics of Elf/and," appeared In his book
Orthodoxy, which was published In 1908. What is particularly appealing
about the essay Is Its defense of fairy tales on philosophical grounds,
rather than for reasons relating to the child's education or psychological
development. The psychological case, to be sure, has been persuasively
set forth by Bruno Bette/helm, in The Uses of Enchantment, and Bette/helm
refers briefly to Chesterton's writings. It Is not altogether clear, however,
that Bette/helm Is on solid ground when he Interprets Chesterton as saying
that fairy tales are "mirrors of inner experience, not of reality; and it is
as such that the child understands them." Chesterton's view of "reality"
Is one that Bette/helm can hardly share for Chesterton Is Inclined to see
even ordinary events as capable of Inspiring wonder.
Young children like realism, Chesterton Insists, because they find It
Inherently mysterious and marvelous. "A child of seven Is excited by being
told that Tommy opened a door and saw a dragon. But a ch/Id of three Is
excited by being told that Tommy opened a door." What such children are
utterly delighted by Is fact as well as fantasy. And they are reasonable:
they accept the necessary sequences of logic without cavil: "If the Ugly
Sisters are older than Cinderella, It Is (In an Iron and awful sense) necessary
that Cinderella Is younger than the Ugly Sisters. There Is no getting out of
It." Perhaps what Is remarkable is not Chesterton's finding the everyday
world so Intriguing, as that most of the rest of us have long since ceased
to find It so.

Gilbert Keith Chesterton

W

hen the business man rebukes the
idealism of his office-boy, it is
commonly in some such speech as this:
"Ah, yes, when one is young, one has
these ideals in the abstract and these
castles in the air; but in middle age they
all break up like clouds, and one comes
down to a belief in practical politics, to
using the machinery one has and getting
on with the world as it is." Thus, at least,
venerable and philanthropic old men
now in their honoured graves used to
talk to me when I was a boy. But since
then I have grown up and have discovered that these philanthropic old men were
telling lies. What has really happened is
exactly the opposite of what they said
would happen. They said that I should
lose my ideals and begin to believe in
the methods of practical politicians.
Now, I have not lost my ideals in tt-:e
least; my faith in fundamentals is exactly
what it always was. What I h~ve lost is my
old childlike faith in practical politics. I
am still as much concerned as ever
about the Battle of Armageddon; but I
am not so much concerned about the
General Election. As a babe I leapt up on
my mother's knee at the mere mention
of it. No; the vision is always solid and
reliable. The vision is always a fact. It is
the reality that is often a fraud. As much

as I ever did, more than I ever did, I
believe in Liberalism. But there was a
rosy time of innocence when l believed
in Liberals.
I take this instance of one of the enduring faiths because, having now to
trace the roots of my personal speculation, this may be counted, I think as the
only positive bias. I was brought up a
Liberal, and have always believed in
democracy, in the elementary liberal
doctrine of a self-governing humanity. If
any one finds the phrase vague or
threadbare, I can only pause for a moment to explain that the principle of
democracy, as I mean it, can be stated in
two propositions. The first is this: that all
things common to all men are more important than the things peculiar to any
men. Ordinary things are more valuable
than extraordinary things; nay, they are
more extraordinary. Man ls something
more awful than men; something more
strange. The sense of the miracle of
humanity itself should be always more
vivid to us than any marvels of power, intellect, art or civilization. The mere man
on two legs, as such, should be felt as
something more heartbreaking than any
music and more startling than any
caricature. Death is more tragic even
than death by starvation. Having a nose

is more comic even than having a Norman nose.
This is the first principle of
democracy: that the essential things in
men are the things they hold in com·
mon, not the things they hold separately. And the second principle is merely
this: that the political instinct or desire is
one of these things which they hold in
common. Falling in love is more
poetical than dropping into poetry. The
democratic contention is that govern·
ment (helping to rule the tribe) is a thing
like falling in love, and not a thing like
dropping into poetry. It is not something
analogous to playing the church organ,
painting on vellum, discovering the
North Pole (that insidious habit), looping
the loop, being Astronomer Royal, and
so on. For these things we do not wish a
man to do at all unless he does them
well. It is, on the contrary, a thing
analogous to writing one's own loveletters or blowing one's own nose. These
things we want a man to do for himself,
even if he does them badly. I am not here
to argue the truth of any of these conceptions; I know that some moderns are
asking to have their wives chosen by
scientists, and they may soon be asking,
for all I know, to have their noses blown
by nurses. I merely say that mankind
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does recognize these universal human
functions, and that democracy classes
government among them. In short, the
democratic faith is this: that the most
terribly important things must be left to
ordinary men themselves - the mating
of the sexes, the rearing of the young,
the laws of the state. This is democracy;
and in this I have always believed.
But there is one thing that I have never
from my youth been able to understand.
1 have never been able to understand
where people got the idea that demo·
cracy was in some way opposed to tradition. It is obvious that tradition is only
democracy extended through time. It is
trusting to a consensus of common human voices rather than to some isolated
or arbitrary record. The man who quotes
some German historian against the
tradition of the Catholic Church, for instance, is strictly appealing to
aristocracy. He is appealing to the superiority of one expert against the awful
authority of a mob. It is quite easy to see
why a legend is treated, and ought to be
treated, more respectfully than a book of
history. The legend is generally made by
the majority of people in the village, who
are sane. The book is generally written
by the one man in the village who is
mad. Those who urge against tradition
that men in the past were ignorant may
go and urge it at the Carlton Club, along
with the statement that voters in the
slums are ignorant. It will not do for us. If
we attach great importance to the opinion of ordinary men in great unanimity
when we are dealing with daily matters,
there is no reason why we should
disregard it when we are dealing with
history or fable. Tradition may be defin·
ed as an extension of the franchise.
Tradition means giving votes to the
most obscure of, all classes, our
ancestors. It is the democracy of the
dead. Tradition refuses to submit to the
small and arrogant oligarchy of those
who merely happen to be walking about.
All democrats object to men being disqualified by the accident of birth; tradi·
tion objects to their being disqualified
by the accident of death. Democracy
tells us not to neglect a good man's opinion, even if he is our groom; tradition
asks us not to neglect a good man·s opi·
nion, even if he is our father. I, at any
rate, cannot separate the two ideas of
democracy and tradition; it seems evident to me that they are the same idea.
We will have the dead at our councils.
The ancient Greeks voted by stones;
these shall vote by tombstones. It is all
quite regular and official, for most tomb·
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stones, like most ballot papers, are
marked with a cross.
I have first to say, therefore, that if I
have had a bias, it was always a bias in
favour of democracy, and therefore of
tradition. Before we come to any theoretic or logical beginnings I am content to
allow for that personal equation; I have
always been more inclined to believe the
ruck of hard-working people than to
believe that special and troublesome
literary class to which I belong. I prefer
i even the fancies and prejudices of the
I' people who see life from the inside to the
clearest demonstrations of the people
' who see life from the outside. I would
i always trust the old wives' fables against
1 the' old maids' facts. As long as wit is
mother wit it can be as wild as it pleases.
Now, I have to put together a general
position, and I pretend to no training in
such things. I propose to do it, therefore,
by writing down one after another the
three or four fundamental ideas which I
have found for myself, pretty much in
the way that I found them. Then I shall
roughly synthesis them, summing up
my personal philosophy or natural reli·
gion; then 1 shall describe my startling

it from a nurse; that is, from the solemn
and star-appointed priestess at once of
democracy and tradition. The things I
believed most then, the things I believe
most now, are the things called fairy
. tales. They seem to me to be the entirely
: reasonable things. They are not fantasies: compared with them other things
are fantastic. Compared with them
religion and rationalism are both abnormal, though religion is abnormally right
and rationalism abnormally wrong.
Fairyland is nothing but the sunny country of common sense. It is not earth that
judges heaven, but heaven that judges
earth; so for me at least it was not earth
that criticised elfland, but elfland that
criticised the earth. I knew the magic
beanstalk before I had tasted beans; I
was sur~ of the Man in the Moon before 1
was certain of the moon. This was at one
with all popular tradition. Modern minor
poets are naturalists, and talk about the
bush or the brook; but the singers of the
old epics and fables were supernaturalists, and talked about the gods of
brook and bush. That is what the moderns mean when they say that the

"I knew the magic beanstalk before I tasted beans;
I was sure of the Man in the Moon before
I was certain of the moon."

discovery that the whole thing has been
discovered before. It had been discovered by Christianity. But of these profound
persuasions which I have to recount in
order, ·the earliest was· concerned with
this element' of popular tradition. And
without the foregoing explanation
touching tradition and democracy I
could hardly make my mental experi·
ence clear. As ·it is, I do not know
whether l can make it clear, but l now
propose to try.
My first and last philosophy, that
which I believe with unbroken certainty,
I learnt in the nursery. I generally learnt

ancients did not "appreciate Nature,"
because they said that Nature was
divine. Old nurses do not tell children
about the grass, but about the fairies
that dance on the grass; and the old
Greeks could not see the trees for the
dryads.
But I deal here with what ethic and
philosophy come from being fed on fairy
tales. If I were describing them in detail I
could note many noble and healthy prin·
ciples that arise from them. There is the
chivalrous lesson of "Jack the Giant
Killer"; that giants should be killed
because they are gigantic. It is a manly
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mutiny against pride as such. For the
rebel is older than all the kingdoms, and
the Jacobin has more tradition than the
Jacobite. There is the lesson of "Cinderella," which is the same as that of the
Magnificat - exaltavit humiles. There is
the great lesson of "Beauty and the
Beast"; that a thing must be loved before
it is loveable. There is the terrible
allegory of the "Sleeping Beauty," which
tells how the human creature was blessed with all birthday gifts, yet cursed with
death; and how death also may perhaps
be softened to a sleep. But I am not concerned with any of the separate statutes
of elfland, but with the whole spirit of its
law, which I learnt before I could speak,
and shall retain when I cannot write. I am
concerned with a certain way of looking
at life, which was created in me by the
fairy tales, but has since been meekly
ratified by the mere facts.
It might be stated this way. There are
certain sequences or developments
(cases of one thing following another),
which are, in the true sense of the word,
reasonable. They are, in the true sense of
the word, necessary. Such are mathematical and merely logical sequences.
We in fairyland (who are the most
reasonable of all creatures) admit that
reason and that necessity. For instance,
if the Ugly Sisters are older than Cinderella, it is (in an iron and awful sense)
necessary that Cinderella is younger
than the Ugly Sisters. There is no getting
out of it. Haeckel may talk as much
fatalism about that fact as he pleases: it
really must be. If Jack· is the son of a
miller, a miller is the father of Jack. Cold
reason decrees it from her awful throne:
and we in fairyland submit. If the three

brothers all ride horses, there are six
animals and eighteen legs involved: that
is true rationalism, and fairyland is full
of it. But as I put my head over the hedge
of the elves and began to take notice of
the natural world, I observed an extraordinary thing. I observed that learned
men in spectacles were talking of the actual things that happened - dawn and
death an so on - as if they were rational
and inevitable. They talked as if the fact
that trees bear fruit were just as
necessary as the fact that two and one
trees make three. But it is not. There is
an enormous difference by the test of
fairyland; which is the test of the imagination. You cannot imagine two and
one not making three. But you can easily
imagine trees not growing fruit; you can
imagine them growing golden candlesticks or tigers hanging on by the tail.
These men in spectacles spoke much of
a man named Newton, who was hit by an
apple, and who discovered a law. But
they could not be got to see the distinction between a true law, a law of reason,
and the mere fact of apples falling. If the
apple hit Newton's nose, Newton's nose
hit the apple. That is a true necessity:
because we cannot conceive the one occurring without the other. But we can
quite well conceive the apple not falling
on his nose; we can fancy it flying
ardently through the air to hit some
other nose, of which it had a more
definite dislike. We have always in our
fairy tales kept this sharp distinction between the science of mental relations, in
which there really are laws, and the
science of physical facts, in which there
are no laws, but only weird repetitions.
We believe in bodily miracles, but not in

mental impossibilities. We believe that a
Bean-stalk climbed up to Heaven; but
that does not at all confuse our convic·
tions on the philosophical question of
how many beans make five.
Here is the peculiar perfection of tone
and truth in the nursery tales. The man
of science says, "Cut the stalk, and the
apple will fall"; but he says it calmly, as if
the one idea really led up to the other.
The witch in the fairy tale says, "Blow the
horn, and the ogre's castle will fall"; but
she does not say it as if it were some·
thing in which the effect obviously arose
out of the cause. Doubtless she has
given the advice to many champions,
and has seen many castles fall, but she
does not lose either her wonder or her
reason. She does not muddle her head
until it imagines a necessary mental connection between a horn and a falling
tower. But the scientific men do muddle
their heads, until they imagine a
necessary mental connection between
an apple leaving the tree and an apple
reaching the ground. They do really talk
as if they had found not only a set of
marvellous facts, but a truth connecting
those facts. They do talk as if the con·
nection of two strange things physically
connected them philosophically. They
feel that because one incomprehensibte
thing constantly follows another irtcom·
prehensible thing the two together
somehow make up a comprehensible
thing.· Two black riddles make a white
answer.
In fairyland we avoid the word "law";
but in the land of science they are singularly fond of it. Thus they will call some
interesting conjecture about how forgotten folks pronounced the alphabet,

" •.. if the Ugly Sisters are older than Cinderella,
it is (in an iron and awful sense) necessary that
Cinderella is younger than the Ugly Sisters ... "
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Grimm's Law. But Grimm's Law is far
less intellectual than Grimm's Fairy
Tales. The tales are, at any rate, certainly
tales; while the law is not a law. A law im·
plies that we know the nature of the generalisation and enactment; not merely
that we have noticed some of the effects.
If there is a law that pick-pockets shall
go to prison, it implies that there is an
imaginable mental connection between
the idea of prison and the idea of picking
pockets. And we know what the idea is.
We can say why we take liberty from a
man who takes liberties. But we cannot
say why an egg can turn into a chicken
any more than we can say why a bear
could turn into a fairy prince. As ideas,
the egg and the chicken are further off
from each other than the bear and the
prince; for no egg in itself suggests a
chicken, whereas some princes do suggest bears. Granted, then, that certain
transformations do happen, it is essen·
tial that we should regard them in the
philosophic manner of fairy tales, not in
the unphilosophic manner of science
and the "Laws of Nature." When we are
asked why eggs turn to birds or fruits fall
in autumn, we must answer exactly as
the fairy godmother would answer if
Cinderella asked her why mice turned to
horses or her clothes fell from her at
twelve o'clock. We must answer that it is
magic. It is not a "law," for we do not
understand its general formula. It is not
a necessity, for though we can count on
it happening practically, we have no
right to say that it must always happen. It
is no argument for unalterable law (as
Huxley fancied) that we count on the ordinary course of things. We do not count
on it; we bet on it. We risk the remote
possibility of a miracle as we do that of a
poisoned pancake or a world-destroying
comet. We leave it out of account, not
because it is a miracle, and therefore an
impossibility, but because it is a miracle,
and therefore an exception. All the
terms used in the science books, "law,"
"necessity," "order," "tendency," and so
on, are really unintellectual, because
they assume an inner synthesis, which
we do not possess. The only words that
ever satisfy me as describing Nature are
the terms used in the fairy books,
"charm," "spell," "enchantment." They
express the arbitrariness of the fact and
its mystery. A tree grows fruit because it
is a magic tree. Water runs downhill
because it Is bewitched. The sun shines
because it is bewitched.
I deny altogether that this Is fantastic
or even mystical. We may have some
mysticism later on; but this fairy-tale
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language about things is simply rational
and agnostic. It is the only way I can express in words my clear and definite
perception that one thing is quite
distinct from another; that there is no
logical connection between flying and
laying eggs. It is the man who talks
about "a law" that he has never seen who
is the mystic. Nay, the ordinary scientific
man is strictly a sentimentalist. He is a
sentimentalist in this essential sense,
that he is soaked and swept away by
mere associations. He has so often seen
birds fly and lay eggs that he feels as if
there must be some drea~y. tender connection between the two ideas, whereas
there is none. A forlorn lover might be
unable to disassociate the moon from
lost love; so the materialist is unable to
disassociate the moon from the tide. In
both cases there is no connection, except that one has seen them together. A
sentimentalist might shed tears at the
smell of apple-blossom, because, by a
dark association of his own, it reminded
him of his boyhood. So the materialist
professor (though he conceals his tears)
is yet a sentimentalist, because, by a
dark association of his own, appleblossoms remind him of apples. But the
cool rationalist from. fairyland does not
see why, in the abstract, the apple tree
should not grow crimson tulips; it sometimes does in his country.
This elementary wonder, however, is
not a mere fancy derived from the fairy

cause they find them romantic. In fact, a
baby is about the only person, I should
think, to whom a modern realistic novel
could be read without boring him. This
proves that even nursery tales only echo
an almost pre-natal leap of interest and
amazement. These tales say that apples
were golden only to refresh the forgotten
moment when we found that they were
green. They make rivers run with wine
only to make us remember, for one wild
moment, that they run with water. I have
said that this is wholly reasonable and
even agnostic. And, indeed, on this
point I am all for the higher agnosticism;
its better name is Ignorance. We have all
read in scientific books, and, indeed, in
all romances, the story of the man who
has forgotten his name. This man walks
about the streets and can see and appreciate everything; only he cannot remember who he is. Well, every man is that
man in the story. Every man who has
forgotten who he is. One may understand the cosmos, but never the ego; the
self is more distant than any star. Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God; but thou
shalt not know thyself. We are all under
the same mental calamity; we have all
forgotten our names. We have all forgotten what we really are. All that we call
common sense and rationality and practicality and positivism only means that
for certain dead levels of our life we forget that we have forgotten. All that we
call spirit and art and ecstacy only

"We believe in bodily miracles, but not in mental
impossibilities. We believe that a Bean-stalk climbed
up to Heaven; but that does not at all confuse our
convictions on the philosophical question of
how many beans make five."
tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the
fairy tales ls derived from this. Just as we
all like love tales because there is an in·
stinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales
because they touch the nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment. This is
proved by .the fact that when we are very
young children we do not need fairy
tales: we only need tales. Mere life is in·
teresting enough. A child of seven is excited by being told that Tommy opened
a door a~d saw a dragon. But a child of
three is excited by being told that Tommy opened a door. Boys like romantic
tales; but babies like realistic tales - be-

means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget.
But though (like the man without
memory in the novel) we walk the streets
with a sort of half-witted admiration, still
it is admiration. It is admiration in Eng·
lish and not only admiration in Latin.
The wonder has a positive element of
praise. This is the next milestone to be
definitely marked on our road through
fairyland. I shall speak in the next chapter about optir:nlsts and pessimists in
their intellectual aspect, so far as they
have one. Here I am only trying to describe the enormous emotions which can-
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"We can say why we take liberty from a man who takes liberties. But we cannot
say why an egg can turn into a chicken any more than we can say why a bear
could turn into a fairy prince. As ideas, the egg and the chicken are further off
from each other than the bear and the prince; for no egg in itself suggests a
chicken, whereas some princes do suggest bears."

not be described. And the strongest
emotion was that life was as precious as
it was puzzling. It was an ecstacy be·
cause it was an adventure; it was an ad·
venture because it was an opportunity.
The goodness of the fairy tale was not af·
fected by the fact that there might be
more dragons than princesses; it was
good to be in a fairy tale. The test of all
happiness is gratitude; and I felt grateful,
though I hardly knew to whom. Children
are grateful when Santa Claus puts in
their stockings gifts of toys or sweets.
Could I not be grateful to Santa Claus
when he put in my stockings the gift of
two miraculous legs? We thank people
for birthday presents of cigars and slip·
pers. Can I thank no one for the birthday
present of birth?
There were, then, two first feelings, in·
defensible and indisputable. The world
was a shock, but it was not merely
shocking; existence was a surprise, but it
was a pleasant surprise. In fact, all my
first views were exactly uttered in a rid·
die that stuck in my brain from boyhood.
The question was, "What did the first
frog say?" And the answer was, "Lord,
how you made me jump!" That says suc·
cinctly all that I am saying. God made
the frog jump; but the frog prefers jump·
ing. But when these things are settled
there enters the second great principle
of the fairy philosophy.
Any one can see it who will simply
read "Grimm's Fairy Tales" or the fine
collections of Mr. Andrew Lang.·For the
pleasure of pedantry I will call it the Doc·
trine of Conditional Joy. Touchstone
talked of much virtue in an "if'; accord·
ing to elfin ethics all virtue is in an "if."
The note of the fairy utterance always is,
··You may live in a palace of gold and
sapphire, If you do not say the word
'cow' "; or "You may live happily with the
King's daughter, If you do not show her
an onion." The vision always hangs upon
a veto. All the dizzy and colossal things

conceded depend upon one small thing
withheld. All the wild and whirling things
that are let loose depend upon one thing
that is forbidden. Mr. W.B. Yeats, in his
exquisite and piercing elfin poetry, describes the elves as lawless; they plunge
in innocent anarchy on the unbridled
horses of the air"Rlde on the crest of the dishevelled tide,
And dance upon the mountains Ilka a flame."

It is a dreadful thing to say that Mr. W.B.
Yeats does not understand fairyland. But
I do say it. He is an ironical Irishman, full
of intellectual reactions. He is not stupid
enough to understand fairyland. Fairies
prefer people of the yokel type like myself; people who gape and grin and do as
they are told. Mr. Yeats reads into elfland
all the righteous insurrection of his own
race. But the lawlessness of Ireland is a
Christian lawlessness, founded on reason and justice. The Fenian is rebelling
against something he understands only
too well; but the true citizen of fairyland
is obeying something that he does not
understand at all. In the fairy tale an incomprehensible happiness rests upon an
incomprehensible condition. A box is
opened, and all evils fly out. A word is
forgotten, and cities perish. A lamp is lit,
and love flies away. A flower is plucl<ed,
and human lives are forfeited. An apple
is eaten, and the hope of God is gone.
This is the tone of fairy tales, and it is
certainly not lawlessness or even liberty,
though men under a mean modern tyranny may think it liberty by comparison. People out of Portland Goal might
think Fleet Street free; but closer study
will prove that both fairies and journalists are the slaves of duty. Fairy godmothers seem at least as strict as other
godmothers. Cinderella received a
coach out of Wonderland and a coachman out of nowhere, but she received a
command - which might have come
out of Brixton - that she should be back
by twelve. Also, she had a glass slipper;

and it cannot be a coincidence that glass
is so common a substance in folk-lore.
This princess lives in a glass castle, that
princess on a glass hill; this one sees all
things in a mirror; they may all live in
glass houses if they will not throw
stones. For this thin glitter of glass everywhere is the expression of the fact that
the happiness is bright but brittle, like
the substance most easily smashed by a
housemaid or a cat. And this fairy-tale
seotiment also sank into me and became
my sentiment towards the whole world. I
felt and feel that life itself is as bright as
the diamond, but as brittle as the
window-pane; and when the heavens
were compared to the terrible crystal l
can remember a shudder. I was afraid
that' God would drop the cosmos with a
crash.
Remember, however, that to be breakable is not the same as to be perishable.
Strike a glass, and it will not endure an
instant; simply do not strike it, and it will
endure a thousand years. Such, it seemed, was the joy of man, either in elfland
or on earth; the happiness depended on
not doing something which you could at
any moment do and which, very often, it
was not obvious why you should not do.
Now, the point here is that to me this did
not seem unjust. If the miller's third son
said to the fairy, "Explain why I must not
stand on my head in the fairy palace,"
the other might fairly reply, "Well, if it
comes to that, explain the fairy palace.''
If Cinderella says, "How is it that I must
leave the ball at twelve?" her godmother
might answer, "How is it that you are going there till twelve?" If I leave a man in
my will ten talking elephants and a hundred winged horses, he cannot complain
if the conditions partake of the slight eccentricity of the gift. He must not look a
winged horse in the mouth. And it seemed to me that existence was itself so very
eccentric a Jegacy that I could not com·
plain of not understanding the limita·
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tions of the vision when I did not understand the vision they limited. The frame
was no stranger than the picture. The
veto might well be as wild as the vision;
it might be as startling as the sun, as
elusive as the waters, as fantastic and
terrible as the towering trees.
For this reason (we may call it the fairy
godmother philosophy) I never could
join the young men of my time in feeling
what they called the general sentiment
of revolt. I should have resisted, let us
hope, any rules that were evil, and with
these and their definition I shall deal in
another chapter. But I did not feel
disposed to resist any rule merely
because it was mysterious. Estates are
sometimes held by foolish forms, the
breaking of a stick or the payment of a
peppercorn: I was willing to hold the
huge estate of earth and heaven by any
such feudal fantasy. It could not well be
wilder than the fact that I was allowed to
hold it at all. At this stage I give only one
ethical instance to show my meaning. I
could never mix in the common murmur
of that rising generation against
monogamy, because no restriction on
sex seemed so odd and unexpected as
sex itself. To be allowed, like Endymion,
to make love to the moon and then to
complain that Jupiter kept his own
moons in a harem seemed to me (bred
on fairy tales like Endymion's) a vulgar
anti-climax. Keeping to one woman is a
small price for so much as seeing one
woman. To complain that I could only be
married once was like complaining that I
had only been born once. It was incommensurate with the terrible excitement
of which one was talking. It showed, not
an exaggerated sensibility to sex, but a
curiolJs insensibility to it. A man is a fool
who complains that he cannot enter
Eden by five gates at once. Polygamy is
a lack of the realization of sex; it is like a
man plucking five pears in mere absence
of mind. The aesthetes touched the last
insane limits of language in their eulogy
on lovely things. The thistledown made
them weep; a burnished beetle brought
them to their knees. Yet their emotion
never impressed me for an instant, for
this reason, that it never occurred to
them to pay for their pleasure in any sort
of symbolic sacrifice. Men (I felt) might
fast forty days for the sake of hearing a
blackbird sing. Men might go through
fire to find a cowslip. Yet these lovers of
beauty could not even keep sober for the
blackbird. They would not go through
common Christian marriage by way of
recompense to the cowslip. Surely one
might pay for extraordinary joy in ordin-
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ary morals. Oscar Wilde said that sunsets were not valued because we could
not pay for sunsets. But Oscar Wilde was
wrong; we can pay for sunsets. We can
pay for them by not being Oscar Wilde.
Well,. I left the fairy tales lying on the
floor of the nursery, and I have not found
any books so sensible since. I left the
nurse guardian of tradition and democracy, and I have not found any modern
type so sanely radical or so sanely conservative. But the matter for important
comment was here: that when I first went
out into the mental atmosphere of the
modern world, I found that the modern
world was positively opposed on two
points to my nurse and to the nursery
tales. It has taken me a long time to find
out that the modern world is wrong and
my nurse was right. The really curious
thing was this: that modern thought contradicted this basic creed of my boyhood
on its two most essential doctrines. I
have explained that the fairy tales founded in me two convictions; first, that this
world is a wild and startling place, which
might have been quite different, but
which is quite delightful; second that
before this wildness and delight one may
well be modest and submit to the queerest limitations of so queer a kindness.
But I found the whole modern world running like a high tide against both my
tendernesses; and the shock of that collision created two sudden and spontaneous sentiments, which I have had ever
since and which, crude as they were,
have since hardened into convictions.
First, I found the whole modern world
talking scientific fatalism; saying that
everything is as it must always have
been, being unfolded without fault from
the beginning. The leaf on the tree is
green because it could never have been
anything else. Now, the fairy-tale philosopher is glad that the leaf is green
precisely because it might have been
scarlet. He feels as if it had turned green
an instant before he looked at it. He is
pleased that snow is white on the strictly
reasonable ground that it might have
been black. Every colour has in it a bold
quality as of choice; the red of garden
roses is not only decisive but dramatic,
like suddenly spilt blood. He feels that
something has been done. But the great
determinists of the nineteenth century
were strongly against this native feeling
that something had happened an instant
before. In fact, according to them, nothing ever really had happened since the
beginning of the world. Nothing ever
had happened since existence had happened; and even about the date of that

I

they were not very sure.
The modern world as I found it was
solid for modern Calvinism, for the
necessity of things being as they are. But
when I came to ask them I found they
had really no proof of this unavoidable
repetition in things except the fact that
the things were repeated. Now, the mere
repetition made the things to me rather
more weird than more rational. It was as
if, having seen a curiously shaped nose
in the street and dismissed it as an accident, I had then seen six other noses of
the same astonishing shape. I should
have fancied for a moment that it might
be some local secret society. So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all
elephants having trunks looked like a
plot. I speak here only of an emotion,
and of an emotion at once stubborn and
subtle. But the repetition in Nature
seemed sometimes to be an excited repitition, like that of an angry schoolmaster
saying the same thing over and over
again. The grass seemed signalling to
me with all its fingers at once; the crowded stars seemed bent upon being understood. The sun would make me see him
if he rose a thousand times. The recurrences of the universe rose to the maddening rhythm of an incantation, and I
began to see an idea.
All the towering materi~lism which
dominates the modern mind rests
ultimately upon one assumption; a false
assumption. It is supposed that if a thing
goes on repeating itself it is probably
dead; a piece of clockwork. People feel
that if the universe was personal it would
vary; if the sun were alive it would dance.
This is a fallacy even in relation to
known fact. For the variation in human
affairs is generally brought into them,
not by life, but by death; by the dying
down or breaking off of their strength or
desire. A man varies his movements
because of some slight element of
failure or fatigue. He gets into an omnibus because he is tired of walking; or
he walks because he is tired of sitting
still. But if his life and joy were so gigantic that he never tired of going to Islington, he might go to Islington as
regularly as the Thames goes to Sheerness. The very speed and ecstasy of his
life would have the stillness of death.
The sun rises every morning. I do not
rise every morning; but the variation is
due not to my activity, but to my inaction. Now, to put the matter in a popular
phrase, it might be true that the sun rises
regularly because he never gets tired of
rising. His routine might be due, not to a
lifelessness, but to a rush of life. The
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thing I mean can be seen, for instance, in
children. when they find some game or
joke that they specially enjoy. A child
kicks his legs rhythmically through excess, not absence, of life. Because
children have abounding vitality,
because they are in spirit fierce and free,
therefore they want things repeated and
unchanged. They always say, "Do it
again"; and the grown-up person does it
again until he is nearly dead. For grownup people are not strong enough to exult
in monotony. But perhaps God is strong
enough to exult in monotony. It is possible that God says every morning, "Do it
again" to the sun; and every evening,
"Do it again" to the moon. It may not be
automatic necessity that makes all
daisies alike; it may be that God makes
every daisy separately, but has never got
tired of making them. It may be that He
has the eternal appetite of infancy; for
we have sinned and grown old, and our
Father is younger than we. The repeti·
tion in Nature may not be a mere recurrence; it may be a theatrical encore.
Heaven may encore the bird who laid an
egg. If the human being conceives and
brings forth a human child instead of
bringing forth a fish, or a bat, or a griffin,
the reason may not be that we are fixed
in an animal fate without life or purpose.
It may be that our little tragedy has
touched the gods, that they admire it
from their starry galleries, and that at the
end of every human drama man is called
again and again before the curtain.
Repetition may go on for millions of
years, but mere choice, and at any instant it may stop. Man may stand on the
earth generation after generation, and
yet each birth be his positively last appearance.
This was my first conviction; made by
the shock of my childish emotions meet·
ing the modern creed in mid-career. I
had always vaguely felt facts to be
miracles in the sense that they are won·
derful: now I began to think them
miracles in the stricter sense that they
were willful. I mean that they were, or
might be, repeated exercises of some
will. In short, I had always believed that
the world involved magic: now I thought
that perhaps it involved a magician. And
this pointed a profound emotion always
present and sub-conscious; that this
world of ours has some purpose; and if
there is a purpose, there is a person. I
had always felt life first as a story: and if
there is a story there is a story-teller.
But modern thought also hit my second human tradition. It went against
the fairy feeling about strict limits and

conditions. The one thing it loved to talk
about was expansion and largeness.
Herbert Spencer would have been greatly annoyed if any one had called him an
imperialist, and therefore it is highly regrettable that nobody did. But he was an
imperialist of the lowest type. He popularized this contemptible notion that the
size of the solar system ought to overawe the spiritual dogma of man. Why
should a man surrender his dignity to
the solar system any more than a whale?
If mere size proves that man is not the
image of God, then a whale may be the
image of God; a somewhat formless image; what one might call an impressionist portrait. It is quite futile to argue that
man is small compred to the cosmos; for
man was always small compared to the
nearest tree. But Herbert Spencer, in his
headlong imperialism, would insist that
we had in some way been conquered and
annexed by the astronomical universe.
He spoke about men and their ideals exactly as the most insolent Unionist talks
about the Irish and their ideals. He turned mankind into a small nationality. And
his evil influence can be seen even in the
most spirited and honourable of later
scientific authors; notably in the early
romances of Mr. H.G. Wells. Many mor·
alists have in an exaggerated way repre·
sented the earth as wicked. But Mr.
Wells and his school made the heavens
wicked. We should lift up our eyes to the
stars from whence would come our ruin.
But the expansion of which I speak
was much more evil than all this. I have
remarked that the materialist, like the
madman, is in prison; in the prison of
one thought. These people seemed to
think it singularly inspiring to keep on
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saying that the prison was very large.
The size of this scientific universe gave
one no novelty, no relief. The cosmos
went on for ever, but not in its wildest
constellation could there be anything
really interesting; anything, for instance,
such as forgiveness or free will. The
grandeur or infinity of the secret of its
cosmos added nothing to it. It was like
telling a prisoner in Reading gaol that he
would be glad to hear that the gaol now
covered half the country. The warder
would have nothing to show the man except more and more long corridors of
stone lit by ghastly lights and empty of
all that is human. So these expanders of
the universe had nothing to show us ex·
cept more and more infinite corridors of
space lit by ghastly suns and empty of all
that is divine.
In fairyland there had been a real law;
a law that could be broken, for the definition of a law is something that can be
broken. But the machinery of this cos·
mic prison was something that could not
be broken; for we ourselves were only a
part of its machinery. We were either
unable to do things or we were destined
to do them. The idea of the mystical con·
dition quite disappeared; one can neith·
er have the firmness of keeping laws nor
the fun of breaking them. The largeness
of this universe had nothing of that
freshness and airy outbreak which we
have praised in the universe of the poet.
This modern universe is literally an empire; that is, it was vast, but it is not free.
One went into larger and larger windowless rooms, rooms big with Babylonian
perspective; but one never found the
smallest window or a whisper of outer
air.

"The only words that ever satisfy me as describing
Nature are the terms used in the fairy books,
"charm," "spell," "enchantment." They express
the arbitrariness of the fact and its mystery."
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"Thus I have said that stories of magic alone can express my sense that life
is not only a pleasure but a kind of eccentric privilege."
Their infernal parallels seemed to exlessness which was the reverse of the
pand with distance; but for me all good
fierce and pious care which I felt touching the pricelessness and the peril of life.
things come to a point, swords for in·
stance. So finding the boast of the big
They showed only a dreary waste; but I
felt a sort of sacred thrift. For economy
cosmos so unsatisfactory to my emotions I began to argue about it a little;
is far more romantic than extravagance.
and I soon found that the whole attitude
To them stars were an unending income
was even shallower than could have
of halfpence; but I felt about the golden
been expected. According to these peosun and the silver moon as a schoolboy
ple the cosmos was one thing since it
feels if he has one sovereign and one
had one unbroken rule. Only (they would
shilling.
say) while it is one thing it is also the onThese subconscious convictions are
ly thing there is. Why, then, should one
best hit off by the colour and tone of cerworry particularly to call it large? There
tain tales. Thus I have said that stories of
is nothing to compare it with. It would be
magic alone can express my sense that
just as sensible to call it small. A man
life is not only a pleasure but a kind of
may say, "I like this vast cosmos, with its
eccentric privilege. I may express this
throng of stars and its crowd of varied
other feeling of cosmic cosiness by allucreatures." But if it comes to that why
sion to another book always read in boyshould not a man say, "I like this cosy lit·
hood, .-.Robinson Crusoe," which I read
tie cosmos, with its. decent number of
about
this time, and which owes its eterstars and as neat a provision of live stock
nal vivacity to the fact that it celebrates
as I wish to see"? One is as good as the
the poetry of limits, nay, even the wild
other; they are both mere sentiments. It
romance of prudence. Crusoe is a man
is mere sentiment to rejoice that the sun
on
a small rock with a few comforts just
is larger than the earth; it is quite as sane
snatched from the sea: the best thing in
a sentiment to rejoice that the sun is no
the book is simply the list of things savlarger than it is. A man chooses to have
ed
from the wreck. The greatest of
an emotion about the largeness of the
poems
is an inventory. Every kitchen
world; why should he not choose to have
tool
becomes
ideal because Crusoe
an emotion about its smallness?
might have dropped it in the sea. It is a
It happened that I had that emotion.
good exercise, in empty or ugly hours of
When one is fond of anything one adthe
day, to look at anything, the coaldresses it by diminutives, even if it is an
scuttle
or the book-case, and think how
elephant or a lifeguardsman. The reason
could be to have brought it
happy
one
is, that anything, however huge, that can
out of the sin.k ing ship on to the solitary
be conceived of as complete, can be
island. But it is a better exercise still to
conceived of as small. If military
remember
how all things have had this
moustaches did not suggest a sword or
hair-breadth
escape: everything has
tusks a tail, then the object would be
vast because it would be immeasurable. • been saved from a wreck. Every man has
had one horrible adventure: as a hidden
But the moment you can imagine a
untimely
birth he had not been, as inguardsman you can imagine a small
'
fants
that
never see the light. Men spoke
guardsman. The moment you really see
much
in
my
boyhood of restricted or
an elephant you can call it "Tiny." If you
ruined men of genius: and it was comcan make a statue of a thing you can
mon to say that many a man was a Great
make a statuette of it. These people proMight-Have-Been.
To me it is a more
fessed that the universe was one cohersolid
and
startling
fact that any man in
ent thing; but they were not fond of the
the street is a Great Might-Not-Haveuniverse. But I was frightfully fond of the
Been.
universe and wanted to address it by a diBut I really felt (the fancy may seem
minutive. I often did so; and it never
foolish) as if all the order and number of
seemed to mind. Actually and in truth I
things were the romantic remnant of
did feel that these dim dogmas Of vitality
Crusoe's ship. That there are two sexes
were better expressed by calling the
and one sun, was like the fact that there
world small than by calling it large. For
were two guns and one axe. It was. poigabout infinity there was a sort of care-

I1

I

I

nantly urgent that none should be lost;
but somehow, it was rather fun that none
could be added. The trees and the planets seemed like things saved from the
wreck: and when I saw the Matterhorn I
was glad that it had not been overlooked
in the confusion. I felt economical about
the stars as if they were sapphires (they
are called so in Milton's Eden): I hoarded
the hills. For the universe is a single jewel, and while it is a natural cant to talk of
a jewel as peerless and priceless, of this
jewel it is literally true. This cosmos is indeed without peer and without price: for
there cannot be another one.
Thus ends, in unavoidable inadequacy, the attempt to utter the unutterable
things. These are my ultimate attitudes
towards life; the soils for the seeds of
doctrine. These in some dark way I
thought before I could write, and felt
before I could think: that we may proceed more easily afterwards, I will roughly recapitulate them now. I felt in my
bones; first, that this world does not explain itself. It may be a miracle with a
supernatural explanation; it may be a
conjuring trick, with a natural explanation. But the explanation of the conjuring trick, if it is to satisfy me, will have to
be better than the natural explanations I
have heard. The thing is magic, true or
false. Second, I came to feel as if magic
must have a meaning, and meaning
must have some one to mean it. There
was something personal in the world, as
in a work of art; whatever it meant it
meant violently. Third, I thought this
purpose beautiful in its old design, in
spite of its defects, such as dragons.
Fourth, that the proper form of thanks to
it is some form of humility and restraint:
we should thank God for beer and Burgundy by not drinking too much of
them. We owed, also. an obedience to
whatever made us. And last, and strangest, there had come into my mind a
vague and vast impression that in some
way all good was a remnant to be stored
and held sacred out of some primordial
ruin. Man had sa.ved his good as Crusoe
saved his goods: he had saved them
from a wreck. All this I felt and the age
gave me no encouragement to feel it.
And all this time I had not even thought
of Christian theology.
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• An opportunity to study the procedures of teaching children philosophy has been
announced by the IAPC. Two 14-day, residential workshops will be held at the New
Jersey School of Conservation, Branchville, N.J., (July 5-18, and July 19-August 1).
Participants will earn 6 graduate credits in philosophy for children from Montclair
State College. (Applicants should possess a bachelor's degree). Total cost for
each two-week session, inclusive of room, board, books and college fees is $500.
* **

•

Ergo Films (P.O. Box 3420, Los Angeles, CA 90028) advises that they are delighted
with the reception that has been accorded their filmstrip kit, THINKING ABOUT
THINKING. The kit, which consists of five filmstrips illustrated with artworks rather
than photographs, deals with the elements of formal logic, and is especially suitable
for grades 5 and 6. Ergo reports that the filmstrips are being used in teacher-training
workshops as well as in classrooms, and are particularly appropriate for general
Introductions to logic as well as for quick and effective review of the essentials of
logic towards the end of a philosophy for children program.
* * *

Bulletins

• Zip-Zap, a children's story aimed at encouraging children's philosophical thinking,
has been written by Lillian Molnar. Both the book and an accompanying instructional
manual can be purchased from the author (Mole's Knoll South, Clementon, N.J. 08821).
* **
• Teachers interested In dealing with some of the philosophical issues involved In civic
education may wish to investigate the Law in a Free Society curriculum. The project
is an offshoot of the State Bar of California, and Is now moving towards completion
of a K·12 curriculum based on eight law-related concepts considered fundamental to
an understanding of social and political life: authority, privacy, justice, responsibility,
participation, diversity, property and freedom. These concepts form the basis for both
the teacher-training materials and the classroom multimedia instructional materials,
which include color filmstrips, student books, casebooks, curriculum guides and
lesson plans. Information may be obtained by writing Law in a Free Society, Suite 600,
606 Wilshire Boulevard, Santa Monica, CA 90401.
* * *

• A pilot program in philosophy for children is operating in the sixth grade of the Grant
Line Elementary School, New Albany, Indiana. Supervisors of the project are Prof.
Curtis H. Peters, Department of Philosophy, and Dr. Edward Quinn, Division of Education, both of Indiana University Southeast. A report from Profs. Peters and Quinn
is expected later this year, and will be published in THINKING.
* * *
• Year-long, on-site teacher-training services are now possible for school districts interested in enabling their teachers to acquire the skills necessary for encouraging
children to think philosophically. In some Instances, graduate credits are available
at an additional cost. Inquiries should be addressed to the IAPC.

***
• Maumee Valley Country Day School in Toledo, Ohio, has introduced Philosophy for
Children into its Lower School (K-8) curriculum).

***
• Larry Frase, Ed. D., Assistant Superintendent for Educational Services of the Flowing
Wells School District, in Tucson, Arizona, reports that the P,C program In the Flowing
Wells School District is proving highly satisfactory. The program is being used with
gifted and talented students, and is taught by four full-time teachers on staff.

** *

from

the
field
•
•

•
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• Among the awareness courses in philosophy for children being given on the college level this semester are those by Sr. Maureen L. Egan, at the College of Our
Lady of the Elms, Chicopee, Massachusetts, Prof. Martin Tamny, Department of
Philosophy, College of the City of New York, George Dalin at the National Institute for Education, Chicago, Frederick S. Oscanyan at Berea College in Kentucky, and Dr. Eric Hoffman at State University of New York at Fredonia. Among
those scheduled for the fall semester is a course by Prof. Jonathan Adler,
Brooklyn College.
* * *

Bulletins
from

the
field
•
•
•

• Psychologists are beginning to pay attention to what children say - to
themselves and to one another - about their drawings. ETS Developments
(Spring 1979) reports that research is proceeding at the ETS Center for Child Care
Research into children's cognitive development as reflected in what children
comment on their own artistic activities. The researchers, Rodney Cocking and
Carol Copple, have so far found that "as children become more reflective about
their drawings - both in planning and execution - they also become more
eager to judge the quality of their own drawings, often making humorous comments about their inability to show what they've intended." It is perhaps an indication of the researchers' insight that they are able to note the ability of the
children to be humorous about themselves as well as their capacity for aesthetic
judgment. The children are aged 3112 to 5.
* * *

• Project for a Model School of Education. In an article in the April 1979 issue of
Change, a journal devoted to higher education, Alexis Greene discusses a proposal
being developed in New Jersey that calls for "an experimental school of education,
a four-year program that would train teachers in the techniques of Philosophy for
Children and would serve as a model for future schools of education.
"As it is now pictured, the 164-credit curriculum would include 65 credits in
subject area courses; 27 credits of pedagogy; practical classroom experience; 24
credits of electives; and 48 credits of Philosophical Sequences - courses such
as Philosophical Thinking Skills for Children, Scientific Thinking Skills for
Children, and Value Thinking Skills for Children. At the end of four years, a student would receive a master's degree and be certified as an elementary school
teach et.
"The proposal comes at a propitious time, when New Jersey is re-evaluating its
certification of teacher-training programs and is apparently trying to endorse
graduate programs that offer practical classroom experience and a rigorous curriculum. Edward Hollander, New Jersey's Chancellor of Higher Education, reports
that at the moment in New Jersey it is possible for a teacher to receive his or her
certificate on the basis of a clerical examination of transcripts, without ever having been in a classroom. 'We have relatively pedestrian programs with minimum
requirements,' says Hollander. With regard to the Philosophy for Children proposal, he says, 'I support it as an interesting approach worth exploring'."
* * *

• Ronald F. Reed, Ph.D. in philosophy, has been appointed Assistant Professor in
the Department of Education at Texas Wesleyan College. Reed will specialize in
the Philosophy for Children Program that is being instituted in and by Texas
Wesleyan. His duties will include training teachers and future teachers how to
teach philosophy for children. He will do this at the College and in the Fort
Worth School System. Funding for the teacher training in the Fort Worth School
Svstem comes from a aenerous arant made bv a orivate citizen. Reed. who
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"I take it therefore to be a scientific task to which
education should set itself, that of making the
subject-matter of its instruction the material of
personal intercourse between pupils and instructors,
and between the children themselves."

Language
as
Thinking
George Herbert Mead
This article by George Herbert Mead was
originally published In Science, in 1910,
under the title of "The Psychology of Social
Consciousness Implied In Instruction."
1 One finds in it a number of the major
themes which were so significantly
developed in other works by Mead, such as
Mind, Self and Society, or Movements of
Thought in the Nineteenth Century. For
here, as elsewhere, Mead stresses that
reflective thinking In the Individual Is an internalization of linguistic behavior In society. Human conversation, discussion,
dialogue-these are the matrix of thought
and reasoning. When we speak to others,
we also listen to ourselves the way those
others might listen to us: we adopt their attitudes towards our own verbal expressions. By taking Into ourselves the possible
attitudes of ·others towards our own sym. bollc expressions, we Introject or internalize the entire community of persons with
whom we communicate. This internalized
forum therefore replicates In thought the
social community of symbolic behavior or
discourse.
Thus Mead had worked out-a generation before Vygotsky-an explicit theory of
thinking as Internalized speech. And he

likewise recognized, as this essay
demonstrates, that the learning process
can be significantly enhanced through
enlisting children's social impulses In the
formation of cooperative classroom communities. Indeed, if internalized communication among children translates Into
thought, what reason is there not to conclude that a classroom community of Inquiry, when internalized, will result In
children whose thinking adopts the
methods and procedures of inquiry?
There are those who look upon the child
entering school as If it were "the barbarian
at the gates." Such offspring, It Is contended, are most certainly in need of socialization. Whether or not they can eventually
become educated is a moot point. Mead
had little patience with such prophecies of
disaster. Every human Infant, he Insisted,
brings Into the world powerful social
tendencies which Impel that child to participate In a community. It Is by living with
others and anticipating their responses to
what we do that we become Individuals or
selves. Indeed, we cannot become selves
without living In some social or communal
fashion, just as we cannot think without

participating in the social instJtutlon of
linguistic communication.
Mead is well aware that many educators
are prepared to deny his charges, and to insist that the social Impulses of the child are
being fully utilized In the classroom. But
Mead contends that this Is so only in a
manipulative sense: the child's school life
is not genuinely social-It is only school
discipline (with Its pains and pleasures of
academic competition) that Is social. The
rewards are presently social, but not the life
of learning, or the process of inquiry. When
a community of Inquiry has been established in the classroom, the social impulses of
the child become the ground of the learning
process.
We are only beginning to recognize the
educational Importance of what Mead was
urging upon us three-quarters of a century
ago: If we want to encourage individuals to
reflect, then we must have disciplined
dialogue In the classroom. If we want Individuals who can think for themselves,
then the classroom must be converted Into
a community of . Inquiry where, following
Socrates, one must follow the argument
where It leads.
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.·''So far as education is concerned, the child does
not become s()cial by learning.
tie mus.t be social in order to learn."

I

have been asked to present the social
abiding in consciousness. They would be
fallacy of this division of labor. The
fourid in the impulse of the childrenexsituation in the school as the subject of
earlier vogue of manual training and the
a possible scientific study and control.
pressed in play, in tlie tendency of the
domestic arts before the frank recogni·
tion ofJheir relation to industrial train·
The . sarne ·situation amon~ ·p rimitive
childre~to . put t~~rn~~lves in . the place
of.· the men •.·and . women of .the · . ·grpup, ··
>people • is··.scief1tifically .. studied by ·. ·the
ing took place, was due .in no small part
sociologist (fold-psychologist). He notes
i.e., to imitate them in the emotions
to the attempt to introduce those in·
two methods in ·the process of primitive
which consciousness of themselves in
terests of the child's into the field of his
education. The first is generally describtheir relationship to others evoke, and in
instruction which gathers about a socialed as that of play and imitation. The imthe import for the boy which the ideas
ly constituted self, to admit the child's
.Pµlses of theg?ildren fin?theirexpr~s· . .anp ;cults .wouldhavewhen surchar~ed .· personality asa whole i~to the school.
' ' ~ion in play, .(3n(l play· descri~~sthe at~ ' •withstu::h emotions: <
.. ·. .·.· ·. .. •..••. .·. . ·.·. ' ·. ' '
I think.we should be prepared to admit
Utude of the child's conscioµspess.Jmif we. turn to our syst~m of education the implication of this .educational
we find that the materials of the curriCulmovement - that however abstract the
itation defines the form of unc:onscious
social control exercised by ·the com- · um have been presented as percepts
material is which is presented and howmunity overthe expression of .childish
capable of being assimilated by the na~
ever abstracted its ultimate use is from
the immediate activities of the child, the
impuls~ 0 .· •· ·.·
•\> . ·. . > > .... ·.·· . . tuie oftheir contentto other contents in
.Jn . the J911~ c~rernonies Qf\ i. ~i(fattior;i
:c()nsciousness, ahf.i :th~ mannerhas .be.en \. situation'. ',implied>in..·instruction . and in
'education as~prned ·. 8' more· conscious ' \ ii;djc~ted in 'Nhi~h ' i1)'1s ' material cartbe
the psychology of that instruction is a
and alrnost deliberate form. The boywas
mdst favorably prepared for such assimsocial situation; that it is. impossible to
fully interpret or control the process of
inducted into the clan mysteries, into
ilation. This type of psychological treatment of material and the lesson is recoginstruction without recognizing the child
the mythology and social procedure of
as a self .and viewing his¢onscious prothe community, under an emotional tenJtiz~~ at once asHerbartian. It is an as~ocesses ffomthe point ofvfow of their re~ion . . which ~~~ skillfuHy · arp~sect ~nd, . . · ci.~t.ipnc:sl type ()fp~ychology~ · . lts•..c:rJtifs .·
lation in his consciousness to his self,
maintained ..Hew43~sllbjectedwtests. of
add', th~t it'is •. inteile~tualistic. · ln . anycase
endurance which were calculated not onit is not a social psychology, for the child
among other selves.
ly to fulfill this purpose, but also:to Iden·
is not primarily considered as a self
In the first place, back of all instructify the ends ·and interests of the in·
among other selves, but as an Apperception lies the relation of the child to the
dividual with those of the soc:i~I group.
tlollsmasse. The child's relations to the
teacher ~~d apout it lie the relations of
the cryil~ Jo 1th~ other children in the
pth~r(l1ernbers ofJ~.~ · group,towhichhe .
These more .g~ner~Lpurpose~ .gf the .ip·
. itiatory ·. cerern9p.ies .•·werealso,\·at<times • · .· · belgpgs, have nci irrunecHate bearing .pn ·. •·. schoolroomand on the playground. It is,
however, of interest to ·note that so far as
cunningly acjapted to enhance the
·the material · nor Ofl the •teaming
it.
the material ·of instruction is concerned
· authority of the medicine man .or · the
The ·banishment from the traditional
an ideal situation has been conceived to
control over food and wornen by the
school work of play and of any adult acbe one in which the personality of the
older men in the community.
tivities in which the chHd could have a
.· ... .. · · •. Whatever~pipiOfl onem£ty·.h,C)Jd:ofthe ·. . p~. ~:·as ..a · · chilg, :i.e. ,>t~~ bctnishrnel'lf:: of ·. · · teac:he(~isapp~ars .as C(:),'J1Pletely aspos- .
slbJe:behind the .· proc:~ss · .of .1earnlng•. 1n
:.••. ihterpretati'()~·\>~hich··..• folk~p~y#f1Dlqgy .·· ·· pro.~~s~e~ · ih whic;~··.1~-~ child can: bec9n~
the acfo~l process of instruction the em·
and anthropologyhave given·o.f .this earscious ()f himselfi~ relation ' to others,
phasis llpon the relation of pupil and
ly phase of educ(ltion, no one would
means that the process of learning has
teacher in the consciousness of the child
deny, I imagint?,Jhe possibility of studyas little social content as possible.
has been felt to be unfortunate. In like
An explanation of the different ating the educatipn of the savage child
mann~r. tl;t~ .instinctive .social .relations
:scientificany •. f10r / that . this W(:W. l~be a
till.Ides iplhe traiping of the .c hild in ~he
\ p~ychologic;al (· st_u9y~ ·.•lmitc:tti<:>p( play.• < primitiVt? ·. ·and )n "th'e ·r-podern ·.·.•civUi;ed _·.·. between ::the children ·in school hours ·is
repress~d~ In ·the process ofmemorizing
.'emotional tensions favoring the acquire•
cCIJT1munities · is fou:nd,>In ·. part, · ill the
ment of clan rnyths and cults,·. and ·. the
' division of labor between the school on
and reciting a lesson. or working out a
problem .in arithmetic a vivid consciousformation ofclanjudgments of evaluathe one side, and the home and the shop
ness of the personality ofthe teacher in
orthe farm on the other. The business of
tion, these must be all interpreted and
his relationship to thatofJhe child would
formulated by some form of psychology.
stgr,ing the mind •... with .·. ideas, '. b(Jth
. Th~·. particul13r:fgrl11 :whi<:~i. h<2s,:~~~lt . ~!lh • ,n')(lt7rials.· and rneth()~s; . hasbe~n. assj~~- ... Imply e.1the!rthat the. tea~herw~s obliged ·
these .·. phenomena >·and .· ··J'r()c:~sses •.is
ed:to.the school. T~~ task of organizing
to exerc;i.~e discipline to carry on the process ofinstruction, and this must in the
and sodalizing the self to which these
social psycho fogy. The , important
nature of the case constitute friction and
materials and methods belong is left to
features of the situation would be found
division of attention, ·or else that the
not in the structure of the idea to be
the home and the industry or p,rofession,
child's interest is .·distracted from the
tg<the Rlaygro1.md! m~ street andsodety
assimilated considered as materi"I of in~
· structionfor anyc;?ild•.nor in .tr~urie~9f
iJ1 g~~~~~I. A ~·~1,ilt dE?Cl' .· of •Jnoder9•.. subJ~9ttm~tter of the Je~~on~ to. some·
~ssodation wh.i<:h would guarante.e their · . e~ucational Hteratu.re .~urns ·upon the
thing in:<which the · personality of the
.

of
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teacher and pupil mightfind some other
content;. for, even a tea.c:;her's approyal
and a child's delight <thereir has no
essential relation to the··· mere subject~
matter of arithmetic or< English. It. certainly has no such relationship as that
implied in apprenticeship,. in the boy's .
helping on the farm orthe girl's helping
in the housekeeping, has no such relationship as that of members of an athletic team to each other. In these latter instances, the vivid cons5iousness of the
self of the child and of his master, ofthe
parents whom he helps and of the associates with whom he plays is part of the
child's consciousness of what he is doing, and his consciousn~$s of these personal relationships involves no division
of attention. Now it had been a part of
the fallacy of an intellectualistic
pedagogy that a divided' attention was
necess.aryto insure applJ<:ation of atten·
tion - that the rewards{ and especially
the punishments, of the school hung be·
fore the child's mind to catch the attention that .was wanderingJrom the task;
and through their assotjiations with th~

the child - is nothis own problem the recognitiorr himself a~ ~~cing ·a
task and a taskmaster is no p~~hof the
solution of the problem. But a difficulty
which the child feels and brings to his
parent or teacher for solution is helped
on toward interpretation by the consciousness of the child's relation to his
pastors and masters. Just insofar as the
subject-matter of instruction can be
brought into the form of problems arising in the experience of the chH9 ..,.... just
so far will the relation of the childto the
instructor become a part of the natural
solution of the problem - actual success of a teacher depends ·in large
measure upon thi~ 5apacity •to ~tate.the
subject-matter of ·instruction in' terms of
the experience of· the children. The
recognition of the value of industrial and
vocational training comes back at once
to this, that w~(;)tthe child has tgle~rn·is
what he wants to acquire, to bec(>l-ne the
man. Under these conditions·ins_truction
takes on frankly the form of conversation, as much sought by the pu.pil as the
instructor.

9f

about such marketing and shopping and
bl)il~~ng .as neyer . . w:~e·~nsea or landi

thatone sees that the social form. of in·
shuction is a form only fof'the writer of
the arithmetic~ When further we consider
how utterly inadequate· ·.the teaching
fore~ .of our. publk Sfhools is to tran~· •.
form ·this matter into •. co11crete experi~:
ence of the children or even into their
own experience, the hopelessness of the
situation is overwhelming. Ostwald l')as
\Yritt~n •a .textbook of c:h~roistry for t~~ ·
secondary school which. h~s done what'
every textbook should do. It is not only
that the material shows real respect for
the i.ntelligence of the student, but it ls
so C>f~anized that th~>~7velopment o.f
the subject-matter is in reality the actlcm.·
and r.eaction of one mind· upon another
mind. The dictum of .the Platonic
Socrates, that one mu~t follow the argum~11t where< it lead~. JJ} t,~.~. dialogu~····
should be the motto ofthe;wFiter of text: :.
books.
·.
It has beenindicated already that Jang.
u~g7 being essentia 1.IY ip · its natur7
con.\
th..'.i.n. . l<lng.. with>th. e. c::~ilci. is t~pdered
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· ''The dictl.lm of the Platonic S()crates, <that one
must follow the argument where it leads. in the
·dialogue, should be the 111otto of
the.writer.of textbooks."

schoolwork .to bring itpa<;:k to the task.
This involves a continual vibration of attention on the part ofthe average child
between the task and the sanctions .of
school discipline. ·ft is ~>nly the
psychology .• of school '~i~cipline ·that is
social. The pains and•·••penalties, .. the
pleasures of success in •. competition, of
favorable mention of all sorts implies
vivid self·consclousnes$. It is evident
that advantage wouldf()llow from making the consciousness•· of self or selves
which is the life of the child's play - on
its competition or cooperation - have
as essential a place in h1struction. To use
Professor Dewey's · phrase, instruction
should' be an. interchange of experience
in which the child brings his experience
to be interpreted by the experience of
the parent or teacher•. This recognizes
that education is interd1arige of ideas, .is
conversation - belongs to a universe of
discourse. If the lesson •ls· simply set for

I take it therefol'eto J:?e a sci~(ltifictask
to which education should set itself that
of making the subject-matter of its instruction the material of personal intercourse between pupils and i?~~n.1ctors,
and between th~ children th~qi~elves;
The conversation of concrete iridiyiduals
must be substituted for the pale abstrac·
tions of thought.
To a large extent our schooL()rganization ·reserves t~e use of the pers()pal relation between teacher and taugf.it for the
negative side, for the prohibitions. The
lack of interest in the personal content
of the lesson is in fact startling when one
considers thatJt is the person~fform in
which the instruction should be given.
The best illustration of this lack of interest we find in th.e problems which disgrace our arithmetics. They ar(!\supposed matters ofc<mverse, but their content
is so bare, their abstractions so raggedly
covered with the form of. questions

cfet~ b}'

taking on . the:toqfi of .conver~a·
has been also indicated thatthis
can take place •only• ·when the thought
has reference to a real•problem in the exl'~ri~nce .of the chil?; The further deman? for. control ov~r at~(;!ntion. carri~~ ..
iJs back to the conditioos'of attention~
Here again we find that traditional
school practice depends· upon social
consciousness. for bringing the wand7r-.
ing. ~ttention. back to tlur task, when it
finds thatthe subjective conditions of attention to the material of instruction are ·
lacking, and even attempts to carry over
c,t. formal self-consci()~~ru~ss into. atten\
tiol'l,.iWhen through. t~e sens.e of duty t~~·
pupilis called upon to identify the solu~
tion of the problem with himself. On the
other hand, we have in vocational instn1ction the situation• in \¥hich •the swdepthas identified hi~· iJT'lpulses wit~ t~.~ .
subject-matter of the tas.k.Jn the former' .
case, as in the case·· of inStfuction, our
tion~Jt
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" ..• actual success as a teacher depends in large measure upon
(the) capacity to state the subject-matter of instruction in terms
of the experience of the children."

traditional practice makes use ot the
self-consciousness of the child in its
least effective ferm. The material of the
lesson is not identified with the impulses
of the child. The attention is not due to
the organization of impulses to outgoing
activity. The organization of typical
school attention is that of a school self,
expressing subordination to school auth·
ority and identity of conduct with that of
all the other children in the room. It is
largely inhibitive - a consciousness of
what one must not do, but the inhibi·
tions do not arise out of the consciousness of what one Is doing. It is the nature
of school attention to abstract from the
content of any specific task. The child
must give attention first and then undertake any task which is assigned to him,
while normal attentiqn is essentially
selective and depends for its inhibitions
upon the specific act.
Now consciousness of self should follow upon that of attention, and consists
in a reference of the act, which attention
has mediated, to the social self. It brings
about a conscious organization of this
particular act with the individual as the
whole - ma'kes it his act, and can only
be effectively accomplished when the attention is an actual organization of impulses seeking expression. The separa·
tion between the self, implied in typical
school attention, and the content of the
school tasks, makes such an organization difficult if not impossible.
· In a word attention is a process of organization of consciousness. It results in
the reenforcement and inhibitions of
perceptions and ideas. It is always a part
of an act and involves the relation of that
act to the whole field of consciousness.
This relation to the whole field of con·

sciousness finds its expression in con·
sciousness of self. But the consciousness
of self depends primarily upon social relations. The self arises in consciousness
pari passu with the recognition and definition of other selves. It is therefore un·
fruitful if not impossible to attempt to
scientifically control the attention of
children in their formal education, un·
less they are regarded as social beings in
dealing with the very material of instruction. It is this essentially social character
of attention which gives its peculiar grip
to vocational training. From the psy·
chological point of view, not only the
method and material but also the means
of holding the pupils' attention must be
socialized.
Finally a word may be added with ref·
erence to the evaluations - the emo·
tional reactions - which our education
should call forth. There is no phase of
our public school training that is so defective as this. The school undertakes to
acquaint the child. with the ideas and
methods which he is to use as a man.
Shut up in the history, the geography,
the language and the number of our cur·
ricula should be the values that the
country, and its human institutions,
have; that beauty has in nature and art;
and the values involved in the control
over nature and social conditions.
The child in entering into his heritage
of ideas and methods should have the
emotional response which the boy has in
a primitive community when he has
been initiated into the mysteries and the
social code of the group of which he has
become a citizen. We have a few remain·
ders of this emotional response, in the
confirmation or conversion and en·
trance into the church, in the ~nitiation

into the fraternity, and in the passage
from apprenticeship into the union. But
the complexities of our social life, and
the abstract intellectual character of the
ideas which society uses have made it in·
creasingly difficult to identify the attain·
ment of the equipment of a man with the
meaning of manhood and citizenship.
Conventional ceremonies at the end
of the period of education will never ac·
complish this. And we have to further
recognize that our education extends for
many far beyond the adolescent period ·
to which this emotional response natur·
ally belongs. What our schools can give
must be given through the social con·
sciousness of the child as that con·
sciousness develops. It is only as the
child recognizes a social import in what
he is learning and doing that moral
education can be given.
I have sought to indicate that the pro·
cess of schooling in its barest form can·
not be successfully studied by a scien·
tific psychology unless that psychology
is social, i.e., unless it recognizes that
the processes of acquiring knowledge,
of giving attention, of evaluating in emo·
tional terms must be studied in their
relation to selves in a social con·
sciousness. So far as education is concerned, the child does not become social
by learning. He must be social in order
to learn.
-from Science, XXXI (1910), 688-693, orlglnally entitled, "The Psychology of Soclal Consciousness lmplled In Instruction."
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The Diary of Adam and Eve
Monday. This new creature with the long
hair.is a good deal in the way. It is always
hanging around and following me about.
I don't like this; I am not used to com·
pany. I wish it would stay with the other
animals ... Cloudy to-day, wind in the
east; think we shall have rain... We?
Where did I get that word? - I remem·
ber now - the new creature uses it.
Tuesday. Been examining the great wat·
erfall. It is the finest thing on the estate, I
think. The new creature calls it Niagara
Falls - why, I am sure I do not know.
Says it looks like Niagara Falls. That is
not a reason, it is mere waywardness and
imbecility. I get no chance to name anything myself. The new creature names
everything that come along, before I can
get in a protest. And always that same
pretext is offered - it was superfluous,
then. The world evidently raised me in
its respect; and indeed it is a large, good
world and will bear repetition. It says it is
not an It, it is a She. This is probably
doubtful...
Tuesday. She has littered the whole
estate with execrable names and offen·
sive signs:
THIS WAY TO THE WHIRLPOOL
THIS WAY TO GOAT ISLAND
CAVE OF THE WINDS THIS WAY
She says this park would make a tidy
summer resort if there was any custom
for it. Summer resort - another invention of hers - just words, without any
meaning. What is a summer resort? But
it is best not to ask her, she has such a
rage for explaining.
Friday. She has taken to beseeching me
to stop going over the Falls. What harm
does it do? Says it makes her shudder. I
wonder why; I have always done it always liked the plunge, and coolness. I
supposed it was what the Falls were for.
They have no other use that I can see,
and they must have been made for
something. She says they were only
made for scenery - like the rhinoceros
and the mastodon.
I went over the Falls in a barrel - not
satisfactory to her. Went over in a tub still not satisfactory. Swam the Whirl·
pool and the Rapids in a fig-leaf suit. It
got much damaged. Hence, tedious
complaints about my extravagance. I am
too much hampered here. What I need is
change of scene.
Saturday. I escaped last Tuesday night,
and traveled two days, and built me
another shelter in a secluded place, and
obliterated my tracks as well as I could,
but she hunted me out by means of a
beast which she has tamed and calls a

wolf, and came making that pitiful noise
again, and shedding that water out of the
places she looks with. I was obliged to
return with her, but will presently
emigrate again when occasion offers.
She engages herself in many foolish
things; among others, to study out why
the animals called lions and tigers live
on grass and flowers, when, as she says,
the sort of teeth they wear would in·
dicate that they were intended to eat
each other. This is foolish, because to do
that would be to kill each other, and that
would introduce what, as I understand it,
is called "death"; and death, as I have
been told, has not yet entered the Park.
Which is a pity, on some accounts.
·
Sunday. Pulled through.
.Monday. I believe I see what the week is
for: it is to give time to rest up from the
weariness of Sunday. It seems a good
idea .... She has been climbing that tree
again. Clodded her out of it. She said no·
body was looking. Seems to consider
that a sufficient justification for chanc·
ing any dangerous thing. Told her that.
The word justification moved her admir·
ation - and envy, too, I thought. It is a
good word.
Tuesday. She told me she was made out
of a rib taken from my body. This is at
least doubtful, if nor more than that. I
have not missed any rib .... She is in
much trouble about the buzzard; says
grass does not agree with it; is afraid she
can't raise it; thinks it was intended to
live on decayed flesh. The buzzard must
get along the best it can with what is pro·
vided. We cannot overturn the whole
scheme to accommodate the buzzard.
Saturday. She fell in the pond yesterday
when she was looking at herself in it,
which she is always doing. She nearly ·
strangled, and said it was most uncom·
fortable. This made her sorry for the
creatures which live in there, which she
calls fish, for she continues to fasten
names on to things that don't need
them and don't come when they are called by them, which is a matter of no con·
sequence to her, she is such a numb·
skull, anyway; so she got a lot of them
out and brought them in last night and
put them in my bed to keep warm, but I
have noticed them now and then al I day
and I don't see that they are any happier
there than they were before, only
quieter. When night comes I shall throw
them outdoors. I will 11ot sleep with them
again, for I find them clammy and. unpleasant to lie among when a person
hasn't anything on.
Sunday. Pulled through.
Mark Twain

GHOSTS
AND
ETERNITY
"What do people generally say?" mut·
tered Svidrigailov, as though speaking
to himself, looking aside and bowing his
head: "They say, 'You are ill, so what appears to you is only unreal fantasy.' But
that's not strictly logical. I agree that
ghosts only appear to the sick, but that
only proves that they are unable to ap·
pear except to the sick, not that they
don't exist."
"Nothing of the sort," Raskolnikov in·
sisted irritably .
"No? You don't think so?" Svid·
rigailov went on, looking at him deliberately. "But what do you say to this argument (help me with it): ghosts are as it
were shreds and fragments of other
worlds, the beginning of them. A man in
health has, of course, no reason to see
them, because he is above all a man of
this earth and is bound for the sake of
completeness and order to live only in
this life. But as soon as one is ill, as soon
as the normal earthly order of the organism is broken, one begins to realise the
possibility of another world; and the
more seriously ill one is, the closer
becomes one's contact with that other
world, so that as soon as the man dies he
steps straight into that world. I thought
of that long ago. If you believe in a future
life, you could believe in that, too."
"I don't believe in a future life," said
Raskolnikov.
Svidrigailov sat lost in thought.
"And what if there are only spiders
there, or something of that sort," he said
suddenly.
'He is a madman,' thought Raskolnikov.
"We always imagine eternity as some·
thing beyond our conception,
something vast, vast! But why must it be
vast? Instead of all that, what if it's one
little room, like a bathhouse in the country, black and grimy and spiders in every
corner, and that's all eternity is? I some·
times fancy it like that."
"Can it be you can imagine nothing
juster and more comforting than that?"
Raskolnikov cried, with a feeling of
anguish.
"Juster? And how can we tell, perhaps
that is just, and do you kriow it's what I
would certainly have made it," answered
Svidrigailov, with a vague smile.
Fedor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment
Part Four.
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Stephen M. Johnson
~

and .Robert A. Pines • .

.g~p. :·the.: ~dt(!ria ·.- for :9al1girig :perform· ·
group of ··fifth through •· : · eighth•grade
: aiice mastel'Y~. rernairi ·iHµ$ive. As a de~ .·. teachers. in Newark; New Jersey. Their
'for' the .iridiyidtialization and per~ . . students .were part .of the experimental
sonalization of teacher education, its
group in a state-supported two-year val·
proHferative competent'y lists render it
idation study of Matthew Lipman and
vulnerable to ''reductionist" criticism.
Ann Margaret Sharp's "Philosophy for
Yet, CBTE has ·had, in our view, the
Children" program. The study was C'>n·
significant if residual effect of refocusducted by the Educational Testing Serv·
ing the attention of _teacher educators
ice in both Newark and Pompton Lakes,
upon (a) the relati_onship between teach·
New Jersey.
. er performance ancl student . achieveWe began by examining the teaching
ment, (b) specific. teacher behaviors
manuals which accompany .the novels
which long-standing research has shown
Harry Stottlemeler's ·Discovery (grades
to.·.be•. • positi.v~lyj~lated . tb .student
5-6).and Lisa (grades,7-8), around which
' act\foverrie~t .::· (Rp~en~hine : & .. Furst; .' . the insfructionalprogtam was to be con·
. 19.7 l), and (c) the iJJ:lpc>rtalic~ ofgenerat~ ·. structed (Lipman .& Sharp, 1976; l 977).
·.. ing q\.i~Mti:t~tiye·~~ncf ·q,ualitatiye :~upport
Several prerequisites for teac.h ing. phil·
J9r : ~yp()the~iz~ci;. t~~~her::. behaviqr:·shld• · . . ·.psqphic(tl ttlin.~ir)g .· . ar~· . dt~d : there: .(a)
.·:' ~n~.'.:~cp·1·~~~rij~nt::T~l~ti?ri.i;1lips~ : , · : >··. · '..· a~oidance .: of irid·o~tdnaUon, (b) ·respect
•:·:·':··. ~ · resµlt' ha,s · ~e~tj·;·tpe : ~esign of.teach· ' ' '. forchildren'sopinions,·and (c) evocation
of children's trust. These' served as car·
: er-training m()dels ~rquncfprocess~prod·
nerstones for a. ·rrarnework :· of teacher
uct .hypotheses. ~Because . the validity of
pre-college ·philosophy .programs · will
skills and characteristics. which we hy·
pothesized would contribute to the pro·
very .likely tUrn ·on the demonstrated
ability of teachers to re.alize projected
gram's broad objectives: (a) the improve·
student outcomes, the -teacher behavior·
ment of reasoning ability, (b) the
student achievement paradigm suggests
development of creativity, and (c) per·
at least a direction ·in ·which the related
sonal development.
teacher training might proceed.
The additional teacher variables we
This, in fact, was the direction we took
identified included a number of those
in designing a· training program for a
described in the previously cited re·
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for students in simulated and real
search literature which were particularly
suited to the P4C program, and other
classroom settings. We met with the
essentially methodological skills specifgroup of teachers· for two hours each
ically tied to the logical and philosophweek, supplementing this with several
ical content of the novels. The former
classroom visits to each per year. Rolewere (d) clarity, (e) variability, (f) enthusplaying and video-taped classroom obiasm, (g) task-orientation, (h) teacher in·
servation were the principal means we
directness, (i) the use ofstructuringcom·
used to observe and self-observe, prac·
ments, (j) the use of higher-order questice and assess performance. All the
tions, and (k) probing. The latter, which
teachers were able to demonstrably
presupposed subject-matter knowledge,
achieve the required (third) criterion levwere (1) maintaining relevance, (m) anel, although some were surprised by-how
swering, (n) listening, and (o) the teacher
much guided and attentive effort it took.
as model, and were suggested in both
Skill in questioning is also tactically
the manuals and Philosophy in the .· central to success with P4 C and can
Classroom (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan,
further illustrate • the application • of
CBTE as it derivesfrom one explicit con1977). Obviously, considerable overlap
existed between these two categories.
ception of the teaching role. The teacher
Placement in one as opposed to the
must knowingly question. Ideas, reasother was discretionary.
ons, assumptions and conclusions must
Taken collectively, the teaching varibe effectively elicited.
ables suggest a role which permeates
Therefore, using Classroom Teaching
the classroom behavior of the pre-colSkllls: A handbook (Cooper et al.,
lege philosophy teacher(Sarbin & Allen,
1977), we trained. the teachers to: (a)
1968) .and .accords• with•••pervasive noknow the distinction between lower· and
tions about learning and living in P4 C.
higher-order questions as they reflect
The teacher should be concerned; a
the content of Harry Stottlemeier's Disfacilitator or provacateur; the creator of
covery and Lisa; (b) perform specified
a nurturant climate for, and process of,
high-order questioning tasks related to
philosophical inquiry. Perhaps most imthe novels; and (c) demonstrate the conportantly, he or she must be a moral and
sequences of their teaching with stu·
intellectual model for students.
dents as reflectedjn commensurately diHaving identified teacher role characvergent though~. The cognitive .domain
teristics, we clearly needed to operation- I of Bloom's "Taxonomy of Educational
alize each for training purposes. BeObjectives" operationally defined the
cause we wished to stress observable
level of both teacher question and studperformance, we f?o,rrow~d significantly,
ent response. The teachers were relatedbut not exclusiveiy, .. from established
ly trained to increase the mean one.
competency-based trainin.g procedures
second "wait-time" which teachers rouand materials. Some examples may be
tinely demonstrate before re-asking or
illustrative.
rephrasing questions. With much time
As noted, one of the prerequisites for
and effort, our·. teachers acquired this
instruction in the Philosophy for Childnew habit, thus• increasing the quantity
ren program is respect for children and
and quality of student participation in
their opinions. This characteristic, like
discussion. -Information sessions, peer
its companion prerequisites, bears diteaching, and taped classroom performrectly upon human relations in the class·
ance were all helpful in learning this par·
room, and by extension, upon the affect•
ticular skill. Again, .all of the teachers
ive climate created. Th¢ research psyeventually del'llonstrated minimally ·acchologist Robert Carkhuff has developceptable levels of performance - aled a model for human relations training
though again, some were shocked at
in the classroom which identifies eight
how long it took to learn and strengthen
dimensions of healthy "helping.. relatheir new habits.
tionships, of which "perceiving and re·
This same feature - habits taking
sponding with respect'' is one. Carkhuff
longer to change and new skills taking
provides a four-point scale for rating
longer to learn .than we anticipated, re·
each in. practice. This was the model
curred in the•• parts of our program that
(presented most cornprehensively in
were not strictly competency-based.
Gazda, et al., 1973) we adapted for use
Training the teachers to teach the philoswith the Newark teachers.
·
ophical material of the novels would be,
We designed their training to foster
we anticipated, simply a matter of
both the ability to identify and discrimin·
holding our own regular philosophical
ate among the four scale levels of
discussions with them (modelling), givteacher respect and ·to demonstrate a
ing them the basics of Aristotelian logic
minimally acceptable degree of respect
(by a few sessions of direct instruction),
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and then providing opportunities for
practice. We soon found, however, that it
was not that easy.
All of our teachers agreed that the
most "fun" of our sessions together were
those in which we, all of us, explored the
ideas and possibilities raised by• .the
children's novels. The philosophically
rich Harry and Lisa do accomplish what
they were meant to - lead the interested
child to immature but genuinely philosophical thoughtfulness, and reawaken in
thoughtful adult teachers the enthusiasm of youthful discovery. While we us·
ed the splendid sixth ••chapter of Phil·
osophy In the Classroom theoretically
to distinguish philosophical discussion
from lively bull-session, it was our own
live and lengthy philosophical discussions that translated this theoretical
ideal into a reality recognizable enough
to serve our participant-teachers as
model for their own classrooms.
Though we manag¢cl far fewer of thei.;e
lengthy · discussions among ourselves
than we had intended, such modelling
was indeed enough for that third of our
teachers who turned. out to be the "best"
at teaching the philosophical materials
in their classrooms .. Differing in style,
grade-level, and subject specialty, these
were . the teachers who. were confident
enough in themselves easily to enjoy
open-ended exploration and to deal
"eyes-level" with their children. Since
they had been dealing this way before
our program, and already enjoyed the
marked respect and trust of their
children, these teachers needed only the
materials of the novels .and the model~
ling of our shared philosophical disc.us·
sions to do full.••• justice to P,.C's
philosophical intentions and fully tap
the latent enthusiasm of their students.
With the rest of.our teachers, however,
no amount of mere modelling would
have been enough. That is, given only
modelling of the philosophical content
and direct instruction of the logical
material, a second third of our teachers
would have effectively used P4 C merely
(!) to raise the level and interest of their
reading classes· •and to improve the
logical and mathematical reasoning of
their students. The remaining third,
given only the materials and after-school
modelling, might • • not •have enhanced
their students' cla~sroorh experience at
all (however many• individual stud~nts
may have been privately "turned on" by
Harry and Lisa.)
So it was that, with two-thirds of our
teachers, teaching the philosophical
materials of Harry and Lisa would have
proved impossible without the very slow
......

·
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----·- ·-----·-----------------------ness to our educator's competency.
So it was that we ended up having to

-----·---~-----··-----~--

change of classroom habits effected by
our relentless use of and practice with
competency-based exercises, peerteaching, and classroom observations.
After sufficient practice with competency-based materials and peer-teaching in
our seminars, they were ready to be subjected to videotaping of their actual
classroom performances. The teachers'
viewing of these tapes, shared with their
peers in our seminars, drove them to
their strongest efforts to change their
classroom habits and deal effectively
with the philosophical materials. This
motivation was guided by our increasingly critical (but always specific and
constructive) comments during later
classroom observations. In this way only
did these less-apt teachers' overall per·
formances generally improve. Eventually, most became capable of holding (at
least occasionally) genuine philosophical discussions of the materials in Harry
and Lisa.
Competence in teaching the logical
materials of the program was much
more easily and predictably produced.
The content and skills are those of the
basics of Aristotelian logic; the basic
materials are the exercises in P4C's
teacher's manuals, supplemented by any
Introductory college text or simply with
homemade mimeograph explanations
and further exercises. We made and used
our own supplementary materials. The
surprise here (again) was how long it
took for our teachers to feel really secure
with the logical materials and content of
Harry and Lisa. The novels' logical
materials are as limited as they are vital.
But, as we learned, they won't be well
taught .at all - or even heartily attempted - unless and until the classroom
teachers are completely secure. with
them, i.e., confident that they can deal
effectively and comfortably with whatevery logical contin·gency or example
their ·children may raise.

devote a major portion of every week's
seminar to direct instruction and repetition and practice of the basic logical
materials. This proved not only to be not
a matter of boredom or discontent, but
to be a great relief and even fun for the
teachers. We found it impossible to be
too basic with logic, impossible to prac·
tice it too much, and impossible to lead
the teachers to real felt security in the
logic without extensive use of Venn
diagrams. From all our teachers (including the "best"), then, we learned: to
assume nothing logically; to practice the
logical materials every week; and to use
the Venn diagrams without fear of overuse. Most of the teachers used the Venn
diagrams in their own classrooms as ·
well. Most were marvelously inventive in
making the diagrams into enjoyable drill
games with the children, and all were delighted with the results (including the
children's enthusiasm). Meanwhile, all of
the teachers were reassured by their own
competence with the Venn diagrams.
Thus it was that competency-based instruction in our training program was
complimented by the modelling of philosophical discussion and direct instruction in, and constant practice of, basic
logical materials. In the process, we were
taught by our teachers - and all of us
together were taught by our teachers'
children - how dynamically fresh and
richly exciting both logical thinking and
expansive philosophical exploration can
be. As the children's excited creativity
taught all of us, so did our teacher's own
modelling, in their classrooms, show us
how very varied and creative are the
ways in which the possibilities of precollege philosophy can be realized with
grade-school children.
·
Similar mutual stimulation and enrichment occurred between the two of
us. Our philosopher's amateur enthusiasm gave extra life and down-to-earth-

based exercises, while our educator's
extra-disciplinary depth brought fresh
insights and practical clarity to our philosophical discussions and logical exercises. This interplay made all the
materials much more fun for both of us
and far more lively, comfortable, and ac·
cessible to our teacher trainees.
The results of the New Jersey validation study were encouraging (Pompton
Lakes, New Jersey Board of Education,
1978). In Newark, significant Improve..
ment was attained . by the experimental
group reflecting each of the major programmatic objectives. Significance was
also achieved in basic skill performance
(reading and mathematics) as a result of
exposure to the P4C program - a noteworthy outcome given current clamorings for accountability in that sphere.
Moreover, qualitative evidence was obtained which indicated that the teachers
of the experimental group in Newark
had developed more positive expectations for student performance. It is, of
course, quite probable that that result
translates into an improved interpersonal classroom climate and the likelihood
that students can better meet such
teacher expectations (Good & Brophy,
1973).
These results, of course, cannot be interpreted as validating our teacher·
training program at Newark. The study
was not designed for that purpose. The
study did, however, incorporate some of
the critical design elements which have
been proposed to assess the effectiveness of competency-based teacher-education programs (Turner, 1972). At a
less ambitious level of assessment, the
positive judgments we made about
teacher competence on the basis of
their ongoing observable behavior did
provide supportive " ... evidence about
the efficacy of the teacher education
program (p.5)."
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Kierkei)aard
on Chirdhood
Kierkegaard wrote these reflections on
childhood In 1837. Perhaps they are not so
much about childhood itself as about the
mistaken ways In which we tend to Judge
that period of life. Kierkegaard Indicts two
common Judgments of childhood as being
fundamentally Incorrect:
1. There Is the view that earlier stages are
of Importance only because they condition ·
later ones. The best thing to do, then, Is to
pass through such stages Just as quickly as
possible, since they have no Intrinsic value.
Childhood Is such a phase. For parents It Is
a tiresome period, dedicated mainly to look·
Ing after the child's well-being. One must
amuse children to while away the time,
tel/Ing them empty tales over and over
again. Those who write these pointless
stories thereby encourage children to be
passive and docile. Such literature for child·
ren - Kierkegaard scoffs at It as "poetic
rlnsewater" - is Incapable of prodding
children to Inquire, or to think for themselves.
2. The other mistaken view Is that taken

I

by adults whose primary aim Is to Impart
"useful knowledge" to children. Their stories aim to help children learn other
languages, or the geography of far-away
countries, or how to read music. And when
they do tell children stories, they Invariably
add, "but you realize, it was only a fairy tale."
Kierkegaard's own position is that
childhood Is rich In values uniquely Its own.
Yet It is a period in which children are
dependent upon teachers for Intellectual
and emotional nourishment. These
teachers should have mastered the
Socratic mode of questioning, and should
have reproduced the quality of childhood
experience in themselves. They must know
what the life of childhood requires, as well
as how and when to give It. Further, they
must know how to encourage children to
think about things that matter to them. And
they must be capable of arousing In
children the desire to ask, rather than
fending off reasonable questions with "Are
you going to let me finish this tale or not?"

f after reading the essay someone were to say that I do
indeed speak of the art of storytelling but in the entire
essay seem rather to rant against it, I wou Id now wholly
agree, inasmuch as I have spoken only against misuse,
and I would also point out that I have used the expression
storytelling in a more comprehensive sense involving
everything with which one occupies a child's mind outside of formal schooling, not all of which can accurately
be called play, and in-which, of course, storytelling does
play a major role.
That so many people are engaged in telling stories to
children is a natural consequence of the fact that there
are a great number of children and that children have a
deeply rooted desire to hear stories, and yet there are
very few people who have talent for storytelling. As a
result much harm is done. There are two recommended
ways of telling stories to children, but between these two
there is a multiplicity of wrong ways.
First, there is the way which children's nurses (and
other who may be so categorized) unconsciously follow.
They open up a whole world of fantasy to the child, and
the fact that they are sincerely convinced of the truth of
their stories 1 must instill a salutary tranquillity in the
child, no matter how fantastic the content itself may be.
Only when the child himself detects that ~he teller does

One must spend time preparing to tell
children stories, Kierkegaard suggests, by
going to the trouble of finding out what the
children are studying in school, what
they're thinking about outside of school,
and then by selecting stories that bear on
these experiences. The aim should be to
nourish children's inquisitiveness, sense of
wonder, and desire for understanding.a s
well as to bring something poetic Into their
everyday existence. If we fall to motivate
children to learn, or if we present them with
nothing but dry, fragmented factual knowledge unrelated to their everyday existence,
we deprive them of access to the standards
by which the presence or absence of
meaning In life may be Judged, and we deny
them the experiences which could make
their /Ives meaningful.
From s;ren Kierkegaard's Journals.&
Papers, Vol. 1, edited and translated by
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1967) pp. 113-119. Reprinted with permission.

not believe stories are the stories damaging - yet not
because of the content itself but because of the untruth in
regard to the teller - because of the mistrust and suspiciousness which the child gradually develops.
The second way can be followed only by someone who
in perfect clarity has reproduced the life of childhood,
who knows what this life requires, who knows what is
good for it and now from this vantage point offers
children intellectual-emotional nourishment which is
beneficial for them, who knows how to be a child;
whereas the nursemaids basically are children. (Fortunately. children are able to derive good from both ways,
and following the second way certainly does not exclude
appreciation of the first. On the other hand, the semieducated usually eliminate the process of development
valued by one who has a mature view of life.)
The preparation is not elaborate. The husband comes
home from the busy office. puts on his slippers, gets his
pipe, kisses mother on the cheek and says, "Well, my
dear," (this is to accustom the children to affectionate
behavior) - and now we see a scene common to most
children's books - "Uncle Frank," who tells the stories
which the children have eagerly anticipated all day, and
little Fritz and Mary coming on the run, clapping their
hands: "Uncle Frank 2 is going to tell stories!" The mother
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clusters the children around her, w'hhthe smallest in her
arms, and says, "Listen nicely, now, to what your dear uncle is telling!"
As for the procedure for the storytelling, for our story·
tellers~ all general RWsuits •on behalfofc.h iJdren out·
side of formal instruction, and this, too, as muchas possible, should be Socratic. One should arouse in children a
desire to ask, instead of fending off a reasonable question, which perhaps goes beyond Uncle Frank's general
information.or .in . some other way (inconveniehceshim,
with the words: "Stupid child! Can't he keep still while I
am telling the story?'' To prevent more serious scenes,
the mother assures that "he will not do itany more." The
whole point is to bring the poetic into touch with their
j lives in every wa~; to exercise a ~g~er of enc~aritment, ·.
·to let a glimpse appear at the most unexpected moment
and thenvanish. One should not schedule the poetic for
certain hours and certain days. Children do not jump
around such a person .l ike loutish calves with dangling
legs.andclap ••their ·. ha.r•ci§ .becausett-iey .• are goi~gto hear
a story.; Him they approach in an ·open, free, confident
way, entrustthemselves to him, initiate him into many little secrets; tell him about their play.and he knows how to
join in, also knowsho\Vto givetQ~ ~ame a more.seriou5
side. The children nev.e r distressJ1im orpesterhirn,·for
they have too much respect and esteem for him. 3
He knows what they are doing in school. He does not do
their homework with them but quietly inquires about
their lessons, masters them, n()tjr;i .order to quiz them,
not to ta~eaparticulatpart anddrc:tlT)atize it for them, not
to give them an opportunity to show off if there are others
around - but rather to let a glimpse suddenly leap forth,
to connect it in a special way to what usually occupies
them, yet entirely en p~~sant, so that the chlld's soul is
electrified>andfeels, .c:!s it were, the . omniprtsence of
something poetic, which is indeed precious to him but
which he nevertheless dares not approach too closely. 4 In
this way an intellectual-emotional mobility is constantly
nurtured, a continuing attentivene~sto what. tt)eyhear
and see, ·anattentiveness whichOlhferwise has fobe produced by external means, for example, by having the
children come from a dimly lighted room into a brightly
lighted room, where "Unde Frank" is siUing,by'Nearying
themthe\\V.h ole day b~<talking . abpl)t''how wonderful'' it
is to hear Uncle Franktell stories . etc.
··

Tntervene alarmingly i.n their lives {anxiety can actually
stem from this cause and not always from trivial complaining.) Those daily assurances, "You are happy now,
but wait until you are older 5 - then the troubles will
c9me," •·.etc.t have a h~{.l"llf ul effect, inasmuch as they
strike atthe roots of the child and instill a peculiar anxiety as to how long he can continue to be happy (and in this
way they are already unhappy). If this continuousJeremiad makes no impression, it naturally has the same harmful effect as all othermisplaced chatter.
This indefiniteness [in the Socratic approach]' might
seem to militate against a certain very proper demand for
rigor and clear limitation; this should rather be represent·
ed in the sc:hoolroom in the personality of the teacher
(here ·we are.c:oncerned with freetirpe);He who in childhood has never been under the gospel but only under law
never becomes free 6 - maybe this iswrong, but there is
something noble in it; whereas the more the law is
propounded, the more . rrinor ' mischief germinates,' and
Q()thingismore. capabl~ of .•·produci9g . enervation .••• The
eye has a power to call forth sprouts of the good and to
crush the evil - but misinterpreted rigor and discipline,
a daughter of indolence, almost permits one generation
to take reve9ge upon t~e nextforthE!.:trrashing itreceived itself and for the mishandling ltf1as suffered · - by
treating the next generation in like manner.
When one is a child and has not toys, one Is well pr0vided
for, because Jhen Imagination takes ?yer. I still re11lember
with amazement my childhood top, the only toy I had --what
acquaintance was as Interesting as this one? Yet it did not
belong wholly to me. It had, so to say, its official duties as an
actual top, and only then in its leisure did it become my diversion. In our day there are COIJlplaints thatan official holds too
1844
many offices,•·but this one encompassed ~II.

But then shouldn't one tell stories? Certainly, mythology and good fairy stories are what the child needs. Or
the child is allowed to read them himself and teltthem
and is then Socratkally corrected (gradually correcting
by questioning in such a mannerthat the child is by no
means set straight under the coercion of a tutor but
seems rather to be correcting others - and anyone who
9therwise understands hp\V to handle children \ViU .certainly not be in dange'r of encouraging arrogance). But
above all let this be impromptu, not at a set time and
I remember an example of how in such a life everything beplace; children should experience early in life that happicomes engendering, how everything the children read in the
ness is a fortunate constellation which one should enjoy
classics became reflected; when the~read of ostrc:1cism, they
\Vith gratitude but also kriow how to ~iscontinue in good
lntroducedit at once lntothelr play, etc.
tirT1e; and aboveall ones~ould not forget the point.o f the
And now those children's books for "well-behaved, Indusstory. (A mistake I can only touch upon here, although it
trious, obedient, lovable, innocent, unspoiled" children comes up again later, is this: continually and almost all
onsequently by presenting thern with a copy one says to
day long to tell trashy, empty stories and thereby manuhem that they are such, since otherwise. it . would be a
facture . thes~ readers of novels who clevour a vol~rne a
1837 ' . . day, one aftertheother, withoutanyspecific impre.ssion.)
misunderstanding to giyethem. the t)op,~.
However, even tho-ugh clarity prevails, a certain senFurthermore,_ one evokes certain self-activity (drawing
timentality can easily intrude if one forgets that adultand the like) because of the story, told in various ways,
hood has what childhood promised. We are inclined,
becomes related to a child's familiar environment.
however, to think thatitpromised .• ~J()t . more,especially
\. Now comesthe . questi~n:what signifi~ancedoes childwhen dealing with exceptionally alert childrei:i. :a nd so we
~ood .r~ally have? Is it a -s tage with significance only be-
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Fundamentally everyone is born to rule. This is bestseen in
children. Today I saw a little girl in her nurse's arms. They met
some acquaintances of the child's family.Th~ nurse held a
flower in herhand, and now every body, each and all, very sub·
missively had to smell the flower and say,"Achoo!' This was
repeated several times. If the nurse wanted to skip someone,
the little girl noticed It at once and gave her to understand
that she had to do everything exactly right. And then the little
female sovereign bestowed with a smile her highest favor
upon the one who sneezed exactly right.
Then the nurse wanted her to walk, but she leaned out a bit
from the nurse's arms, dropped her head coyly, and rewarded
the nurse with a kiss from beneath - affectedly, and yet with
1845
a childlikeness.

Storytelling has assumed a fantastic and lopsided
tendency. It has been considered UQreasonable and
damaging later to overstockthe child's imagination with
such stories. On the other hand, it has been considered
quite all right to tell something to while away the time
and amuse the children. Since it was merelyfor diversion
and they ·did not want to spend time in preparation, they
started those interminable silly tales aboutthe dog and
the cat, ek•• telling them with the most horrible monotony. The children, once they are spoiled, continually demand more and more editions of the same, always returning8 to the stereotype with one or more important alterations (for ~xample, that once it was a red dog, then a
black one.)
In the meantime this view was discovered to be wrong;
since, indeed, the time could be utilized better, could be
used for . something better even in the form of jest and
play. Two procedures evolved from this - either educate
the children morally, as it is called, or impart some useful
knowledge. The consequence of the second path I shall
touch upon slightly. There came as if bymagic a plague
of natural history, not textbooks but reading books and
all kinds of picture books to impart to the children the
vocabularies of modern languages, and '"'Uncle Frank"
told of his travels in Africa and designated the plants and
animals by their scientific names, and parents and others
asked:"What is nose in French?" etc. Or.oneotaught them
to pick out a simple piece on the pia,no; (If one really
wishes by such things to keep children from being embarrassed by being conspicuous.then on the other hand one
really ought not make children eager to be conspicuous.)
Out of all this there developed a completely atomized
knowledge which did not enter into a deeper relationship
to children and their existence [Existents],which was riot
appropriated in an intellectual-emotional way, and which
was thus deprived of any possible standard. As a result
people fell into the presumption that they were great
natural scientists and linguists. If only details are decisive, it is naturally quite incidental how many or how few
are required for mastery. Out of this arises seductive opportunism - and the busy Martha's who forget the one
thing needful. Of such atomized knowledge it is not true
that what is assimilated in youth is never forgotten in
old age •.•
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'"Nursery·tales" - this expression lmplles just as much about the mode of telling
the tales as it does about the content.
1

Unfortunately there Is a reason for Its always being an uncle who appears as the
central figure, for the parents' activity Is usually limited to making their appearance
on the monthly day·of·reckonlng as chief administrators or presenters of prizes for
noble deeds - In both cases with the precise and punctual conscience of a book·
keeper. If, then, there were any uncles, there would undoubtedly be plenty for them
to do.
1

We ourselves ought to learn from children, from their marvelous creativity, which
- unllke certain self·lmportant tutors - we ought to allow to prevail, remembering
Christ's words when he was twelve years old, "Old you not know that I must be
about my father's business?" - (I believe I have read something similar In one of
Mynster's sermons.) It Is better not to be quick with the prosaic switch, as was the
schoolteacher In Alferne, because children have deep feelings - and In this way
one avoids, among other things, (0 divine nemesis!) falling 1400 yards down
beneath the earth and becoming - a ninny.
•Chlldren are not deeply Interested In Greek mythology, at least not In that which In
more mature years Is regarded as the most maglnlcant (yet Hercules, possibly N.B. extraordinary deeds).
•Many begin this so early, while the children are still very small, that occaslonally It
occurs to such a chlld to do as the baby Abraham St. Clara tells about, who saw the
miserableness of the world so vividly at the time of birth that It ran back Into Its
mother's womb again. - Is this a way 10 strengthen a chlld for life? Does this not

enervale the child's whole life by depriving It of enthusiasm's perpetuum-moblle?
'A state becomes In a sense unfree In lhal II gives ilself law.
'This Is rooled In the haste of the times, which basically misunderstands every age
because It believes that each age-level exists merely for the sake of the next.
•Once in a while such people accidentally remember a more fanciful story from their
childhood, but they tell It In order to answer the question which comes up as soon
as they are finished - "Are there mermaids llke that?" - with a "No, mermaids are
just something people Imagine." Is the fairy tale then so meaning less that one must
Immediately destroy the story and its impression, that one must promptly break the
glltterlng .soap bubble in order to show that all Its glory was nothing more than
soapy water? Children crave fairy stories, and this alone Is sufficient proof of their
value. - Now the question arises - to what extent should the storyteller himself
believe these stories? •If the storyteller himself believes the stories, then I do not
think the question will arise for the children as to whether or not It Is true. The story
should slmultaneously exercise such an overwhelmlng and tranquillzlng effect that
It never occurs to the children. Not to tell children such exciting Imaginative stories
and tales leaves an unfitted space for an anxiety which, when not moderated by
such stories, returns again all the stronger (compare Tieck, Die Verlobung: Dresden:
1823; pp. 63-65). Compare also the artless simple story In Nordisk K/aempehistorler
II, ed. Rain; Copenhagen: 1827 (N.B. naturally the story is not by Rain), expeclally
the end, p. 9; "Can it be that someone who hears these stories wlll find that the
mighty events and great deeds of the sagas do not square with his experience and
for that reason will minimize them" - right: hlnc 11/ae lacrymae!
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Does space
go on
for ever?
The fol/owing article appeared In the (London) Times Educational Supplement,
January 12, 1978 and Is reprinted here with
permission. Galen Stawson is a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at Oxford.

Galen Strawson looks at some of the arguments for
introducing philosophy into the curriculum.

hat arguments are there for inW
troducing philosophy in the
schools'? What arguments, in particular,
for introducing metaphysics and epistomology - and their servant, logic'? It is
for these that the case needs making, for
ethics is already represented in the curriculum by moral education programmes.
Peter Mullen, in his book Beginning
Philosophy (Edward Arnold 1.50) is
"sure that everyone, and particularly

students of secondary school age, can
successfully be introduced to
philosophical method." Trying out "so
called 'philosophical questions' with
students of average ability" in a secondary school, he was "astonished to find
that the questions and puzzles which
have been the subject matter of
academic philosophy for ~enturies were
of immediate fascination to the
students." I do not see why he was

astonished. Childhood is a time of
unusually direct, penetrating and wideranging cuiosity; children from an early
age are naturally concerned with some
of the central metaphysical and
epistemological questions of
philosophy. What is time'? What is mind'?
What is dreaming? Did everything have
a beginning'? Why does the universe anything - exist at all'? Does space go
on for ever'?
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Such .questions; the ·problem of free ·
will and determinism, or the problem of
knowledge - of how we can be certain
ofanythi~g, and of r'hen itJs.reasonat>le
to believe something ~ wbuld, if well
presented', stimulate the .most animated
discussion in the classroom. Philosophy,
writes Matthew Lipman •. in his po9k
Philosophy In The Classroom (New
Jersey: IAPC) is the .. lost dimension in
education", uniquely valuable for the
"cultivation .of natµral wonder".
If such cultivation is the goal, · 'the
primary aim of philosophy lessons
should not be to inculcate currently
receivedright answersto such questions
as those given above. It should be rather
to promote that quite special argumentative persistence and imaginative agility
in speculation .that philosophical > Pro~
blems are so particularly apt to call
forth. Clearly, the •benefits of increased
speculative inventiveness and conceptual. sophisticatl9n .c laimed .for ·. philosophy .would spread to all other subjects.
On this point, it is worth comparing attitudes .to the tea5hing of pJiilosophy in
schools . in France, · where i~ . has bt:?en

tance to philosophy, "le ·courpnnemerit ·.
des sciences"; or rather, In according it
too much prestige as the glamorous ruling queen of •.the scie?ces, rnther .. than
lr~~ting it as Just ·011e subject · among
others. Yet it is justly seen as C\ centrally
important part of a ·liberal education. It
has oo such comparable standing in Britain now. . ·
Eleven and twelve-year-old American
children who .studied Mathew Lipman's
''.philosophical ·. novel'' Harry .Stottle:.
meler's Discovery (New Jersey: lAPC)
(Harry Stottle/Aristotle) were found by
IQ tests to have a mental age as regards
general reascming ability whi<:h was 27
months in advance .· of their peers of
equal age and otherwise equal education. Of course, what IQ tests test are just
the kind of abilities that would be Jm·
proved by the logic course that the book
- "in which children are found discovering some of.the mor~generarprinciples
e>f :t'lurnanreasoning .a nd ..inference"• ."'.""""
provides among other things. But such
results are nonetheless striking.
Throughoµt the book, the children
··~pply thefrc:Uscoveries to conversations

" .•• the benefits oflncreased speculative inventiveness
and conceptual sophis~ic:ation clailJl~d f 9r philosophy
· would spread to·all other subjects~· .• " ·
compulsory, almost · uninterruptedly,
since the beginning of the . nineteenth
century, and in America, \\'.here Mathew
Lipman ·and others ·have r~cently setup
an "Institute for •the Advancement of
Philosophy for Children" (IAPC).
In France, pupil~ could until rece11tly
· expect to ·. have between four arid ten
philosophy ·1essons a week in their final
year, depending on their other specializations. (()ne of th~ · obJ~5Uves •·of the
Haby reform programme, currently. be· .
ing implemented, is to phase out the
compulsoriness of.philosophy, while re.taining it as ct. lll~jor Option). J\lll()ng.
· · · other things, · a French schookhild can
expect to study such authors as Descartes in some detail; to acquire a picture of how the great . pair ()f opposed
positionsi •realism and idealism, and rationalism and empiricism, shift and
intersect in the work of Locke and Leibniz, Berkeley ., a~d< Hume, Kant .<CJ.nci
Hegel, and indeedin our cultural tradi·
tion as a whole; and to debate the ·ques·
tions listed above. Marx and Freud are
also studied: in Philosophy ~l(lsses~ .· .
Philosophy is' extremely popular
among French schoolchildren. If the
French ·. err in their approach, it is
perhap!; in attil<:hiQg too f11\JCh impor·

.

about education, what is ·'right' and
'wrong', the origin of the world, the
nature of t~e mind, children's rights, dif·
Jerences between ·. •reasons and causes
... "and so on. Another book, Lisa, has
since been prepared for 13 and 14-year·
olds, and more are in preparation. The
Americans are ·apt to emphasizephilos~
ophy's value as an aid to practical efficiency, correct and consistent analysis
()f situations, and •erfectiven~ss .in con' d~e and cipproprlate decision-making.
Yet this pragmatic emphasis ·on ra·
tionality as power is tempered by a different anci .c oncurrent . aim, already
noted - the · "cultivation ()f natural
wonder."
I believe that there is a strong case to
b~ ITlade for introducing philosophy in
schools; but both teachers .and textbooks are lacking. One problem with
currently available teaching resources
....,. unempl9yed .philosophy graduates •....,.
is that because philosophy is at present
only taught in universities, graduates
would feel demeaned by teaching in
s.chools: . . whereas ·. . in . france, <nearly•·• all
philosophy · graduates who wish to ··
become academics begin by· teaching in
schools.
·.As for textbooks, their au~hors must,

a

like "song-write'rs, find
'hook' when
presenting a problem: it must be made
to catch in the pupH's mind. There is a
. diffi5ult path t() be pi~.~~d between maximum clarity and the spoon-feeding like·
ly to · provide •the "philosophy is pointless" ·reaction . .Peter Mullen's Beginning
Philosophy sets .•out ·elementary lesson·
sized problems; sometimes lacking in
imagination, but with well-chosen questions at the end of each section. Some of
Open University Problems of PhHos·
ophy course .books would do very well
for fifth and sixth forms. Most major
topics (Time, Space, Cause, Free Will,
Perception) have ·a book to themselves.
The current · scholastic and sciencefictional debate on "Personal Identity"
seems ideallyJit for the classroom. The
lntet"J'lational · Baccalaureat· Theory of
Knowledge course is . thought to be of
unequal . quality, and sometimes much
too csmbitious: Wittgenstein's Tractatus
LQgi~o-phllos()phlcu~;\r~~erved •f't.·some
universities for . third-year students, is
among the ·texts recommended for
study ..· Whe1t P,hllos9phy .· Does .{Open
Books, 2 . 95) ~by Richard~ Lindley, Roger
Fellows, and Graham Macdonald
(specifically · aimed at students in the
sixth ,form . wondering ~hether <to . read
phll()sophy •at ·university) has an outstanding chapter on philosophy of science, and might also serve as a basis for
prep~ring .a si.•x~f'l~form . cours~.
A · textbook ·prepared· espeeially for
schools might be best arranged as a series of short classical statements of phil·
osophical problems and positions by the
great philosophers. ·Schoolteachers with
philosophical training have had particular success in the classroom when taking
a sh9rt passage- . l)~sc;artes oDdoubt,
Locke on primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley on idealism - as a precise
focus for discussion.
I~ isdifficultto knowhow muc~ philosophy teaching is presently going on in
British schools. The ILE:A were unable to
provide any information at all. There is
~ert(l~ply very Httle: ther~ should be a
great deal .more.

· "''-The<Amerlcans are
apt to emphasize
Philosophy's value.•.• a s
an aid to practical
efficiency, correct and
c'o nsistent an.alysts<of
situations, and effectlv~11es~ 111· cQn~fse
and· pragmatic ··
decision-making."
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Philosophy and the
Middle-S.c hool Student
Louis I. Katzner
.·

he hallway was not very different from what I remembered it to be. It was wide and shiny with cases of books
and other paraphernalia lining the walls. On the other side
of the glass doors through whichHght flooded the hallway
I could see classes in session. Some h~d students sitting
quietly at their desks while in others everyone was scurrying about.
.. .
..·
I hadn't felt like this in a long time. My stomach churned
with the alternate forces of anticipation and concern. Was
I walking into sometrying I couldn't handle? How would
the youngsters I wouldbe teaching respond? Would I be
able to relate to them? Communicate with them? I kept
wondering. about how and why l had gotten myself into
this situation.
It all beg~n a year or so ago when I read about Harry Stottleme}er's Dlscoveryin a popular news magazine. Philosophy for children - an ·intriguing idea indeed. But could
it be pulled off? My very first reading of Harry.convinced
me that it had been . .Philosophical ideas .were presented
in a context ~nd vernacular that youngsters can readily
relate to. The next time my son asked me what that stuff
is I teac~l said, "Read HarJ'Y Stottlemeler's Discovery and
you willfind out what philosophy is.'' But it didn't work.
After two chapters he was bored to death and put the book
down f()r good.
What went wrong? Maybe it can't be done after all. My son
is bright and inquisitive. If he cannot be interested in
philosophy, perhaps \itJs because philosophy is not.for the
young. On the other hand, just plopping a book in someone's lap and saying, .'"Read!" is not much of an introduction to ar1ything. There ~ no reinforcement; •no opportunity
to share one's reactions and ideas with others. I concluded
that my son's experience had not been much of a test of
the viability of phHosQphyfor children.

T

My interest in Harry continued to increase and broaden.
After attending a couple. of workshops sponsored by the
Institute for the Advancement ofPhilosophy for Children,
1,became especially interested in the curricular problems
that philosophy for children posed on the college level:
What ldnd of currjcull)mjs necessaryto•prepare people to
teachphilosophyto children? I had long been concerned
with the lack of philosophy ·background that most elementary and.~econdary teachers bring to their profession,.Perhaps Harry could serve as a stimulus for renewed interest
ii~ phllo50phy on the college level.

Part lot this article Is by Louis I. Katzner, who teaches Philosophy
at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. Part II Is by Frances
Brent, who teaches sixth grade In the Conneaut Elementary School,
Bowling Green, Ohio.

Thus J began devoting my energies to developing courses
and programs in philosophy for students in Bowling Green
State University College of Education. But before I got very
far lreaHzed I had a problem. PracticaHy everyone I spoke
to began with questions about my credentials: Had I ever
taught at the elementary orsecondary level? No! Had I
evertaught philosophy for children? Nol From such an
ignominious start, there was no place to go but downhill.
It became clear that my efforts would be totally frustrated
unless I acquired some hands~on experienc;e.
I began my quest for this experience by sharing Harry
Stottlemeier's Discovery with the Director of Instruction
of the Bowling Green City Schools. His interest was piqued
enough ·that he agreed to bring the material, .along with
my offer to teach Harry, to the principals of the city's
elementary schools. Within ·a month I had met and worked
out plans with the two sixth grade teachers at one of the
schools. I would meet with each of the sixth grade classes
twice a week for 45 minutes over a ten-week period (this
latter .constraint was ·imposed by my schedule, not theirs).
They would watch, participate whenever they desired and,
if they liked what went on, use Harry themselves the
following year.
I would not realize until later(when I compared notes with
others and tried to arouse interest in philosophy in other
school systems) how fortuitous were the circumstances
which led to this arrangement. To find a Director of In·
structiol'l, a Principal, and two teachers who (l) believed
that studying philosophy could be worthwhile for children,
(2) were willing to set aside 1112 hours in an already overcrowded weekfor its study and (3) would entrust the teaC::h·
ing to someone who had no elementary or secondary
school teaching experience was a stroke of good fortune,
indeed.
Suddenly I was at the end ofthe hall. There was nothing
else to do, so I walked intothe classroom. Frances (the
teacher) was there, and so were most of the youngsters.
They were sitting at their desks doing their own things some chatting, some doodling, and some seeming to do
nothing.When I walked in, the level of conversation seemed
to increase, and I had the distinct feeling that I was being
given the once-over.
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Well, the students weren't ogres. They were bright and in·
quisitive youngsters. Sure we had our moments. I most
vividly remember the first time (it was about our sixth
meeting) either of the teachers dared leave me alone with
their class. Apparently Frances had decided that I had
things sufficiently well in hand that she could, when nee·
essary, leave the room to take care of other things. Un·
fortunately she chose a particularly antsy day. The
youngsters were having a hard time getting into what we
were doing. As soon as she left, the decibel level of the .
undercurrent rose noticeably, and by the time she return·
ed we were on the verge of an all-out spitball war. There
were other times as well when the class was not fully at·
tentive. But these were the exception rather than the rule.
For the most part, the youngsters were very interested in
the things we did. And it is a good thing they were, for I
had little idea of what to do when things got out of hand.
We spent the first class just getting to know each other. I
tried very hard to learn their names (they were delighted
when I missed one and insisted that I put the proper name
with the right face), and to reveal to them the kind of per·
son I am. It was very important that we think of each other
as individuals, so that we would listen with care to what
each other was saying.
Future classes would be spent engaging in a variety of activities. Sometimes we just discussed some of the issues
and ideas introduced in Harry. Other times we engaged
in an activity such as role-playing or making up skits.
Still other times we did logic or other kinds of exerci;;es.
It seemed to me that the best way to keep the youngster's
interest and enthusiasm was to vary the routine as muc:h
as possible. And the Instructional Manual to Accompany
Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery served as an excellent,
continuing and stimulating aid in this regard.
When the first day's classes were finally over, 1 felt both
exhausted and exhilarated. The day's tension had taken its
tall, but I had survived. And my worst fears were allayed.
Yet I could hardly anticipate the kinds of reactions that lay
ahead. The students thoroughly enjoyed the class. This
became clear both through their participation in and cooperation with what we were doing and their requests to
have more philosophy time. They also learned some logic
in spite of the fact that our limited time frame 'resulted in
a de-emphasis of the formal logic in Harry. But to this day
(approximately a year and a half later), the youngsters I run
into from the class invariably try to trick me with a sentence
that either does or does not remain true when reversed.
And finally, the youngsters got the opportunity to discuss
many things that I could tell they had wondered about, but
never had the opportunity to discuss: Can animals think?
·Do we have free will? Are thoughts real? And so on. Every
youngster in each class had a genuine interest in at least
some of these issues.
\~
The two regular teachers also were extremelx_ pleased and
enthusiastic. They sometimes bowed to the \nsistance of
the youngsters and would continue a discussion I had started into the next class period. Also, in spite of ~e fact that

\

we lost about seven days to snow that winter, they never
even suggested that perhaps philosophy should be dis·
continued so that they could have more time to catch up
in English, math and social studies. And finally, they de·
cided to use Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery themselves
the following year. Indeed, one of my greatest thrills would
be to return the next year, and, after being introduced as
Harry's father, watch Frances and Mike teach their own
philosophy course.
But most importantly, little could I anticipate how I would
change because of this experience. First f earned the
credentials I was concerned with. I could speak with people
in the College of Education from a position of mutual re·
spect, and was successful in introducing course work aimed
at preparing people to teach philosophy for children. Sec·
ond, I thoroughly enjoyed the experience, and I liked the
time I spent with the youngsters. I was refreshed by their
inquisitiveness and their relatively uninhibited ways - a
remarkable change of pace from the college students I had
been teaching for so many years. And finally, I greatly ap·
predated the challenge the experience presented. I had to
present the material and structure the activities in a way
that sixth graders could relate to. And I also had to listen
carefully to what they were saying. I found that they are
capable of understanding and expressing very interesting
and sophisticated ideas.
This, of course, is the challenge that faces all teachers.
But it is especially acute with children. Because they are a
captive audience and wear their discontent on their sleeves
so to speak, one cannot afford to lose them. College
students will either stop coming, go to sleep, or do some
homework. Not sixth graders! You had better deliver.This
realization both increased my respect for those who teach
at the elementary and secondary levels and made me a
better teacher. As a result of my experience with the
youngsters I work harder at making my college classes interesting and listen more carefully to what my students
are saying.
And what about my son; the one who put Harry down
after only two chapters of boredom? Fortunately, he had
the opportunity to spend approximately 10 weeks studying
Harry when he got to Junior High. And given an environment in which he could discuss Harry with a teacher and
his peers, he would come home bubbling with enthusiasm
each night. In fact, during his journey with Harry, Lisa and
their friends, we spent many a dinner hour talking philosophy.
Most vivid in my mind is the evening he came home overflowing with the distinction between invention and discovery (they had been discussing why the book is called
Harry Stottlemeler's Discovery rather than Harry Stottle·
meler's Invention). We spent over two hours at the dinner
table with the four children, my wife and myself each giving
his/her view of the distinction, and then grappling with
hard cases thrown up by the others. It was a real delight
and it was a full six months before the youngest child (she
was 8 at the time) stopped pleading with us to continue
discussing the invention/discovery distinction at table.
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Frances Brent

l

am Lou Katzner's Frances of the pre·
ceeding article. Mike Campbell and I
are the "Dynamic Duo" that attempts to
lead the sixth grade students of Con·
neaut Elementary upward and onward,
into the exhilarating atmosphere and uncertain footing of philosophical speculation and discipline.
During Harry's time (Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery is "philosophy
time"), there are raging discussions
among the children about identity and
self. Mike and I are the referees. With a
bow to Shakespeare and Gertrude Stein,
our sixth graders are off and running:
Are you you if you lose a leg? Would you
be you if your name were Herman in·
stead of Tom? Would you be you if you'd
been raised by different parents. A calm
discussion period it is not, with hands
waving, bodies bouncing, faces reddening. Amazingly they are listening to each
other. There are plenty of opinions; the
few repetitions are of the "l agree with ... "
kind.
Later the children settle down with
their journals and list the things that
make them them. Another day they
write"l'm me" poems. There is no problem in settling to either task. They set
about writing poems with great dispatch
and much eagerness to share. Fifty-five
out of fifty-six hand in their poems, ...the
fifty-sixth, well, he wrote one, but it was
private. So be it. Anyone who has worked
with sixth graders knows the eagerness
and willingness described are not easy to
achieve. (Poetry writing without a protest
when there is a ratio of two boys to one
girl...that blows the old stereotype!) Mike
and I can take some of the credit, but
Harry was a catalyst and a launching pad.
Lou, our professional philosopher, has
told his story of involvement. Now let
me, the classroom teacher, tell mine.
Like Lou, I had first met Harry in the
news magazines, and was frankly filled
with desire and envy. I coveted this op·
portunity to work with such ideas and
materials. Neither the public or Universi·
ty libraries had heard of philosophy for
children, so I gave up temporarily.
Months later when my principal, Pat
McGinnis, asked if Mike and I would permit a Bow.ling Green State University
professor to teach philosophy to our
classes we jumped at the chance.
Despite enthusiasm about the potential of materials and teacher •. we had
some reservations. The two of us have a
long, happy history of trying out programs that require children to think and
feel; programs that suggest problems
and directions, that pose_questi~ns

with Aggression," or a writer becomes
fashionable, such as Simon with "Value
Clarification," we're ready to experiment. We get the program going, the
students involved, and then the higher·
ups decide the materials belong at a different grade level. The program is
transferred and never heard 9f again.
Fortunately, there are always new ideas
for us to try.
Our second problem is that coopera·
tipn with the University is usually a oneway street, with the children the losers.
Some Ph.D. up there is feeling a
"publish or perish" pain; a program is
written up that sounds good on paper.
The children, as mere subjects of a study,
are often exploited. We made two
resolves: First, if the program were worthwhile we would keep and develop it, trying to convert other sixth-grade teachers.
Second, the children were not to be exploited. We wanted the arrangement to
work to their advantage.
Initially I was about as easy to work
with as a fire-eating dragon with a sore
throat. I did everything except demand
carbon copies of lesson plans. When an
observer from the College of Education
came and, I felt, slighted the kids by
holding Lou in conversation with her
back to the class, I blew my stack. It was
wasting children's time, treating them as
objects, subjects of a study ... the program was NOT more important than the
children, etc.
Mike and I stayed in the classroom (ex·
cept when pressured by dire emergencies that beset elementary school
children) not to protect Lou, as he
thought, but to protect the youngsters.
Our fears, like his, were groundless. An
equally powerful reason for staying was
to be learners ourselves. For an elementary teacher I have a fairly strong background in philosophy, (four courses at
UC Berkley). but that was twenty years
ago. I know how much I don't know.
Mike and I are brave, but bravery implies
fear, and we were a mass of insecurities.
Before we launched into anything we
wanted to get all tlie knowledge and help
we could get.
We had another reason for remaining
in the room with Lou and the kids. The
program would fail to deliver if it began
and ended when our pet philosopher
walked in and out the door. We wanted
the questions raised, the techniques ex·
plored, the problems unresolved, the
speculations voiced, the excitement felt,
to become a part of the entire curriculum. We had to know what was going on
so we could exploit opportunities during
math, social studies, science, grammar,
reading and writing. The natural tie to
ph!loso_PhY turned up daily and we had
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real basic we feel is philosophy, love of
wisdom, that honors the human capacity
to create, wonder, question and experi·
ment. What better basic for all the
"BASICS" than, as Harry would say,
"thinking about thinking?"
Last year we were on our own with just
one visit from Lou, and Wednesday af·
ternoon was Harry's time. We put both
classes in one room. Mike came in with
hat, umbrella and dark glasses and WAS
the grown up Harry. When he wore out,
and the sessions were exhausting even the kids went home dragging - l
would pick up the discussion and we
would bounce ideas and questions back
and forth and try to keep peace. Interestingly enough, many a shrinking
violet among the children turned into a
tiger lily, and some of the academic
"stars" faded, bothered by the lack of
final, absolute answers.
An incident demonstrated to us how
much Harry had become part of the curriculum. At grade-card time we asked
the youngsters to give them~elves a
grade and a progress report in each subject. The report card does not list
philosophy. With no adult prompting all
but four students included it on their
self-evaluation papers.
Some comments from our eleven year
old thinkers:
"l wish you'd tell us what is real."
"I get so confused sometimes with
Harry."
"It's not my favorite subject, but it's
fun."
"This is fine but confusing. Sometimes I want to answer a question
badly, but I'm afraid it will be a
dumb answer."
"I love Harry."
"I really like it. It's my favorite subject.
I like thinking about things like
that." (This from a shrinking violet
who
turned
tiger
during
philosophy).
"In Harry I would like to get in the ac·
lion more."
"I'm starting to understand Harry."
Of course, as responsible teachers, we
used all the school books provided, and
followed all the curriculum guides and
finished all the units prescribed for our
grade level, but Harry was the basis from
which we worked and planned. Excite·
ment makes for efficient learning. My
point, of course, is that there is time for
philosophy, if you want to find it.
We monitor standardized tests very
carefully, checking results against both
national and local norms. The results
were reassuring. It would be interesting
to find a matching sample within the
system, to see if Harry has had. a
me~~~-r~b_I~ imp~ct. It's_ r:io_t _idl~ cl:'rio~i:
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On The Role Of Logic In Education

N

ow although a man needs not the
theory of a method in order to apply
it as it has been applied already. yet in
order to adapt to his own science the
method of another with which he is less
familiar. and to properly modify it so as
to suit it to its new use. an acquaintance
with the principles upon which it de·
pends will be of the greatest benefit. For
that sort of work a man needs to be more
than a specialist: he needs such a gener·
al training of his mind and such knowl·
edge as shall show him how to make his
powers most effective in a new direction.
That knowledge is logic.

Leibniz on the Role

of Logic in Education

In 1714, just a year before his death, Leib·
nlz wrote Nicolas Remond of his early In·
terest In philosophy:
"I discovered Aristotle as a lad, and even
the Scholastics did not repel me; even
now I do not regret this. But then Plato
too, and Plot/nus, gave me some satlsfac·
tlon, not to mention other ancient thinkers
whom I consulted later. After having
finished the trivial schools, I fell upon the
moderns, and I recall vya/klng In a grove
on the outskirts of Leipzig called the
Rosental, at the age of fifteen, and
deliberating whether to preserve substan·
tis/ forms or not. Mechanism flnallv

It should not be surprising, In view of the
fascination which philosophy held for him
in his own youth, that Leibniz should have
defended the appropriateness of
philosophy - and particularly of logic In the education of other people. When a
writer named Gabriel Wagner, in 1696, at·
tacked the Scholastic learning of the day,
Leibniz was quick to protest that the logic
of the schools had played an Important
role In his own education: "I came at once
to notice that there must be something
great In It, as far as a lad of thirteen years
could notice such a thing." He argues that
the principles of logic are extremely useful
to "the art of Inquiry Into nature Itself and
of putting It on the rack;" by means of
these aids, "a poor head could excel the
best, just as a child with a ruler can draw
better lines than the greatest master with

In short. if my view is a true one. a
young man wants a physical education
and an aesthetic education. an education in the ways of the world and a moral
education. and with all these logic has
nothing in particular to do: but so far as
he wants an intellectual education. it is
precisely logic that he wants: and wheth·
er it be in one lecture-room or another.
his ultimate purpose is to improve his
logical power and his knowledge of
methods.
Charles Peirce. review of Clark University
1889· 1899: Deceniel Celebration (Worcester. Mass .. 1899). in Science (April
20. 1900). p. 622.

generally too crude for the more advanced
sciences. Yet when It comes to Important
matters, he argues, where the danger of
error Is extremely great, "we do well to
analyze matters most Industriously and
reduce everything to the simplest and
most easily grasped Inferences," just as
we accept small change In bunches, but
would prefer to count diamonds on our
fingers. Logic gives our reasonings form,
and form Is Important: "we can change a
ball of twine Into a Gordian knot by trying
to unwind it In a disorderly way."
Knowledge of logic Is of value to young
people learning to reason, Leibniz goes on
to say, just as knowledge of perspective Is
of value to artists. People like Gabriel
Wagner find logic superficial and uncon·
vlncing because "no one takes the form or
the orderly process seriously but uses It
only for the amusement of youth or rather,
hardly tries to use It at all." The fault lies
not with logic, but with the failure of logl·
clans to demonstrate Its applicability to
life situations: "when a logician gives a
rule without an example, It Is like trying to
learn to duel with mere verbal Instructions." It Is clear that Leibniz's conten·
tlons as to the educational value of loglc
have lost little of their relevance, par·
tlcularly In the light of present-day efforts
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" ••• as soon as I began to
learn logic, I was greatly
stirred by the classification and order which I
perceived in its principles. I came at once to
notice that there must
be something great in it,
as far as a lad of thirteen could notice such a
thing.,,

B

y logic or the art of reasoning I understand the art of using the understanding not only to judge proposed
truth but also to discover hidden truth. If
such an art is possible, in other words, if
there are marked advantages to be
found in such processes, it follows that it
ought by all means to be sought and valued highly, indeed, to be considered as
the key to all the arts and sciences. You
seem to admit that there are excellent
advantages to be gained by thought and
Investigation; if you are merely unwilling
to admit that this procedure should be
named logic, our controversy concerns
only a word. But since I do not think that
this is your purpose, I can take your position to mean only that you are rejecting,
not the true logic, but what we have
heretofore honored by that name.
If this is your opinion, I must indeed
confess that all our logics until now are
but a shadow of what I should wish and
what I see from afar; but I must also confess, to stick to the truth and give everyone his due, that I also find much that is
good and useful in the logic of the past.
Gratitude as well compels me to say this,
for I think I can truthfully say that even
the logic taught me in school has been
most fruitful for me. Before l entered a
class in which it was taught, I was steeped in the historians and poets, for I had
begun to read history as soon as I could
read at all, and I found great pleasure
and value in verse. But as soon as I
began to learn logic, I was greatly stirred

by the classification and order which I
perceived in its principles. I came at
once to notice that there must be something great in it, as far as a lad of thirteen
years could notice such a thing. My
greatest pleasure lay in the categories,
which seemed to me to be a standard roll
of everything in the world, and I examined many logics to see where the best and
most exhaustive lists could be found. I
often asked myself and my companions
into which category and subdivision of it
this or that concept might belong, although I was not at all pleased to find
that so many things were entirely excluded, and I found, too, that some of
the categories, especially the last two or
perhaps four, dropped away completely
for me because they were included in the
earlier ones or because I could find no
actual use for them. I soon made the
amusing discovery of a method of guessing or of recalling to mind, by means of
the categories, something forgotten
when one has a picture of it but cannot
get at it in his brain. One needs only to
ask one's self or others about certain
categories and their subdivisions (of
which I had compiled an extensive table
out of various logics) and examine the
answers, and one can readily exclude all
irrelevant matters and narrow the problem down until the missing thing can
be discovered. Nebuchadnezzar could
perhaps have reconstructed his forgotten dream in this way ....
Here belongs also the art of inquiry into nature itself and of putting it on the
rack - the art of experimenting which
Lord Bacon began so ably. You will reply
that the ablest heads have no need of
such advantages but get along well
enough with their natural understanding
and that simpletons cannot achieve as
much with all such aids. There is some
truth in this, but it is also true that there
are few who know or make use of their
advantages and that it is a misfortune for
the human race that it has taken so little
advantage of the grace revealed by God
and of the treasures of benevolent nature. For I am of the opinion that men
could accomplish things deemed incredible until now, if they really wanted to
apply themselves to it, but their eyes are
still holden, and everything takes time to
ripen. So I am convinced that with the
advantage of these aids and the willingness to use them, a poor head could excel the best, just as a child with a ruler
can draw better lines than the greatest
master with free hand. The greatest geniuses, however, would make unbelievable
progress if they added these advantages.
So far I have discussed only that part
of the accepted logic which serves discovery and which, in a sense, should precede; now the part which concerns judgment must be considered. Here we come
to the syllogisms and their figures and
modes. This is the part which people
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hold to be the most useless; they make
fun of Barbara and Celarent. My own observation has been different, however,
and although Mr. Arnauld, in his Art of
Thinking, thinks that men do not easily
make errors in the form but almost always in the materials of thought, the
situation is in fact quite otherwise ....
Even addition, multiplication, and
division of numbers, as they are learned
in the arithmetic schools, are
demonstrations in form, and we can depend upon them because they prove by
virtue of their form. In this sense one
may say that an entire bookkeeping calculation is formally demonstrable and
consists in demonstrations in form.
This is also true of algebra and many
other formal proofs, which are indeed
empty yet perfect. It is simply unnecessary for all forms of proof to be labeled
omnis, atque, and ergo. Into all infallible sciences that are exactly demonstrated, higher logical forms are incorporated, some of which come from Aristotle,
some of which must find their source
elsewhere. Cardan saw this in his Logic.
Just as counting on fingers and the use
of lines and crosses are left to peasants,
mathematicians having higher devices,
so, when one has raised logic higher in
the true sciences, one leaves to pupils
this calculating by the fingers as it were,
by means of omnls, atque, and ergo, by
means of which they cannot count
beyond three at a time, so to speak,
because their inferences and syllogisms
can have only three terms and three
propositions. It is sometimes advisable,
however, to stick to such peasant-calculating and child's logic. We sometimes
accept small change in bunches but
prefer to count over larger pieces, say, of
gold, separately, and if we had to count
diamonds, we should gladly count them
on our fingers, because such counting,
though of the ·poorest type, is also the
surest, whereas the higher, the more artificial, and the more rapid the counting,
the greater the danger of error. So in
logic also; in important matters such as
theological c:ontroversies which concern
the nature and will of God and also our
soul we do well to analyze matters most
industriously and reduce everything to
the simplest and most easily grasped in·
ferences, so that even the most insigni·
ficant student cannot fail to see what
follows and what does not. It will be
found that men have often reached a
standstill and remain stuck in important
discussions because they abandon form,
just as we can change a ball of twine into
a Gordian knot by trying to unwind it in a
disorderly way.
G.W. Leibniz, "Letter to Gabriel Wagner,"
1696. In Phllosoph/cal Papers and Letters,
Vol. II, ed. by Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969), pp.
463-466).
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Samuel Tayler Coleridge
In 1797, Coleridge began writing a sequence of autobiographical letters to
his friend, Thomas Poole. What follows is an excerpt from his letter of October 16, 1797, in which he is talking of
himself at the age of eight:
I read every book that came in my way
without distinction; and my father was
fond of me, and used to take me on his
knee and hold long conversations with
me. l remember that at eight years old l
walked with him one winter evening
from a farmer's house a mile from Ot·
tery, and he told me the names of the
stars and how Jupiter was a thousand
times larger than our world, and that the
other twinkling stars were suns that had
worlds rolling round them; and when I
came home he shewed me how they rolled round. I heard him with a profound
delight and admiration: but without the
least mixture of wonder or incredulity.
For from my early reading of fairy tales
and genii, etc., etc., my mind had been
habituated to the Vast, and I never regarded my senses in any way as the cri·
teria of my belief. I regulated all my
creeds by my conceptions, not by my
sight, even at that age. Should children
be permitted to read romances, and rela·
tions of giants and magicians and genii?
I know all that has been said against it;
but I have formed my faith in the affirm·
ative. I know no other way of giving the
mind a love of the Great and the Whole.
Those who have been led to the same
truths step by,step, through the constant
testimony of their senses, seem to me to
want a sense which I possess. They contemplate nothing but parts, and all parts
are necessarily little. And the universe to
them is but a mass of little things. It is
true, that th~ mind may become credulous and prone to superstition by the
former method; but are not the experimentalists credulous even to madness in
believing any absurdity, rather than
believe the grandest truths, if they have
not the testimony of their own senses in
their favour? I have known some who
have been rationally educated, as it is
styled. They were marked by a microscopic acuteness, but when they looked
at great things, all became a blank and
they saw nothing, and denied (very illogically) that anything could be seen,
and uniformly put the negation of a
power for the possession of a power, and
called the want of imagination judgement and the never being moved to rapture philosophy!

Children
Discover
Ideas ...

Marie Jeanne Phllpon,
Madame Roland
Madame Roland was born in 1754, and
at the age of eleven entered the Malson
des Dames de la Congregation, In
Paris. After two years, she reports, "~
change came o'er the spirit of her
dream," and instead of Fenelon and
Bossuet she came to prefer the encyclopedlsts of the day, especially
those whose philosophical ethics tended to be naturalistic and stoical. But It
was not until she was nineteen that
she read Rousseau, which seemed to
her a revelation. In 1793 she was arrested and imprisoned, although it is
said that there was "no tangible accusation" of wrongdoing. She spent
the period of her Imprisonment In
study, and- In the composition of her
political memoirs, a brief portion of
which Is reprinted here. After five
months she was condemned by the
Revolutionary Tribunal and guillotined.
Here is Madame Roland describing
her reading at the age of nine, and stlll
finding me_rit in the time she devoted,
at that early age, to the philosophy of
education:

Plutarch seemed to be exactly the intellectual food that suited me. I shall
never forget the Lent of 1763, at which
time I was nine years of age, when I carried it to church instead of the exercises
of Holy Week. It is from that period that I
may date the impressions and ideas
which rendered me a republican, without
my dreaming of ever becoming one.
"Telemachus," and "Jerusalem
Delivered," interfered a little with the
current of these majestic thoughts. The
tender Fenelon moved my heart, and
Tasso fired my imagination. Sometimes
I read aloud at my mother's request, qf
which I was by no means fond, as it
diverted me from that close attention
which constituted my delight, and oblig·
ed me to proceed with less rapidity. But
would have plucked out my tongue rath·
er than have read in that manner the episodes of the Island of Calypso, and a
number of passages in Tasso. My respiration quickened, a sudden glow overspread my countenance, and an agitation followed, which my Jaltering voice
would have betrayed. With Telemachus I
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was Eucharis, and Herminia with Tancred. Completely transformed into those
heroines, I thought not as yet of being
something myself with some other personage. None of my reflections came
home to me. I looked around me for
nothing. I was the very characters themselves, and saw only the objects which
existed on their account. It was a kind of
waking dream, that led to nothing more
substantial.
I recollect, however, having seen with
considerable emotion a young painter of
the name of Tabora!, who came occasionally to my father's house. He was
about twenty, his voice was soft, his
features languishing, and he blushed
like a girl. When I heard him in the
workshop, I had always a crayon or
something else to seek; but as the sight
of him embarrassed no less than it pleased me, I ran out again more speedily
than I entered, with a palpitation of my
heart and a trembling of my limbs that I
hastened to conceal in my little closet. I
can readily believe, that, with such a
disposition, assisted by leisure and a certain kind of company, both my imagination and my person might have been
greatly affected.

" ••• I loved to reflect; I
thought seriously of improving myself; ••• I
studied the movements
of my mind; I sought to
know myself.
The works of which I have been speaking gave place to others, which softened
the powerful impressions they had produced. Some of the writings of Voltaire
served to operate this diversion. One
day, when I was reading "Candide," my
mother having deserted her party of piquet, the lady with whom she was playing calling me from the corner in which I
was sitting, desired to see the book I had
in my hand; and on my mother's return
expressed her astonishment at the
nature of my studies. My mother,
without making any answer, contented
herself with merely ordering me to carry
it back to the place whence it came. I
cast an evil eye upon this woman, of forbidding countenance, monstrous rotundity of waist, and affected importance;
nor from that day forward did I ever
bestow a smile upon Madame Charbonne. My good mother, however, made
no alteration in her truly unaccountable
conduct, but permitted me to read all
the books I could lay my hands on, with·
out seeming to attend to them, though
she knew very well what they were. I
must observe at the same time, that no

immoral publication ever came in my
way; and even now I am only acquainted
with the titles of two or three; the taste I
have acquired having ever prevented my
feeling the smallest temptation to procure them.
As I preferred books to everything
else, my father sometimes made me
presents of that kind; but, piquing
himself, as he did, on seconding my propensity to serious studies, his choice was
whimsical: he gave me, for instance,
Fenelon on female education, and Locke
on that of children in general; thus putting into the hands of the pupil what
were designed for the tutor. I am persuaded, however, that the incongruity
was not unproductive of benefit, and
that chance perhaps served me better
than the usual considerations of propriety whould have done. I was very forward
for my age; I loved to reflect; I thought
seriously of improving myself; that is to
say, I studied the movements of my
mind; I sought to know myself; and I felt
that I had a destination which it was requisite I should enable myself to fill.
Edmund Gosse

Edmund Gosse (1849-1928) was a we/1known British critic who helped introduce Ibsen to the English public,
and did much to revive interest in John
Donne, Sir Thomas Browne and Henry
Fielding. His Father and Son was intended to be a document "of educational and religious conditions which
have passed away and will never
return." It is not merely autobiography,
therefore, but "a study of the development of moral and educational ideas
during the progress of Infancy."
In the course of this, my sixth year, there
happened a series of minute and soundless incidents which, elementary as they
may seem when told, were second in real
importance to none in my mental
history. The recollection of them confirms me in the opinion that certain leading features in each human soul are inherent to it, and cannot be accounted for
by suggestion or training. In my own
case, I was most carefully withdrawn,
like Princess Blanchefleur in her marble
fortress, from every outside influence
whatever, yet to me the instinctive life
came as unexpectedly as her lover came
to her in the basket of roses. What came
to me was the consciousness of self, as a
force and as a companion, and it came
as the result of one or two shocks, which
I will relate.
In consequence of hearing so much
about an Omniscient God, a being of
supernatural wisdom and penetration
who was always with us, who made, in
fact, a fourth in our company, I had
come to think of Him, not without awe,
but with absolute confidence.
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My Father and Mother, in their serene
discipline of me, never argued with one
another, never even differed; their wills
seemed absolutely one. My Mother
always deferred to may Father, and in
his absence spoke of him to me, as if he
were all-wise. I confused him in some
sense with God; at all events I believed
that my Father knew everything and saw
everything. One morning in my sixth
year, my Mother and I were alone in the
morning-room, when my Father came in
and announced some fact to us. I was
standing on the rug, gazing at him, when
he made this statement, I remember
turning quickly, in embarrassment, and
looking into the fire. The shock to me
was that of a thunderbolt, for what my
Father had said 'was not true'. My
Mother and I, who had been present at
the trifling incident, were aware that it
had not happened exactly as it had been
reported by him. My Mother gently told
him so, and he accepted the correction.
Nothing could possibly have been more
trifling to my parents, but to me it meant
an epoch. Here was the appalling
discovery, never suspected before, that
my Father was not as God, and did not
know everything. the shock was not
caused by any suspicion that he was not
telling the truth, as it appeared to him,
but by the awful proof that he was not, as
I had supposed, omniscient.
This experience was followed by
another, which confirmed the first, but
carried me a great deal further. In our little back-garden, my Father had built up
a rockery for fems and mosses and from
the water-supply of the house he had
drawn a leaden pipe so that it pierced upwards through the rockery and produced, when a tap was turned, a pretty
silvery parasol of water. The pipe was exposed somewhere near the foot of the
rockery. One day, two workmen, who
were doing some repairs, left their tools
during the dinner-hour in the backgarden, and as I was marching about I
suddenly thought that to see whether
one of these tools could make a hole in
the pipe would be attractive. It did make
such a hole, quite easily, and then the
matter escaped my mind. But a day or
two afterwards, when my Father came in
to dinner, he was very angry. He had
turned the tap, and instead of the fountain arching at the summit, there had
been a rush of water through a hole at
the foot. The rockery was absolutely
ruined.
Of course I realized in a moment what
I had done, and I sat frozen with alarm,
waiting to be denounced. But my Mother
remarked on the visit of the plumbers
two or three days before, and my Father
instantly took up the suggestion. No
doubt that was it; the mischievous
fellows had thought it amusing to stab
the pipe and spoil the fountain. No suspicion fell on me; no question was asked
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of me. \ sat there, turned to stone within,
but outwardly sympathetic and with unchecked appetite.
We attribute, I believe, too many
moral ideas to little children. It is obvious that in this tremendous juncture I
ought to have been urged forward by
good instincts, or held back by naughty
ones. But I am sure that the fear which I
experienced for a short time, and which
so unexpectedly melted away, was a
purely physical one. it had nothing to do
with the motions of a contrite heart. As
to the destruction of the fountain, I was
sorry about that, for my own sake, since I
admired the skipping water extremely
and had had no idea that I was spoiling
its display. But the emotions which now
thronged within me, and which led me,
with an almost unwise alacrity, to seek
solitude in the back-garden, were not
moral at all, they were intellectual. I was
not ashamed of having successfully and so surprisingly - deceived my
parents by my crafty silence; I looked
upon that as a providential escape, and
dismissed all further thought of it. I had
other things to think of.
In the first place, the theory that my
Father was ominscient or infallible was
now dead and buried. He probably knew
very little; in this case he had not known
a fact of such importance that if you did
not know that, it could hardly matter
what you knew. My Father, as a deity, as
a natural force of immense prestige, fell
in my eyes to a human level. In future,
his statements about things in general
need not be accepted implicitly. But of
all the thoughts which rushed upon my
savage and undeveloped little brain at
this crisis, the most curious was that I
had found a companion and a confidant
in myself. There was a secret in this
world and it belonged to me and to a
somebody who lived in the same body
with me. There were two of us, and we
could talk with one another. lt is difficult
to define impressions so rudimentary,
but it is certain that it was in this dual
form that the sense of my individuality
now suddenly descended upon me, and
it is equally certain that it was a great
solace to me to find a sympathizer in my
own breast.
About this time, my Mother, carried
away by the current of her literary and
her philanthropic work, left me more
and more to my own devices. She was
seized with a great enthusiasm; as one of
her admirers and disciples has written,
'she went on her way, sowing beside all
waters.' I would not for a moment let it
be supposed that I regard her as a Mrs.
Jellyby, or that l think she neglected me.
But a remarkable work has opened up
before her; after her long years in a mental hermitage, she was drawn forth into
the clamorous harvest-field of souls. She
developed an unexpected gift of persuasion over strangers whom she met in the
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much, might be threatened by dangers
of the same sort; and the fact that the
narrative came abruptly to an end, in the
middle of one of its most thrilling sen·
tences, wound me up almost to a
disorder of wonder and romance.
The preoccupation of my parents
threw me more and more upon my own
resources. But what are the resources of
a solitary child of six? I was never inclined to make friends with servants, nor did
our successive maids proffer, so far as I
recollect, any advances. Perhaps, with
my 'dedication' and my grown-up ways
of talking, I did not seem to them at all
an attractive little boy. I continued to
have no companions, or even acquaintances of my own age. I am unable to
recollect exchanging two words with
another child till after my Mother's death.
The abundant energy which my
Mother now threw into her public work
did not affect the quietude of our private
life. We had some visitors in the day·
time, people who came to consult one
parent or the other. But they never
stayed to a meal, and we never returned
their visits. I do not quite know how it
was that neither of my parents took me

omnibus or in the train, and with whom
she courageously grappled. This began
by her noting, with deep humility and
joy, that 'I have reason to judge the
sound conversion to God of three young
persons within a few weeks, by the instrumentality of my conversations with
them.' At the same time, as another of
her biographers has said, 'those
testimonies to the Blood of Christ, the
fruits of her pen, began to be spread very
widely, even to the most distant parts of
the globe.' My Father, too, was at this
time at the height of his activity. After
breakfast, each of them was amply occupied, perhaps until night-fall; our
evenings we still always spent together.
Sometimes my Mother took me with her
on her 'unknown day's employ'; I
recollect pleasant rambles through the
City by her side, and the act of looking
up at her figure soaring above me. But
when all was done, I had hours and hours
of complete solitude, in my Father's
study, in the back-garden, above all in
the garret.
The garret was a fairy place. It was a
low lean-to, lighted from the roof. It was
wholly unfurnished, except for two ob-

I
"But of all the thoughts which rushed upon my
savage and undeveloped little brain at this crisis,
the most curious was that I had found a
companion and a confidant in myself."
jects, an ancient hat-box and a still more
ancient skin-trunk. The hat-box puzzled
me extremely, till one day, asking my
Father what it was, I got a distracted
answer which led me to believe that it
was itself a sort of hat, and I made a
laborious but repeated effort to wear it.
The skin-trunk was absolutely empty,
but the inside of the lid of it was lined
with sheets of what I now know to have
been a sensational novel. It was, of
course, a fragment, but I read it, kneeling on the bare floor, with indescribable
rapture. It will be recollected that the
idea of fiction, of a deliberately invented
story, had been kept from me with entire
success. I therefore implicitly believed
the tale in the lid of the trunk to be a true
account of the sorrows of a lady of title,
who had to flee the country, and who was
pursued into foreign lands by enemies
bent upon her ruin. Someone had an in·
terview with a 'minion' in a 'mask'; I went
downstairs and looked up these words in
Bailey's English Dictionary, but was left
in darkness as to what they had to do
with the lady of title. This ridiculous
fragment filled me with delicious fears; I
fancied that my Mother, who was out so

to any of the sights of London, although
I am sure it was a question of principle
with them. Notwithstanding all our study
of natural history, I was never introduced
to live wild beasts at the Zoo, nor to dead
ones at the British Museum. I can understand better why we never visited a
picture-gallery or a concert-room. So far
as I can recollect, the only time I was
ever taken to any place of entertainment
was when my Father and I paid a visit,
long anticipated, to the Great Globe in
Leicester Square. This was a huge structure, the interior of which one ascended
by means of a spiral staircase. It was a
poor affair; that was concave in it which
should have been convex, and my Im·
aglnation was deeply affronted. I could
invent a far better Great Globe than that
in my mind's eye In the garret.
Being so restricted, then, and yet so
active, my mind took refuge in an infantile species of natural magic. This contended with the definite ideas of religion
which my parents were continuing, with
too mechanical a persistency, to force
into my nature, and it ran parallel with
. them. I formed strange superstitions,
1- which I can only ·render Intelligible by
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naming some concrete examples. l persuaded myself that, if I could only
discover the proper words to say or the
proper passes to make, I could induce
the gorgeous birds and butterflies in my
Father's illustrated manuals to come to
life, and fly out of the book, leaving
holes behind them. I believed that,
when, at the Chapel, we sang, drearily
and slowly, loud hymns of experience
and humiliation, I could boom forth with
a sound equal to that of dozens of
singers, if I could only hit upon the for·
mula. During morning and evening
prayers, which were extremely lengthy
and fatiguing, I fancied that one of my
two selves could flit up, and sit clinging
to the cornice, and look down on my
other self and the rest of us, if I could only find the key. I laboured for hours in
search of these formulas, thinking to
compass my ends by means absolutely
irrational. For example, I was convinced
that if I could only count consecutive
numbers long enough, without losing
one, I should suddenly, on reaching
some far-distant figure, find myself in
possession oJ the great secret. I feel
quite sure that nothing external suggested these ideas of magic, and I think
it probable that they approached the
ideas of savages at a very early state of
development.
All this ferment of mind was entirely
unobserved by my parents. But when I
formed the belief that it was necessary,
for the success of my practical magic,
that I should hurt myself, and when, as a
matter of fact, I began, in extreme
secrecy, to run pins into my flesh and
bang my joints with books, no one will
be surprised to hear that my Mother's attention was drawn to the fact that I was
looking 'delicate'. The notice nowadays
universally given to the hygienic rules of
life was rare fifty years ago and among
deeply religious people, in particular,
fatalistic views of disease prevailed. If
any one was ill, it showed that 'the Lord's
hand was extended in chastisement', and
much prayer was poured forth in order
that It might be explained to the sufferer,
:or to his relations, in what he or they had
·_sinned. People would, for instance, go
: on living , over a cess-pool, working
themselves up into an agony to discover
how they had incurred the displeasure of
the Lord, but never moving away. As I
became very pale and nervous, and slept
badly at nights, with visions and loud
screams in my sleep, I was taken to .a
physician who, stripped me and tapped
me all over (this gave me some valuable
hints for my magical practices), but
could find nothing the matter. He recommended, - whatever physicians in such
cases always recommend, but
nothing was done. If I was feeble it was
the Lord's Will, and we must acquiesce.
It culminated in a sort of fit of
hysterics, when I lost all self-control, and

sobbed with tears, and banged my head
on the table. While this was proceeding, I
was conscious of that dual individuality
of which I have already spoken, since
while one part of me gave way, and
could not resist, the other part in some
extraordinary sense seemed standing
aloof, much impressed. I was alone with
my Father when this crisis suddenly occurred, and I was interested to see that
he was greatly alarmed. It was a very
long time since we had spent a day out
of London, and I said, on being coaxed
back to calmness, that I wanted 'to go into the country'. Like the dying Falstaff, I
babbled of green fields. My Father, after
a little reflection, proposed to take me to
Primrose Hill. I had never heard of the
place, and names have always appealed
directly to my imagination. I was in the
highest degree delighted, and could
hardly restrain my impatience. As soon
as possible we set forth westward, my
hand in my Father's, with the liveliest anticipations. I expected to see a mountain
absolutely carpeted with primroses, a
terrestrial galaxy like that which covered
the hill that led up to Montgomery Castle in Donne's poem. But at length, as we
walked from the Chalk Farm direction, a
miserable acclivity stole into view - surrounded, even in those days, on most
sides by houses, with its grass worn to
the buff by millions of boots, and
resembling what I meant by 'the country'
about as much as Poplar resembles
Paradise. We sat down on a bench at its
inglorious summit, whereupon l burst into tears, and in a heart-rending whisper
sobbed, 'Ohl Pappa, let us go home!'
This was the lachrymose epoch in a
career not otherwise given to weeping,
for I must tell one more tale of tears.
About this time, - the autumn of 1855,
- my parents were disturbed more than
once in the twilight, after I had been put
to bed, by shrieks from my crib. They
would rush up to my side, and find me in
great distress, but would be unable to
discover the cause of it. The fact was that
I was half beside myself with ghostly
fears, increased and pointed by the fact
that there had been some daring
burglaries on our street. Our servantmaid, who slept at the top of the house,
had seen, or thought she saw, upon a
moonlight night, the figure of a
crouching man, silhouetted against the
sky, slip down from the roof and leap into her room. She screamed, and he fled
away. Moreover, as if this were not
enough for my tender nerves, there had
been committed a horrid murder, at a
baker's shop just round the corner in the
Caledonian Road, to which murder actuality was given to us by the fact that
my Mother had been 'just thinking' of
getting her bread from this
shop.Children, I think, were not spared
the details of these affairs fifty years ago;
at least, I was not, and my nerves were a
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packet of spilikins.
But what made me scream o' nights
was that when my Mother had tucked me
up in bed and had heard me say my
prayer, and had prayed aloud on her
knees at my side, and had stolen downstairs, noises immediately began in the
room. There was a rustling of clothes,
and a slapping of hands, and a gurgling,
and a sniffing, and a trotting. These horrible muffled sounds would go on, and
die away, and be resumed; I would pray
very fervently to God to save me from
my enemies; and sometimes I would go
to sleep. But on other occasions, my
faith and fortitude alike gave way, and I
screamed, 'Mama! Mama!' Then would
my parents come bounding up the stairs,
and comfort me, and kiss me, and assure
me it was nothing. And nothing it was
while they were there, but no sooner had
they gone than the ghostly riot recommenced. It was at last discovered by my
Mother that the whole mischief was due
to a card of framed texts, fastened by
one nail to the wall; this did nothing
when the bedroom door was shut, but
when it was left open (in order that my
parents might hear me call), the card
began to gallop in the draught, and
made the most intolerable noises.

" ••• my Mother
was much baffled
by the logic
of my argument."
Several things tended at this time to
alienate my conscience from the line
which my Father had so rigidly traced
for it. The question of the efficacy of
prayer, which has puzzled wiser heads
than mine was, began to trouble me. It
was Insisted on in our household that if
anything was 4esired, you should not, as
my Mother said, 'lose any time in seeking for it, but ask God to guide you to it'.
In many junctures of life this is precisely
what, in sober fact, they did. I will not
dwell here on their theories, which my
Mother put forth, with unflinching
directness, in her published writings. But
I found that a deifference was made be·
tween my privileges in this matter and
theirs, and this led to many discussions.
My parents said: 'Whatever you need, tell
Him and He will grant it, if it is His will.'
Very well; I had need of a large painted
humming-top which I had seen in a shopwindow in the Caledonian Road. Accordingly, I introduced a supplication for
this object into my evening prayer,
carefully adding the words: 'If it is Thy
will.' This, I recollect, placed my Mother
in a dilemma, and she consulted my
Father. Taken, I suppose, at a disadvantage, my Father told me I must not pray
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for 'things like that'. To which l answered
by another query, 'Why?' And I added
that he said we ought to pray for things
we needed, and that I needed the
humming-top a great deal more than I
did the conversion of the heathen or the
restitution of Jerusalem to the Jews, two
objects of my nightly supplication which
left me very cold.
I have reason to believe, looking back
upon this scene, conducted by candlelight in the front parlour, that my Mother
was much baffled by the logic of my
argument. She had gone so far as to say
publicly that no 'things or circumstances
are too insignificant to bring before the
God of the whole earth'. I persisted that
this covered the case of the hummingtop, which was extremely significant to
me. I noticed that she held aloof from
the discussion, which was carried on
with some show of annoyance by my
Father. He had never gone quite so far as
she did in regard to this question of praying for material things. I am not sure that
she was convinced that I ought to have
been checked; but he could not help seeing that it reduced their favourite theory
to an absurdity for a small child to exercise the. privilege. He ceased to argue,
and told me preemptorily that it was not
right for me to pray for things like
humming-tops, and that 1 must do it no
more. His authority, of course, was paramount, and I yielded; but my faith in the
efficacy of prayer was a good deal
shaken. The fatal suspicion had crossed
my mind that the reason why I was not to
pray for the top was because it was too
expensive for my parents to buy, that being the usual excuse for not getting this I
wished for.
It was about the date of my sixth birthday that I did something very naughty,
some act of direct disobedience, for
which my Father, after a solemn sermon,
chastised me, sacrificially, by giving me
several cuts with a cane. This action was
justified, as everything he did was
justified, by reference to Scripture 'Spare the rod and spoil the child'. I sup·
pose that there are some children, of a
sullen and lymphatic temperament, who
are smartened up and made more wideawake by a whipping. It is largely a matter of convention, the exercise being endured (I am told) with pride by the infants of our aristocracy, but not
tolerated by the lower classes. I am
afraid that I proved my inherent vulgarity by being made, not contrite or humble, but furiously angry by this caning. I
cannot account for the flame of rage
which it awakened in my bosom. My
dear, excellent Father had beaten me,
not very severely, without ill-temper, and
with the most genuine desire to improve
me. But he was not well-advised
especially so far as the 'dedication to the
Lord's service' was concerned. This
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same 'dedication' had ministered to my
vanity, and there are some natures which
are not improved by being humiliated. I
have to confess with shame that I went
about the house for some days with a
murderous hatred of my Father locked
within my bosom. He did not suspect
that the chastisement had not been
wholly efficacious, and he bore me no
malice; so that after a while, I forgot and
thus forgave him. But I do not regard
physical punishment as a wise element
in the education of proud and sensitive
children.
My theological misdeeds culminated,
however, in an act so puerile and preposterous that I should not venture to record
it if it did not throw some glimmering of
light on the subject which I have proposed to myself in writing these pages. My
mind continued to dwell on the mysterious question of prayer. It puzzled me
greatly to know why, if we were God's
children, and if he was watching over us
by night and day, we might not supplicate for toys and sweets and smart clothes
as well as for the conversion of the
heathen. Just at this juncture, we had a
special service at the Room, at which our
attention was particularly called to what
we always spoke of as 'the field of mis·
sionary labour'. The East was represent·
ed among 'the saints' by an excellent
Irish peer, who had, in his early youth,
converted and married a lady of colour;
this Asiatic shared in our Sunday morn·
ing meetings, and was an object of helpless terror to me; I shrank from her
amiable caresses, and vaguely identified
her with a personage much spoken of in
our family circle, the 'Personal Devil'.
All these matters drew my thoughts to
the subject of idolatry, which was severely censured at the missionary meeting. I
cross-examined my Father very closely
as to the nature of this sin, and pinned
him down to the categorical statement
that idolatry consisted in praying to any
one or anything but God himself. Wood
and stone, in the words of the hymn,
were peculiarly liable to be bowed down
to by the heathen in their blindness. I
pressed my Father further on this subject, ·and he assured me that God would
be very angry, and would signify His
anger if anyone, in a Christian country,
bowed down to wood and stone. I cannot
recall why I was so pertinacious on this
subject, but I remember that my Father
became a little restive under my crossexamination. I determined, however, to
test the matter for myself, and one morning, when both my parents were safely
out of the house, I prepared for the great
act of heresy. I was in the morning-room
on the ground~floor, where, with much
labour, I hoisted a small chair on to the
table close to the window. My heart was
now beating as if it would leap out of my
side, but I pursued my experiment. I

knelt down on the carpet in front of the
table and looking up I said my daily
prayer in a loud voice, only substituting
the address 'O Chair!' for the habitual
one.

" ... if I could only find
the key. I laboured for
hours in search of these
formulas, thinking to
compass my ends by
means absolutely irraI ... "
.
t 1ona
Having carried this act of idolatry safely through, I waited to see what would
happen. It was a fine day, and I gazed up
at the slip of white sky above the houses
opposite, and I expected something to
appear in it. God would certainly exhibit
his anger in some terrible form, and
would chastise my impious and wilful action. I was very much alarmed, but still
more excited; I breathed the high, sharp
air of defiance. But nothing happened;
there was not a cloud in the sky, not an
unusual sound in the street. Presently I
was quite sure that nothing would happen. I had committed idolatry, flagrantly
and deliberately, and God did not care.
The result of this ridiculous act was
not to make me question the existence
and power of God; those were forces
which I did not dream of ignoring. But
what it did was to lessen still further my
confidence in my Father's knowledge of
the Divine mind. My Father had said,
positively, that if I worshipped a thing
made of wood, God would manifest his
anger. I had then worshipped a chair,
made (or partly made) of wood, and Godhad made no sign whatever. My father,
therefore, was npt really acquainted with
the Divine practice in cases of idolatry.
And with that, dismissing the subject, I
dived again into the unplumbed depths
of the Penny Cyclopaedia.

" ... philosophy may even
be defined as the general
theory of education."
-John Dewey
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ecent interest in the educational possibilities of philosophy as an elementary school subject suggests that attention should be given to what this curious
innovation must presuppose. Exploration of such presuppositions might in
turn throw new light on the always
murky connections between education
and philosophy.
In the past, discussions about philosophy for young people have assumed that
the students would be no younger than
of secondary school age. The prospect
of encouraging 1philosophical reflection
among elementary school children was
literally unthinkable.
Such discussions have further tended
to assume that the difficulties hitherto
experienced in presenting philosophy to
young people lay in the inherent complexity of the subject, to say nothing of
an abstractness which made it much too
dreary and forbidding for children. Consequently, efforts to introduce philosophy to young people were limited to
seeking ways of making the subject
simpler and more palatable. But of
course one can go only so far in that direction, and so it was assumed that one
should concentrate upon providing philosophical enrichment to the concluding
secondary school years of some of the
brighter students~
These presuppositions were of course
part and parcel of an older theory of education, for which the learning process
consisted in nothing more than the
transmission of the contents of human
knowledge from the old to the young,

much as a parent bird might drop bits of
food into the yawning mquths of its offspring. The alternative theory of education - that more or less taken for granted by proponents of philosophy for
children - has it that the educational
process must generate thinking activit·
ies among those so taught. Accordingly,
it is presumed that as the proper teaching of history generates historical thinking and the proper teaching of mathematics generates mathematical thinking, so the proper teaching of philosophy must generate philosophical thinking, regardless of the age of the students. It is characteristic of this approach
to assume that philosophical thinking
involves a manifest facility in manipulating philosophical concepts so as to be
able to take them apart and put them together in new ways.
Those who contend that philosophy
for children is capable of encouraging
philosophical thinking generally express
assurance that virtually all children have
both the interest and the ability to engage in such activity. Our traditional reluctance to discuss matters philosophical with children is the product of our reliance upon an archaic theory of education. Having observed few children eager
to browse through Kant or even to peruse the livelier passages of Aristotle,
having met with little success in our efforts to convey directly the impact and
urgency of the greatest happiness principle, we have been led to· draw the irresistible inference that there is an unbridgeable chasm between the disciplin-

ed reflection which is philosophy and the
unbridled wondering characteristic of
childhood. It is clear that the plausibility
of this inference is now under attack.

"Like the pre-Socratics,
children tend to be terse.
But in the animated
classroom· dialogues in
which children love to
participate, such
economies of phrasing
add a welcome sparkle
to the discussion."
Underlying the newer approach is the
notion that there are ways of engaging
children in philosophical activities long
before they are competent to read anything in the traditional philosophical
repertoire. The paradoxes of appearance
and reality, permanence and change,
unity and diversity, are enchanting to
them from early childhood, perhaps a
decade or two before they are prepared
to tackle Heraclitus or Parmenides. Like
the pre-Socratics, children tend to be
terse. But in the animated classroom
dialogues in which children love to par·
ticipate, such economies of phrasing
add a welcome sparkle to the discussion.
Children for whom the formal presentations of philosophy are anathema may
find hints of the same ideas entrancing
when embedded in the vehicle of a child-
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ren's story. Young people who find the
writing of a philosophical essay unthinkable can be induced to express philosophical notions in verse form with little
apparent reluctance.
If one educational premise that philosophy for children takes for granted is
that there is a clear distinction between
thinking about a subject and thinking In
a subject, another such premise is that
there is a distinction, although one that
is not so easily demarcated, between
thinking and thinking for oneself. Since
the latter is an instance of the former, it
is subject no less than the former to ap·
praisal in terms of logical criteria. But if
one of the things thinking in its broader
sense entails is figuring out what follows
from premises, then thinking for oneself
involves inferring what follows from
one's own premises. Thinking for oneself implies the intensified focus upon
the child's own interests and point of
view which is a prerequisite for present·
ing philosophy to children in an appealing fashion. It enables one to work out
one's own beliefs and discover good
reasons for their justification; to figure
out what follows from one's own
assumptions; to hammer out in one's
mind one's own perspective on the
world; and to be clear about one's own
values, one's own distinctive ways of interpretin~ one's experience. Philosophy
for children does not assume that thinking for oneself, because it i. thinking
that is relevantly applied, needs any
greater emphasis than one would give to
encouraging children to acquire more
general sorts of reasoning skills. But certainly, in the case of children, it does not
require any lesser emphasis.

" ... shared inquiry comes
to be seen as the positive
counterpart of thinking
for oneself."
Philosophy for children can be expected to flourish in a heterogeneous
classroom where students speak out of a
variety of life styles and experiences,
where different beliefs as to what is important are explicit, and where a plurality of thinking styles, rather than being
deprecated, is considered inherently
worthwhile. The slow thinker with the
sound argument is accorded no less respect in the philosophy classroom than
children who present their views quickly
and articulately. The child who arrives at
beliefs analytically is respected neither
more nor less than the child who arrives
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at beliefs intuitively and speculatively,
although for certain purposes - such as
the justification of beliefs - one intellectual style may be preferable to
another. Thus the variety of . thinking
styles in the classroom, coupled with a
variety of backgrounds, values and life
experiences, can contribute significantly
to the creation of a community of inquiry. Furthermore, shared inquiry
comes to be seen as the positive counterpart of thinking for oneself. When
widely different approaches to problems
are openly accepted, then invidious
competition diminishes and the inputs
from the different participants are
welcomed.
One of the greatest obstacles to the
practice of philosophy by children is the
formidable terminology of the tradition.
To engage in philosophical activity as a
college undergraduate or graduate student is to learn to operate with a technical
vocabulary sanctioned by 2500 years of
usage. The prestige and power of that
vocabulary are quite overwhelming.
They certainly suffice to intimidate any
child happening to venture between the
covers of a philosophy book. For this
very reason, philosophy for children re·
quires the by-passing of that vocabulary.
As nearly as possible, philosophical
thinking among children should be en·
couraged to take place in the terms and
concepts of the ordinary language with
which children are comfortable.

for its instrumental merits, while others
perceive its valµe to be intrinsic, insisting that it be introduced and retained
as a separate subject within the revised
curriculum.

"Children who have been
taught to be systematically inquisitive and
reflective naturally tend
to import such behavior
into the remainder of
their learning activities."
There is really no need to choose between these two meritorious approaches,
since they are not incompatible with one
another. Those who have taught phil·
osophy as a separate and distinct discipline to children have noted that it almost inevitably spills over into other disciplines. Children who have been taught
to be systematically inquisitive and reflective naturally tend to import such behavior into the remainder of their learning activities. Any inquiry into the presuppositions of philosophy for children
would do well. to consider the justifica·
tion of both of these approaches. But the
approach that is the more seriously
threatened, and hence in greater need of
defending arguments, is the one which
seeks to retain philosophy, even in the

" .. as nearly as possible, philosophical thinking
among children should be encourged to take place
in the terms and concepts of the ordinary language
with which children are comfortable."
It is not uncommon for proponents of
a new approach to find themselves in
something of a quandary as to the identification of the tasks to be done and the
priorities to be assigned to each task. In
the case of the educational innovation
known as philosophy for children, per·
plexities of this kind are fairly prevalent.
An example is the tension between those
who are concerned to preserve the integrity of philosophy as a discipline, regardless of the ages of the students, and
those for whom the value of philosophy
is to be found in its intensifying the reflective dimension of the existing curriculum. The latter proponents contend
that children need to be encouraged to
be more thoughtful and more critical in
their approach to history, political science, mathematics, language arts and
the like. They therefore prize philosophy

elementary school, as an integral
discipline.
Every discipline possesses a consummatory aspect - an aspect in which its
materials are apprehended and enjoyed
for their own sake. Thus if the intrinsic
values of architecture - the delights to
be found in the various possible arrange·
ments of volumes in space - were not
taught in a discipline having its own integrity, the instrumental and utilitarian
values of architecture would be jeopard·
ized, and would have far less impact
upon our lives. So it is with the teaching
of philosophy. Children's philosophical
practice may take many forms: there is
the play of ideas which is sometimes
casual and spontaneous, at other times
studied and architectonic. But whatever
the specific form their philosophical activity may take, not to encourage them
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to work with ideas and to cherish them
for their own sake is to be educationally
irresponsible.
Among those who emphasize the in·
strumental function of philosophy, there
are some who contend that philosophy
for children can result in enhanced academic achievement in a wide range of
disciplines. Whether or not this contention is correct is dependent upon suitable educational experimentation and
measurement. Such research in the
humanities has seemed to many people
inappropriate. Thus it has been argued,
in some instances very properly, that
humanistic studies should not be compelled to justify themselves by virtue of
empirical evidence that they promote
academic improvement. Literature, for
example, should not have to justify itself
by showing that its study results in better
grades in social science or mathematics.
One might well make the same case for
philosophy: it is a humanistic subject
whose acquisition represents an enrichment that needs no other justification.
But this argument is not likely to be
persuasive to the vast majority of school
administrators who must make the actual decisions as to which new courses to
introduce and which to cut back. If philosophy Is to be admitted into the curriculum under present-day conditions, it
will succeed in doing so only if it can
demonstrate to those who run the
schools that it can make a significant dif·
ference in the child's overall performance. What effect does the study of
philosophy have upon reading proficiency, upon reasoning, upon creativity?
What changes, if any, does it produce in
attitudes towards oneself, toward one's
going to school, and toward one's classmates? Unless some such results are
available, and unless they are of substantial importance, one should not have any
illusions about the readiness of educational administrators to bring philosophy into the classroom.

towards one another, and of children
and teachers towards one another), and
an absence of indoctrination. Since
these conditions are intrinsic to philosophy itself, part of its very nature, as it
were, it is not surprising that, the
classroom should become a community
of inquiry whenever it serves as an arena
for the effective encouragement of
children's philosophical reflection.
This is not to say that philosophy for
children entails an equalizing of the
status of teacher and students. In the
normal course of philosophical inquiry,
such as in a classroom dialogue, the
teacher may be presumed to possess
authority with regard to the techniques
and procedures by which such inquiry is
to be prosecuted. It is the teacher's
responsibility to assure that proper procedures are being followed. But with
respect to the give-and-take of philosophical discussion, the teacher must be
open to the variety of views implicit
among the students. The students must
be urged by the teacher to make such
views explicit, and to seek out their
foundations and implications. What the
teacher- must certainly abstain from is
any effort to abort the children's thinking before they have had a chance to see
where their own ideas might lead.
Manipulation of the discussion so as to
bring the children to adopt the teacher's
personal convictions is Ii kewise
reprehensible.
That children should be encouraged
to think for themselves and that teachers
should be open to a variety of viewpoints
may strike some educators as mischievously abetting a reflective relativism
even more deleterious and subversive
than a mindless relativism. Under the
banner of 'pluralism', it may be contended, the convergence of views is precluded, agreement and assent are ruled out,
and intellectual diversity becomes the
order of the day. But this ignores the
presupposition of the practice of philos-
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teacher's readiness to encourage intellectual variety is balanced by a consistent emphasis upon the common practice of the procedures of inquiry.
Teachers have a responsibility to see
to it that their pupils have the means, in
the course of a philosophical discussion,
to defend themselves. Thus one justification for teaching logic, other than to
compel children to think rigorously
themselves, is that it enables them to
compel their opponents to think rigorously as well. The same may be said for
making available to children an armory
of philosophical concepts: one insures
thereby that they do not become helpless pawns when in discussion with other
children possessing superior rhetorical
or logical ability. For example, suppose
a teacher in the classroom is confronted
with a suggestion which none of the
students opposes - that the metaphysical issue under discussion be 'decided'
by a vote. There would seem to be good
reason in such a case for the teacher to
question the appropriateness of such a
procedure when applied to philosophical
matters in contrast to political issues. In
short, where student dialogue fails to
materialize, the teacher may be compelled to intervene, by introducing philosophically relevant considerations, so as
to safeguard the integrity of inquiry.
Such an instructional performance obviously demands considerable skill and
astuteness, and it is a reasonable question whether existing elementary school
teachers can be entrusted with such responsibility. The answer is that with rare
exceptions they cannot. Without appropriate training most teachers cannot be
entrusted to deal with the rigors of logic,
or the sensitive issues of ethics, or the
complexities of metaphysics. This is not
to say, however, that teachers cannot be
educated to handle such issues appropriately at the level at which they teach.
The problem is not that teachers-intraining lack the intellectual potential

"When children are encouraged to think philosophically, the classroom is
converted into a community of inquiry. Such a community is committed
to the procedures of inquiry, to responsible search techniques which
presuppose an openness to evidence and to reason. It is assumed that
these procedures of the community, when internalized,
become the reflective habits of the individual."
The construction of a community of
inquiry is a more substantial achievement than the mere contrivance of an
open environment. Certain conditions
are prerequisites: the readiness to
reason, mutual respect (of children

ophy that dissent is a right, not an obligation. Certainly the right to disagree is
no greater than the right to agree, and
the right to pursue unanimity is to be
respected no less than the right to pursue intellectual diversity. Moreover, the

which would convert them into effective
teachers of philosophy in the elementary
school classroom. It is rather that existing teacher-training programs completely fail to prepare the teacher for this responsibility. For example, teachers are
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sometimes provided with courses in
philosophy of education. On rare occasions they may even take a course in log·
ic or philosophy. But such courses by
themselves are worthless when it becomes a matter of preparing the teacher
to encourage children to think philosophically. A college-level course in phil·
osophy does not equip the teacher to
translate the concepts and terminology
of philosophy into a presentation which
children will understand. Unless teachers are trained by means of identical in·
structional approaches as those which
they will be expected to utilize in their
own classrooms, their preparation will
be a failure. If teachers are expected to
conduct dialogues, then they must be
provided with opportunities to engage in
philosophical dialogues themselves and
exposed to models who know how to facilitate discussions in a philosophical
manner. If teachers are expected to elicit
questioning behavior on the part of their
students, then they must be taught by
educators who themselves model such
behavior in the teacher-training sessions. If teachers are expected to teach
children how to reason, then they must
be given practice in reasoning such as
they will expect of their students. And
needless to say, teachers in training
must be encouraged to respect the procedures of inquiry if they are to induce
their students to care about such procedures.
It is likewise evident that for effective
classroom teaching, the basic cur·
riculum in which the teachers themselves are trained should n.ot be substantially different from the curriculum material they will employ in the elementary
school. This is not to say that teachers
are not be be trained in greater depth
than the children. Nuances and complexities of logic and philosophy can be
explored more fully with the teacher, although in most situations these are not
likely to come up explicitly in the classroom. But if the teacher is not familiariz·
ed in the training process with those materials, whatever they are, which will be
used to encourage philosophical think·
ing among children, then again the problem of translation is placed wholly
upon the shoulders of the teacher, and it
is a burden no teacher should be asked
to support.
It would be very difficult to eonstruct a
philosophy program for children without
a moral education component, since
questions of value are so frequently encountered in other aspects of philosophy
and are of such importance to children.
On the other hand, if it is to be included,
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it would be difficult to define it otherwise
than as ethical inquiry. Students must
not only be encouraged to express their
beleifs as to what they consider import·
ant, but to discuss and analyze them,
considering the reasons for and against
holding them, until they can arrive at reflective value judgments which are more
firmly founded and defensible than their
original preferences may have been.
Such inquiry necessarily will involve
students in examining the criteria
employed in favoring one value over another, and can even lead to children's in·
vestigating the criteria by which criteria
themselves are selected. Giving children
practice in determining the grounds on
which some reasons are to be preferred
over other reasons in justifying moral
beliefs, training them to recognize in·
consistencies in argument and getting
them to see the relationships between
theory and practice are likely to be of
considerably more value than exposing
children to the traditional schools of
ethics which are taught in courses for
adults.

" ... the key concepts of
ethics can no more be
grasped by children
without the assistance of
philosophical interpretation than they can be
grasped at
the adult level ••• "
We have said that philosophy without
ethics cannot readily be taught. Conversely, the supposition that moral
education can be taught without expos- ·
ing th~ child to other branches of philosophy is even more dubious. Ethical in·
quiry necessarily involves logical
considerations such as the concept of a
person or a community. aesthetic considerations such as part-whole relationships, as well as a whole range of
epistemological considerations. Children, to all of whom the playing of games
comes very easily, can be helped in a
philosophical classroom to see the
similarities and differences between the

ways rules function in a game and the
ways they are supposed to apply to
moral conduct. Children's moral imagin·
ation may be fired by tales of saints and
heroes, but if we are going to expect
them to engage in moral conduct in a
reflective and responsible fashion they
are going to have to have some degree
of philosophical understanding as to
what sainthood and heroism are about.
In short, the key concepts of ethics can
no more be grasped by the child without
the assistance of philosophical interpretation than they can be grasped at the
adult level.
Our discussion concerning the
presuppositions of philosophy for
children has made no mention of the
types of social settings that would be a
prerequisite to the success of the program in elementary schools, as contrasted with those types that might dispose it to failure. Those who are venturesome enough to initiate such a program
would do well to acquaint themselves in
advance with the values and expectations of the community in which the program is being introduced. Philosophy
presupposes a commitment to open inquiry, and · such inquiry might or might
not be welcome in certain areas. It can
be contended, of course, that this is a
good reason to expect the spread of philosophy for children to be extremely
limited. But this is largely a matter of
timing in educational innovation. A
district with strong conventional values
might not be the best place to initiate a
program whose supporters cannot show
a solid record of improved academic
performance. On the other hand, once
one can demonstrate the academic
benefits from the program and can allay
parental fears that philosophy will aggravate parent-child tensions or undermine parental values, the problem of introduction of such a program into
elementary schools becomes much less
formidable. Let the case of the hard·
nosed administrator or parent be admit·
ted: if philosophy for children is not
good education, it has no place in the
schools. The burden of proof is then
shifted to the program itself to demon·
strate the differences it can make in the
students to whom it is taught.

"Thus one justification for teaching logic, other
than to comp.el children to think r~gorously themselves, is that it enables them to compel their
opponents ·to think rigorously as well."
Reprinted from Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 4, No.

t, 1978
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I

n this brief note I wish to call attention
to three (amongst many) things which
seem to me prerequisite for anything
seriously to be described as teaching or
learning philosophy - that is, in any
even moderately institutionalised way:
for instance, in schools, or any other
place in which educators have to form a
coherent policy. They are conceptual
rather than empirical prerequisites: that
is, a full and adequate logical analysis of
some such phrase as 'a coherent educational policy for the learning/teaching of
philosophy in schools' would, I think, be
seen to entail these prerequisites. I shall
not, however, attempt such a full explication (a very long job), but rely rather on
the reader's own conceptual competence.
The issues are worth raising, because
(in my experience at least) not only are
these three features not generally seen
as necessary, but also (a) their necessity
is not commonly discussed in any clear
and overt way, and - worse - (b) done
on the (perhaps unconscious) assumption that they are not necessary at all. If I
am anywhere near right, that means that
at least a great deal of time is being
wasted, and that we are perhaps persuaded that people are learning philosophy when they are not.

1. Agreement about what philosophy Is
- No serious person of course thinks
that the word 'philosophy' must, by
some natural law, stand for some one
enterprise. Nevertheless, if we are going
to set philosophy before pupils as
something to learn, we at least - and,
presumably, they too at a pretty early
stage must have a fairly clear
understanding of some one enterprise,
or more than one, with the title
'philosophy'. By a 'clear understanding' I
mean at least that we must be able to
Identify the discipline or form of
thought: distinguish it from other types
of thinking: state the criteria of success
that govern it, in particular the type of
truth and evidence peculiar to it. Unless
all this penetrates into the mind of the
pupil (presumably having first been in
our minds), it is hard - I think impossible - to see how he could pursue the
subject in any serious way. How could he
tell whether he was doing it well or badly, getting things right or making
mistakes'? How could he know when he
was philosophising as opposed to, say,
moralising or stating facts pr freely
associating or talking in his sleep or
anything else'? The pupil may not be
able to state the nature of philosophy

with articulate exactness, any more than
he can do this with mathematics or
science or history: but we expect at least
the tacit understanding of what kind of
thinking and reasoning is supposed to
go on that we find in these other fields.
In particular, we expect the pupil to show
that he knows (however tacitly) what sort
of remarks are relevant to this particular
form of enquiry.
Having said that, I find that I mind
more about this as a general principle
than about what enterprise we agree to
attach to 'philosophy' as a title. However,
if the principle be accepted, I find it hard
to see any other sul generls enterprise
with its own particular standards of
evidence and type of truth except that
which deals with what one might broadly
call conceptual or logical enquiry. If
philosophers are not to be moralists,
empirical scientists, historians, spinners
of myths, poets or anything else that is
already catered for in other forms of
thought, then (so far as I can see) they
have to take on the peculiar job of showing how concepts are interconnected,
what can intelligibly be said and what
cannot, what is necessarily or logically
true and what false. The rules and standards for this enquiry, fairly widely prac-
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tised for some time in many countries
and going back to Socrates, should not
need elaboration here. Nor should it
need to be said that the connections of
this enquiry with formal logic, if they exist at all, are tenuous: very few of our
concepts fit naturally into formal logic
and most of the tangles we get into with
them are not immediately to be solved
by formal means. If we must choose contemporary or near-contemporary folkheroes for this, one might mention Ayer,
or Austin, or Wittgenstein or Hare: but
Socrates is a better example, if only
because no one can accuse him of being
an 'Oxford linguistic analyst' (whatever
that is). Socrates was simply trying to get
clear what we mean and imply when we
say certain things. Just how great a practical importance this has can also be
seen in that example: we have merely to
read Plato.
2. Acceptance of authorities - This
prerequisite, largely neglected because
unfashionable ('undemocratic'?), is
probably a logical corollary of the first.
In being clear about what counts as successful engagement in any enterprise,
we would also be clear about who are
amongst those most successful, whether
in the present or the past. Any serious
student will wish to seek these out, try to
learn from their success, and in some
degree imitate them: not of course slavishly, and not accepting what they say as
necessarily right, but appreciating that
they wield the discipline better than he
does. Without this sort of opportunity, it
is hard to see how - in practice - a stu·
dent could learn: any more than he
could learn science without being
brought up against the experiments and
thinking of those who already think as
effective scientists. He would have
nothing to hang on to or look up to or
take as even an illustration of what his
own thinking ought to be.
Educationalists have been fearful of
reducing disciplines to slavish copying
('Take down the following six points
from Professor X about free will and
reproduce them in your next essay'); and
in this state of terror have tended to
slacken or abolish not only any serious
kind of examinations or formal assessment, but also any solid belief in the existence of authority (in this broad sense),
or ~ertise. Of course philosophy is
not like learning one's tables: but it is
like something, something which has
standards and experts and mistakes and
getting it right, and can be examined (or,
if 'examine' is terrifying, let us say 'assessed' or 'verified' or 'checked up on'). (Indeed, it is part of the concept of being a
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serious teacher and learner that one
wants such check-ups: how otherwise
would one know how well one was doing?)
Particularly with new curricular subjects, introduced when this fashion or
loss of nerve is at a high level, educators
tend under the banner of such terms as
'liberal', 'democratic', or even (alas)
'thinking for oneself' to renounce any at·
tempt to make the child confront excellence and measure himself against it.
The assumption is that if we pay enough
attention to the child, he will somehow
find himself developing powers of serious philosophical thought out of a
morass of discussion, 'stimulating encounters', controversial issues, public
problems, 'critical thinking' and so forth.
The alternative tactic of making the
chi Id pay attention to the dlsclpllne,
philosophy, as something external to
himself, rather difficult but also absorbing, something which is not there just to
be tacked on to his own particular in·
terests and prejudices, but is a rather
stern taskmaster - this alternative is
rarely even considered. No doubt some
element of both is required. But a glance
at almost any of the more recent materi·
als ('kits' or 'packs': textbooks are regarded as hopelessly old-fashioned) will
show, I think, how heavily the pendulum
has swung in the former direction.
3. Respect for natural language - If
"philosophy' is at least to include, if not
wholly consist of, gett!ng clear about
what we mean and imply, it seems
necessary that the student must have
some competence in a natural language,
and some respect for it, before we can
even get going. This sounds easy; in fact
there are comparatively few people (and
at times their numbr seems to be
diminishing) of whom it is true.
Philosophers may be (properly) contemptuous of the almost unbelievable
rubbish and nonsense, for which 'jargon'
is too kind a word, which appear in
psychology, the social sciences, political
theory and elsewhere: but the fact is that
this linguistic practice has infected
natural language - particularly perhaps
English - to a remarkable degree. Even
'ordinary conversations', to which one
might have in the past reliably referred
in order to give some content to the idea
of 'what we would normally mean by .. .'.
are now often intolerable high-minded
and jargonized.
In this respect children are, perhaps,
comparatively uncorrupted. But of
course they suffer from, because they
imitate, the linguistic practice of their
elders; and I am not at all clear that

much attempt is made to improve this in
any respect which would help their philosophising. The fashion, again, is for
something other than precision and
clarity: for 'open-endedness', or 'creative
writing', or whatever, rather than for the
kind of training that was achieved, if only per accldens, by the close study of
classical texts in Latin and Greek, the exact if not imaginative rendering of
English passages into those languages,
and (one might say) the classical
tradition in general, now replaced by a
Rousseauesque romanticism. Of course
it is right to emphasise linguistic poverty, lack of vocabulary and restricted
powers of self-expression. But the kind
of imagination, as well as the kind of
precision, that philosophy needs is not,
on the whole, nurtured by a romantic
tradition.
These points may suggest (perhaps
particularly the last) that philosophy is
only suitable for a few children of high intelligence and motivation, prepared to
accept authority and able to be trained
in some severe preparatory discipline
such as the classics - in fact (the angry
reader may suppose) for those very few
individuals who may go to private
schools, enter elitist universities, and
perhaps eventually become philosophy
dons. That is not my view: but it is worth
pointing out that it is not very far from
Plato's, though with mathematics in
place of classics. Certainly there is no
reason to believe that philosophy is
easy. But ( 1) no subject or discipline, if
seriously studied, is easy anyway (least
of all enterprises like 'creative writing',
whose vagueness is hardly grounds for
any relaxation of standards), and some
pupils will reach their limits before
others do: and (2) as Plato also saw, the
difficulties of philosophy may be as
much temperamental as strictly intellectual (if that is the right way to make a
distinction: l mean, it is not so much a
matter of high J.Q. as of patience,
seriousness, desire for clarity and other
moral virtues). I see no reason why all
children should not ·be introduced to
philosophy and encouraged to make as
much progress in it as they can: and I
also believe, incidentally, that a universal programme for philosophy is much
more plausible if 'philosophy' is taken
more or less in the sense described
earlier - that is, as the study of the
meanings of words and the implications
of concepts. Anything much more vague
or high-minded - general discussions
about 'society', for instance - would
result in a general floundering.

1

I
1

1
1

I

Thinking, The Journal of Philosophy for Children, Volume 1, Number 2.

" ... I see no reason why
all children should not be
introduced to philosophy
and encouraged to make
as much progress in it
as they can •.. "

Perhaps I might add, since I have been
in the business for some years, that there
is a fairly exact parallel with another new
area, that of moral education. Here too
(1) we need first to agree what is to count
as 'moral education' or 'being educated
in morality': many.things could be done
under this heading which would be boring or disastrous or opposed to each
other. We also need (2) the idea, however
cautiously worked out, that some people
are or could be better at morality more competent moral thinkers or even
agents. - than others: that it is not a
free-for-all, but that there is such a thing
as authority and expertise in this area as
in any other. Even (3), the need to take
language seriously, is far from unimportant (correct and honest descriptions of
the world and other people are crucial
for the moral life).
The sa111e will be found to apply to all,
or almost all, subjects or disciplines or
enterprises into which the educator wishes to initiate children. (The children
must, of course, appropriate them and
take them over: the moral decisions, the
philosophical beliefs, etc. must be
theirs, and not parrotted from teachers
or text-books. This too applies to any
subject or discipline). But these points
are not, in fact, even made (let alone em-

phasised) in materials for children, nor
in the thinking of those who devise such
materials. Try to imagine a serious and
well-disposed child - there must still be
some around - saying something like:
"I've got a fair idea of how to think in
mathematics, science, history and some
other things; now, you propose to get
me to think philosophically. I am prepared to take the importance of this on
trust, but I do need a clear idea of how to
do it. In particular I want to know what
enemies I have to face - what temperamental deficiencies in myself, what
weaknesses in proceeding - and what
counts as a mistake. I want to know how
to get top marks, how to avoid error. Distinguish for.me that which is specific to
philosophy, so that I do not get it muddled up with other things, and tell me what
the rules are."
To take yet another parallel, we (in the
U.K.) have for some decades been
floundering in the realm of religious education ('R.E.'). Most of us no longer
have confidence in selling a particular
creed: but what are we to do instead?
Well, many different things a~e done,
and the number of conferences, books,
governmental suggestions, etc. about it
is very considerable. But we have failed
to answer - because we have failed even seriously to address - the question
"What demarcates the sphere of religion, and what counts as performing well
or badly in that sphere?" Consequently
we give the children no idea of just what
they are supposed to be educated In; and
the school practice in R.E. is often a ragbag of activities, some of which have little or no connection of any kind with
religion. Similar points could be made
about political education, now becoming fashionable in some quarters.
None of this means that I am at all unsympathetic to any - well, almost any
- attempt to do something under these
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various headings. If the political or cultural situation is such that we do not
have the clear agreement we need, no
doubt some less clearly-based enterprise
will at least keep the topic alive: and no
doubt some of the things done under the
heading will be of value. At least, one
might say, the title is on the map: and
perhaps greater clarity will follow later.
Apart from the laudable and (comparatively) large-scale enterprises on the
American continent, there are pockets
of initiative elsewhere: the A Level philosophy papers in the university of Hong
Kong, for instance, which I have had the
privilege of moderating, seem to me a
shining example of clarity. Less clear
(because of political pluralism and uncertainty about what to do with 'philoso·
phy') but also commendable are the
'Theory of Knowledge' papers in the In·
ternational Baccalaureat, in which
students are encouraged to reflect
philosophically on various departments
of knowledge and on subjects they study
at the same time. There are, I am sure,
many other examples.
However, I do not think we should de·
ceive ourselves. The progress of any sub·
ject (think of science at the time of
Galileo) depends essentially on method·
ological clairty. Unless and until we have
a clear idea of how to do the subject, we
inevitably spend much time in simply
beating the air, creating an impression
of activity and progress when we may
simply be in a muddle. Time spent in
decreasing this muddle is time well
spent: better spent, perhaps, than in gen·
erating more activity. In philosophy particularly, it seems essential that teachers
(as well as students) should be clear: and
that means, if my repetition is not too
boring, that they should be clear not so
much about pedagogic techniques or
about materials or techniques, but about
the aims and the methodology.
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In the summer of 19771 was asked to set up
an educational day . camp program at the
Sweeney Police Athletic League center on
Snyder Avenue ln · Brook/yn~ New York. I set
up a philosophy for children program for 40
boys and girls ot .v ariedabllities .between
the ages of B and 14. The .children were
taught philosophy for one hour every morn·
Ing, and In the afternoon they engaged In
recreational activities: . . y ,
In addition to my .dutif!S as .d irector of the
educational program l t~ught .a . group of
children philosophy.during their lunch hour.
This was an enrichment group that was en·
tlrely optional. The children in this group
were of very diverse abilities but they had In
common a strong desire to learn. Since
these children were already reading Harry
Stottlemeler's Discovery .· In . the morning, I
used Lisa for this lunch hour class. What
follows Is a transcript ot a tape from one of
our class meetings:

Miriam Minkowitz

Dl~<!~$si~n. of ~-~))ts

at > ~. gli(!e .· .· . Atb.l~'til~
When the taping session was over and the children had gone

to join the rest of our special education group on tne trip
scheduled for that day, I leaned back in my chair and played
back the tape. This is what I heard Miriam
(Chorus)
Miriam

Miriam
Betty
Miriam

Carole
Miriam
Carole
Miriam
Carole
Miriam
Carole
Miriam
Carole
Miriam
Wayne

-Who loves animals?
-I do! I do!
-What do you think of the kids in the story we are
reading who tease Lisa, saying, "Lisa eats dead
chicken"?
(giggles and laughs)
-Seriously .. · .
-Well, you sure ain't gonna eat it alive! You can't
.. eat it if it's alive!
--You can't eat . it if it's alive; Now in the first
~hapter ofthebook•Lisa mentions that shelC>v~$
to eatmeat. You heard her mention too, that she
:lovesanim~ls. 1$ there any contradiction the~e?
_..;.She says, ''If l love animals, how could I eat ·
them?''
~Now what .do you .think about that?
--11ove animals ...
-You love animals.
-Uh-huh.
-You say you love animals. Do you eat meat?
-Sure.
-You don't think there is a contradiction between
loving animals and eating meat?
-Nope.
-How many of you ever thought about that?
-1 like animals and I don't like to eat meat. I like
vegetables (the word on the tape sounded like
"vegy-tables" in Wayne's We~t Indian lilt).

..

J.. eagge

Miriam
Wayne
Miriam
Wayne
Miriam
Wayne
Miriam

Wayne
Miriam
Lynn
Miriam
Lynn
Mlf'lam
Lynn .
Carole
Carlton
Lynn
(Chorus)
Miriam
Lynn
Carlton
Miriam
(Chorus)
Carlton

-You like vegetables?

-Vegetables are wholesome for you. But my
mother forces me to eat meat.
-Your mother forces you. Why do you suppose she
does that?
-She says that I am a little boy and I have to do
whatever she says.
-She says that since you are a little boy you have
to listen to what she says?
-But when I grow up I can eat whatever I please.
-When you grow up you can eat whatever you
please? You don't like to eat animals?
- That's right.
-Does anybody else feel that way?
-Not me!
·
-You don't feet that way?
-Nol I like to eatchicken.
~You like to eat chicken?
-Yeah! - it tastes good.
-It's good for you.
-1 eat pigeon.
-Ugh! You eat pigeon?
-Oooooh!
-What's ·"oooh" about pigeon soup that's not
"oooh" about chicken soup?
-Chicken soup is better.
-Have you ever tried pigeon soup? Some people
think things are no good before they've even tried
it.
-Most of you here eat meat, is that correct?
-Right!
-1 eat some meat but not other meat.
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Miriam
Carlton
Miriam

Kimberly
Miriam
Betty
Wayne
Miriam
Wayne
Miriam
Rob~rt

Lynn
Betty
Miriam
(Chorus}
Wayne
Carole
Miriam

Lynn
Betty
Carole

Miriam
Carole
Miriam
Carole
Miriam
Carole
Kimberly

Miriam
(Chorus)
Miriam
Robert
Kimberly
Miriam
Carlton
(Chorus)
Miriam
Kimberly
Miriam
Kimberly
Carole
Miriam
Carlton

Miriam

-Why?
-Because it tastes better.
-Let's see. Except for Wayne, all of you like to. eat
meat. That's one, two, three, four, five, six of you
who like to eat meat. And yet all of you say you
love animals. How can that be? Is there any contradiction between loving animals and eating
them?
-No!
-No?
-Maybe people eat animals because they are afraid
if they don't the animals will eat them!
-But some animals help people! People should eat
harmful animals!
-People should eat harmful animals but they
should not eat helpful animals?
-Yes.
-Do any of you think there is a contradiction between loving animals and eating them?
-Yes.
-No.
-Animals are supposed to be eaten.
-Do you think animals were meant to be used. by
people? Is that why there are animals?
-No!
-If I were an. animal I would not want to be eaten
up.
-1 guess if you think about it, it is a sad thing. But
still, we do eat animals.
-Lisa says in the book - "If I loved animals I would
not eat them." Do you think .that's a true state·
ment?
-1 love pork chops!
- That's right! I eat animals because I love t.hem!
Yum yum! Pork chops!
- That's dumb. That's not what Lisa rneans in• the
story. Look - she means .she loves live animals.
Pets.
-Carole do you love animals?
-Yes.
-Yet you eat them?
-Yes.
-Is there a contradiction?
-I don't know.
-There's no contradiction. You love certain
animals, and·those you don't eat, like your pets.
Other animals you do eat.
-Do any of you eat dogs?
-No!
-Why not?
-That's a nasty thought.
-People don't eat dogs. They're pets.
-You eat some animals but you don't eat pets?
-Some people eat dogs.
-Ugh!
-Carleton is pointing out that some people eat
dogs.
-But we don't. Maybe Chinese people do because
maybe they don't keep dogs for pets.
-So you eat animals but you would not eat pets.
Which animals would you eat?
-Animals you are supposed to eat! Lambs and
cows and chickens...
-Animals that we raise special for eating, maybe.
-What about hunting? Should we eat animals that
we hunt· for?
-Sure. Mother Nature makes all kinds of animals.
Some of them were meant to be hunted and eaten
by others. I mean ... oh well. ..
-Please go on. I am very interested in what you are
saying.
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Carlton

Miriam
Carlton
Miriam
Carlton
Robert
Miriam
Robert
Kimberly
Robert

Miriam
(Chorus)
Miriam
Wayne
Lynn
Wayne
Lynn
Wayne
(Chorus)
Carole
Wayne
Miriam
(Chorus)
Lynn
Wayne
Miriam
(Chorus)
Miriam
(Chorus}
Miriam
Kimberly
Miriam
Robert
Betty
Wayne
Kimberly
Miriam

Carlton
Miriam
(Chorus)
Carole
Wayne
Miriam
Carole
Betty
Kimberly

-I love nature. I love to see the birds and the butterflies. And I am sad when I see some animals
eat other animals. But I know that it is Mother
Nature's way.
-Is it Mother Nature's way that some animals prey
on and eat other animals?
-Yes.
-And it makes you sad, but you accept it because
it is Mother Nature's way?
-Yes.
-1 don't think we should hurt animals because
animals have a right to live same as people do.
-Animals have a right to live like we do?
-Animals should not be killed for fun.
-Who kills them for fun?
-We don't have to hunt. We can go to the A&P to
buy our meat. People who hunt are making a
sport of killing God's creatures.
-How many of you agree with Robert that animals
should not be killed just for fun?
-Me! Right!
-What about this - Should animals be killed to
provide food for human beings?
-No! People do not need to eat animals.
-Yes they do! People need protein.
-What about vegetarians?
-But suppose I don't want to bea vegetarian? Suppose I like to .eat animals?
-Suppose some people wanted •to eat other people?

.....:ugh!!!
-A person is more than flesh and bone. A person is
holy and spiritual.
-Maybe animals are spiritual, too.
-Maybe animals are spiritual like people?
-No!
-That's silly.
-Can they not feel hurt as we do?
-How many of you think animals can feel hurt like
we do?
-Me!
-So do you think animals ought to be treated like
humans?
-Yes! No!
-How many of you think that animals have rights?
- They have some rights.
-What rights?
-To raise their children.
-To be free.
- They have the right to eat what they please!
-Animals have the right to kill things that they
need to eat.
- That's very interesting. Animals have the right to
kill things that they need to eat. Do you think
animals have the right to kill humans to eat?
-Crocodiles do.
-Yes, but is that their "right"?
-Yes! No!
-God made human beings to rule the earth.
-Yes, but animals are God's creatures, too.
-Animals are God's creatures too. Is there any dif·
Ference between animals and humans?
-Animals are wild.
-Some people are wild, tool Some people behave
just like animals!
-During the blackout (Kimberly was referring to
the blackout of July 13, 1977 along the Eastern
part of the United States) the people in my neigh·
borhood behaved just like· animals! It was
disgusting!
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Miriam
Robert

Kimberly

Lynn

Robert
Wayne
Robert
Wayne
Robert
Miriam
Robert
Miriam
Lynn
Miriam
Carlton
Wayne
Miriam
Betty
Robert
Carole
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-Some people behave like animals.
-And some animals behave like people. Some
animals are very kind. Once I had a dog who was
so gentle ...
-People are civilized. Some may act like animals,
but they are supposed to be civilized. Animals
are supposed to be wild.
-What's so great about being civilized? Maybe it's
better to be wild. People couldn't survive in the
jungle, and animals can.
- Tarzan can!
- Tarzan isn't a real person!
-Yes he is! I see him on T.V.!
-But he isn't real, man. He is only a character!
-Yeah, and you're some character, too!
-What is the difference between Tarzan and
Wayne?
- Tarzan, he's bigger than Wayne, he's got these
muscles ...
-Any other difference?
- Tarzan's white.
-1 think there's another difference.
- Tarzan's a grown-up.
- Tarzan's just a character in a story!
-Tarzan is just a character in a story, and Wayne is
a real, live boy.
- That's right. There's an actor who plays Tarzan ...
-Well, an actor is a real person ...
-But he's only playing a part, making believe, you
fool!

Kimberly
Robert
Miriam
Kimberly

Robert
Miriam
Betty
Miriam
Kimberly

- There is no real Tarzan. There is only an actor
playing a part.
-But he is a real person. He is a real actor.
-What is the difference between a real actor and a
real Tarzan?
-A real actor is a person who gets paid for making
believe he is somebody else. A real Tarzan would
be somebody who was actually doing all those
things the actor is pretending to do.
-Wasn't there ·ever a real Tarzan?
-1 don't know. But I do know that he is a character
in a story.
-Like Harry Stottlemeier.(The major character in
the philosophical text we were using).
-How are Tarzan and Harry Stottlemeier alike?
-Both are figments of the imagination.

There the tape ended. I sat back, recalling the session with a
mixture of pleasure and pain. I had made a great many errors. I
should have stayed on each topic longer than I did. I should have
tied together some of the loose ends. We had gone far afield indeed. We had raised many more questions and philosophical
problems than I had intended. But there was a great deal of
pleasure, too - pleasure at the responsiveness of the children
to this new method of thinking. I was most especially pleased
when I thought of Carleton Pope, the little boy who had given
such a cogent and coherent argument for the theory of natural
ecology, the same little boy who, at the age of 11 112 could not
read a word!
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